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 PREFACE 
 
Nobody heard him, the dead man, 
But still he lay moaning: 
I was much further out than you thought 
And not waving but drowning. 
 
Poor chap, he always loved larking 
And now he’s dead 
It must have been too cold for him his heart gave way, 
They said. 
 
Oh, no no no, it was too cold always 
(Still the dead one lay moaning) 
I was much too far out all my life 
And not waving but drowning. 
 
 —Stevie Smith, “Not Waving but Drowning” 
 
 
 Stevie Smith’s poem features three intertwined voices in atemporal and 
disembodied relation. The dead man speaks without quotation marks and outside of time. 
He speaks retrospectively, summarizing his life for us and for an unspecified “they.” 
Whoever “they” are—in whatever unspecified past they occupy—they presume to know 
about the meaning of the poor chap’s life and death: “he always loved larking…it must 
have been too cold....” They think they know what the cold did and what the man loved. 
The untimely speaking of the dead man interrupts their presumption. The voice of the 
poet mediates this misunderstanding: as the disembodied “they” and “him” miss each 
other, the poetic voice, in the third person omniscient, erases itself in its own discourse. 
That “Nobody heard him” even though he “lay moaning,” makes the poet the nobody 
who heard him and who now tells us. The poem produces its effects by framing three 
voices that attempt to capture each other across time and death.  
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  We might recognize in the faintly condescending “Poor chap, he always loved 
larking” our own elegiac relation to the dead. Faced with the trauma of absence that a 
dead body inevitably recalls, we struggle to make meaning out of the past events 
seemingly attached to that body. We console ourselves with this new meaning, this 
epitaph. As in the elegiac tradition, we may also console ourselves by suggesting that 
something belonging to the body survives in memory or in an afterlife. But Stevie 
Smith’s poem interrupts the impulse toward consolation when it speaks in the voice of 
the dead man. “Oh, no no no,” the dead man says. The triple “no” scuttles the elegiac 
project, putting the meaning of the poor chap’s life and death back in question. The 
meaning “they” have made of the dead man’s life is spurious. He was never waving. The 
friendly gesture of meeting or departure, the motion that signals our connection to and 
knowledge of each other, never meant that at all. Instead it has only ever meant I’m 
dying. The signs of connection, love and “larking,” have always only anticipated death. 
“It was too cold always.”  
The speaking of the dead threatens disruption and erasure. When the dead speak, 
they question the meanings we make of death itself; they remind us that we value the 
dead by revaluing them. They remind us that we construct the border between the dead 
past and the living present as a defensive bulwark, erecting a consolatory wall that allows 
us to fix past meaning into a form that authorizes our progress into the future. At 
Gettysburg, Abraham Lincoln famously speaks over the bodies of the dead. The words 
are incised on the walls of the Lincoln Memorial: “we highly resolve that these dead shall 
not have died in vain—that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom.” 
“We,” the living, make our resolutions—“we highly resolve”—in the graveyard. We 
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 construct our future perfect—“these dead shall not have died in vain”—in order to 
construct our perfect future, “a new birth of freedom.” One wonders what the dead bodies 
at Lincoln’s feet, the mingled Confederate and Union soldiers, might have said. In 
response to the triumphant meaning Lincoln makes of their mangled corpses, would they 
also have said “Oh, no no no…”? The perennial post-mortem fiction of western culture’s 
wars, that “dulce et decorum est pro patria mori” (it is sweet and proper to die for one’s 
country), is a consolation prize that authorizes an ethic of sacrifice. It is a way of 
speaking for the dead that attempts to turn the pathos of loss into enough patriotic zeal to 
beat back the fear of death. If the already dead were to speak for themselves, they might 
well compromise that project. What if they find death less than sweet? Can death ever be 
decorous for the dead?  
Lincoln’s rhetoric has a venerable history: funeral orations from antiquity have 
made the same kind of case. One of the main uses of poetry in the western tradition, in 
fact, has been to provide such rhetorical consolation and calls to action. In The 
Metamorphoses, Ovid uses the God of poetry himself to show how this works. Ovid’s 
story of Apollo and Daphne begins with a contest between Cupid and Apollo over whose 
arrows work to greater effect. They both claim superiority, but Cupid gets the last word. 
He pierces Apollo with a golden arrow designed to incite love and Daphne with a leaden 
arrow to induce the opposite. As a result, Daphne reviles “the wedding torch as if it were 
a thing of evil” and begs her father, the river god Peneus, to grant her “perpetual 
virginity” (1.484–7). Apollo, struck by love, pursues Daphne, who runs away. In chase, 
Apollo tries to convince her to stop by reciting his credentials. Among other things, he 
tells her that he is the god of prophecy and music: “By me what shall be, has been, and 
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 what is are all revealed; by me the lyre responds in harmony to song” (1.517–18). Ovid 
thus loads these two figures with heavy symbolic weight. In her embrace of virginity and 
rejection of marriage, Daphne rejects futurity itself. This is clear by contrast to Apollo, 
who describes himself as the realization of time—“what shall be, has been, and what 
is”—as well as the force which creates music (i.e. poetry). Inflamed by desire, Apollo 
chases her until she calls on her father to save her by destroying her beauty (1.547). 
Peneus grants Daphne’s wish, transforming her into a laurel tree. The distraught Apollo 
memorializes her: 
Since thou canst not be my bride, thou shalt at least be my tree. My hair, 
my lyre, my quiver shall always be entwined with thee, O laurel. With thee 
shall Roman generals wreathe their heads, when shouts of joy shall 
acclaim their triumph, and long processions climb the Capitol. Thou at 
Augustus’ portals shalt stand a trusty guardian, and keep watch over the 
civic crown of oak which hangs between. And as my head is ever young 
and my locks unshorn, so do thou keep the beauty of thy leaves perpetual. 
(1.557–65) 
 
Here Apollo memorializes Daphne in the language of futurity. The irony is thick, since 
Daphne’s denial of futurity is the motivation for her transformation. Nevertheless, since 
she is now a non-speaking object in place of a person, her own will becomes irrelevant. 
She can be resignified as an eternal marker for both civic and poetic glory. Seemingly in 
response to Apollo’s “paean,” the laurel tree that was Daphne waves its branches. By this 
waving she “seemed to move her head-like top in full consent” (1.567). The tease here 
lies in the suggestion that such leaf shaking only “seemed” (visa est) to be “full consent” 
(adnuit utque). Although in Ovid’s world it is not unthinkable that a plant may have an 
opinion about something, we should take this particular capitulation with some 
skepticism because the reason Daphne is a tree in the first place is that she refused to 
“consent” to Apollo’s advances.  
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  In addition to displaying Ovid’s characteristic irony when it comes to the power 
of poetry, the Apollo and Daphne story betrays the violence inherent in the elegiac 
impulse. Funeral elegy retrospectively affixes meaning to life in an attempt to justify 
death. It is a way of both closing the book on the dead and mitigating mourning in the 
impulse toward memorialized preservation. To torture the famous phrase from Julius 
Caesar, it comes to bury as much as to praise. In the words of the god of poetry, it sutures 
“what shall be, has been, and what is,” guaranteeing the future by revealing the past as 
dead and defining the present against it. Daphne’s ambiguous waving, however, like the 
waving of the poor chap who is either larking or dying, threatens that guarantee by 
putting it in question.  
In the middle of Hamlet, the eponymous Prince famously describes death as “The 
undiscovered country from whose bourn / No traveller returns” (3.1.81–82).1  But his 
current crisis is attributable to the fact that something has returned from the dead, and it 
claims to be his father. As if that were not enough, it demands to be remembered, and it 
has eyes-only revenge instructions for the Prince.2 The half-life phenomenon of the ghost 
betrays the play’s own language of death as leveling cessation, as “bestial oblivion” or 
the “silence” to which Hamlet consigns himself with his last word.3 Death should be a 
relief, a return to the insignificance of dust. That signification will fall into in-
significance is “a consummation / Devoutly to be wished” (3.1.65–66). At last desire will 
end! The ghost, however, denies Hamlet that consolation, torments him with memory and 
                                                 
1 Unless otherwise noted, all citations of Shakespeare in this dissertation follow William Shakespeare: The 
Complete Works, The Oxford Shakespeare, second edition, general editors Stanley Wells and Gary Taylor. 
2 Michael Neill begins his excellent book, Issues of Death, with this citation, and he returns to it later in his 
chapter on Hamlet.    
3 The phrase “bestial oblivion” appears in an extended, Q2 version of 4.4. See “additional passages” p. 717, 
4.4.31. Hamlet’s dying words are “the rest is silence” followed in some editions by “O, O, O, O!” (5.5.310–
11). 
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 desires that outstrip death itself. “Heaven and earth,” Hamlet cries, “must I remember?” 
(1.2.142–43). Describing the apparition in Hamlet , Marjorie Garber asks, “what is a 
ghost?”: 
It is a memory trace. It is the sign of something missing, something 
omitted, something undone. It is itself at once a question, and the sign of 
putting things in question.4  
 
For Hamlet, the ghost remains a question—in question—throughout this hyperbolically 
interrogative play, encumbering the Prince with the terrible burden of memory.  
 Ghosts such as Hamlet’s father represent the past as materially present and 
speaking, somewhere between dead and alive, or perhaps neither dead nor alive. 
Partaking of both presence and absence, revenants and remainders, they are signs of the 
in-between.5 Not quite dead enough themselves, ghosts put death in question. By doing 
so, they return in defiance of the elegiac impulse. It is no accident that in perhaps the 
most famous elegy in literature, Milton’s Lycidas, the poet declares his object dead so 
emphatically. “Lycidas is dead, dead…,” Milton insists. And as if commanding Lycidas 
to stay dead, the poet tells him “now thou art gon / Now thou art gon, and never must 
return!” To imagine the hoped for “tomorrow” with its “fresh woods, and pastures new,” 
the poet must ensure that the body is securely buried without possibility of return.6 When 
the dead refuse to stay dead—when the past materially enters the present as a speaking 
ghost—elegiac consolation fails. 
                                                 
4 Marjorie Garber, Shakespeare’s Ghost Writers, 129. 
5 See Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx, for a discussion of the figure of the ghost in terms of presence and 
absence. 
6 John Milton, “Lycidas,” lines 8, 37–38, and 193. Though Lycidas does seem to possess a post-mortem 
agency as the “Genius” of the Irish sea, this deifies the dead man rather than imagining a bodily return 
capable of answering the poet (183).   
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  In Hamlet, the ghost “waves” the Prince “to a more removed ground” with what 
Marcellus interprets as a “courteous action.”7 As courteous as it may be, Marcellus 
advises the Prince, “do not go with it.” Hamlet, not setting his life at a pin’s fee, follows 
the ghost as it raises its hand again: “It waves me forth again: I’ll follow it.” After some 
dire warnings from Horatio about cliff ledges and madness, Hamlet insists, “It waves me 
still,” and he follows it, do what it will. This is more uncanny waving: what we might 
otherwise read as a friendly gesture, a father waving his son over for a talk, becomes 
strange, baffling, and dangerous. Shakespeare’s ghost, Ovid’s laurel tree, and Stevie 
Smith’s poor chap wave in ghostly unison. These three ambiguous waves haunt one 
another as they haunt us. Unintentional citations, both proleptic and analeptic, these 
waves beckon us toward confrontations with ghosts that unsettle the very meaning we 
make of their conditions of possibility, their deaths. Does following this beckoning 
imply, as Carla Freccero provocatively writes, “a willingness both to be haunted and to 
become ghostly”?8 This question is worth keeping in mind throughout the analyses that 
follow. Recent queer theory questions historicist methodologies that rely on marking the 
difference between past and present. Theorists such as Freccero hold out the promise of a 
disintegration of that difference in a “reciprocal penetrability” that yields a “commingling 
of times as affective and erotic experience” (488–9). The poems I study here enact that 
haunting reciprocity. Yet the ghosts in these poems also help us elaborate on its 
implications. What if the encounter with a ghost, as in Hamlet, inspires not eros but a 
thoroughgoing disgust with sexuality? What if, as is so often the case in revenge tragedy, 
                                                 
7 William Shakespeare, Hamlet, ed. Susanne L. Wofford, 1.4.60–61. The next sentences follow Wofford’s 
edition, 1.4.60–78. In the Oxford Shakespeare, the ghost “wafts” Hamlet “to a more removèd ground” 
(1.4.42) then, Hamlet says, “it waves me forth again” (49), then “it wafts me still” (56). 
8 Carla Freccero, “Queer Times,” 488. See also Carolyn Dinshaw, who embarks on a “project of 
constructing queer histories that are constituted by…affective relations across time…,” 2.  
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 the ghost that haunts us is murderous? What if, as with Daphne, erotic attachment is 
precisely the problem and not the desired result, precisely that which kills and seeks an 
epitaphic alibi? What if the poor chap was never larking, his waving never waving, and 
our desire for friendly contact, for exchange of sympathies or even “mutual 
penetrability,” yet another elegiac rewrite?  
As a figure of “queer” temporality, the ghost holds out to us the promise of 
securing “affective and erotic” identifications across time, yet it calls into question the 
identitarian systems of reference between past and present that it promises to guarantee. 
As a figure of present absence, a ghost, like Lee Edelman’s “queerness,” “can never 
define an identity; it can only ever disturb one.”9 Ghosts call into question the very 
desires that prompt their appearance. Where, then, is pleasure, affective and erotic, if not 
in identification across the difference of time? This question prompts another. If erotic 
and affective pleasures are embodied phenomena, and if the figure of the ghost is a 
disembodied body, how is it that we somebodies take pleasure in its appearance? The 
pleasures of the encounter with the ghost belong neither to the sameness of identification 
nor the difference of disidentification—though they may well belong to the play of 
sameness and difference. Nor do ghostly pleasures reliably belong to stable bodies 
touching across the divide of time—a scenario, were we to imagine it, just as likely to 
yield fearful revulsion as pleasure—though a ghost only appears by reference to a body. 
Rather, the pleasures of the ghostly are textual pleasures, which, as Roland Barthes 
reminds us, are those of “intermittence.”10 “Is not,” Barthes asks, “the most erotic portion 
of a body where the garment gapes?” The absence of the body and our expectation of it 
                                                 
9 Lee Edelman, No Future, 17. 
10 Roland Barthes, The Pleasure of the Text, 9.  
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in the folds of the text, not the body itself, pleasures. Insofar as spectral pleasure can be 
erotic and affective, it manifests, in Barthes’ words, through “the staging of an 
appearance-as-disappearance” (10). Identification with a ghost can only ever be 
interrupted, foiled, glimpsed, guessed at, furtive. And yet, even as the pleasure of 
identification (or indeed, the pleasure of disidentification) teases and tempts us, again the 
ghost will ask with its plaintive waving: whose pleasure? Pleasure for whom, and at 
whose expense?   
Uncannily revivifying the very terms of desire and death so strongly featured in 
the texts he studies, Stephen Greenblatt famously opens Shakespearean Negotiations 
with the sentence, “I began with a desire to speak with the dead.”11 This is what scholars 
such as Freccero might call a queer desire. But understanding this expression from a 
queer perspective means we must ask ourselves if Greenblatt ends by speaking “with” the 
dead, or for them? My work here examines the ghostly effects such desires can produce. 
It details the ways in which sixteenth-century poets have already put into operation 
Greenblatt’s desire and theorized its implications. It traces the slippages among what it 
means to speak with the dead, to speak for them, and to speak as them. Such speaking 
(perhaps even the desire for it) courts a failure of differentiation between past and 
present. The appearance of a ghost is a sign of that failure. In what follows, I pursue the 
implications of the collapse of differential time in our reading of past texts from the 
vantage of the present as well as through the ghostly figures inscribed in those texts as 
they read their own pasts.  
 
11 In another book, Hamlet in Purgatory, Greeenblatt attributes the literary trend for representations of 
ghosts such as Hamlet’s father to a collective desire to speak with the dead in the wake of the Reformation.  
 INTRODUCTION 
 
If the ghostly conversation to which this analysis belongs stretches across 
Western literature, that conversation finds a specific, local idiom in the sixteenth century. 
My dissertation focuses on early modern ghost complaint poetry, a form through which 
writers lend their voices to lamenting spirits. In this period, “complaint” refers broadly to 
texts of lament or protest. Scholars of the medieval and early modern eras will be familiar 
with different strains of complaint—amorous, political, allegorical, or religious, for 
instance. If the word “complaint” marks various kinds of texts in differing genres, 
however, the phrase “ghost complaint poetry” narrows that field to a group of closely 
related texts. Ghost complaints emerged as a distinct literary form and rose to popularity 
in England during the latter half of the sixteenth century. In the following pages I bring 
into view the contours of this trend. I examine the cultural conditions and literary 
precedents that inform the emergence of these poems. I describe their shared language 
and the similar effects they aim to produce. Since the poems have been categorized 
variously (with such labels as de casibus tragedy, ubi sunt lament, Ovidian verse, female 
complaint, and so on), part of the work of this dissertation will consist in showing how 
they cohere as a group and why the phrase “ghost complaint” best captures that 
coherence.  
Ghost complaint poetry became popular with the publication of A Mirror for 
Magistrates in 1559 and its sequel in 1563. Edited by William Baldwin, these two texts 
collect complaints by various hands. Baldwin’s Mirror prompted a flurry of expansions, 
copies, and spin-offs over the course of several decades. Of the over one hundred poems 
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 collected in the various editions of the Mirror, however, a few clearly stood out, 
capturing the attention of writers who took them as models. Thomas Churchyard’s poem 
featuring the ghost of Jane Shore was one of them. Shore’s Wife inspired a vogue for 
what John Kerrigan has called “female complaint” poems: a succession of poems 
published in the 1590s featuring the ghosts of lamenting women.1 “Readers,” as Heather 
Dubrow remarks, would have “sensed themselves in the presence of a subgenre.”2 The 
group includes such works as Samuel Daniel’s The Complaint of Rosamond (1592), 
Thomas Lodge’s The Complaint of Elstred (1593), Thomas Churchyard’s rewrite of the 
Jane Shore poem as The Tragedie of Shore’s Wife (1593), Michael Drayton’s Matilda 
(1594), John Trussell’s The First Rape of Fair Helen (1595), and Thomas Middleton’s 
The Ghost of Lucrece (1600). Difficult to pin down, these poems drift restlessly into and 
out of our modern taxonomies. They evolve quickly in relation to one another, work self-
reflexively, and push at their own boundaries, generic and otherwise. As Jonathan 
Goldberg notes, “pure forms are a Renaissance anomaly; hybrids are the rule.”3 The 
Mirror poems and the 1590s complaints that spring from them amply demonstrate this 
dictum. While I argue that 1590s ghost complaint poetry coheres as a distinct subgenre in 
the period’s literary imagination, it does so only briefly, emerging under the influence of 
a number of forms and merging into others. Notably, the spectral poetics of ghost 
complaint informs Elizabethan and Jacobean dramatic works. Indeed, the poems have 
roots in classical and medieval literature as well as branches extending well beyond the 
                                                 
1 This dissertation—indeed, any investigation of complaint poems such as those of the 1590s—owes a debt 
to John Kerrigan’s book, Motives of Woe: Shakespeare and ‘Female Complaint’, which remains an 
indispensable overview and analysis of the tradition of female voiced complaint poetry. I gratefully 
acknowledge both an intellectual and a personal debt to John Kerrigan for his generous and insightful 
guidance.        
2 Heather Dubrow, “A Mirror for Complaints,” 410. 
3 Jonathan Goldberg, “Shakespearean inscriptions,” 116. 
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 sixteenth century. Nevertheless, the fad for poetic ghost complaints in the early modern 
period has recognizable temporal borders, beginning with the 1559 Mirror for 
Magistrates and ending with its last edition in 1610. The 1590s group represents the 
height of the vogue for Mirror style poetry. After the turn of the century, the ghost 
complaints fade along with the Mirror tradition. The 1610 Mirror was the last collection 
of its kind.4  
My work here is animated by the sense that our scholarship has paid too little 
attention to these poems. We have dismissed them too readily. From our modern vantage 
looking back across the longue durée of literary history, ghost complaints seem much like 
the specters they feature: they appear suddenly to haunt the literature of the late sixteenth 
century and disappear soon after. Yet they were clearly admired by early modern writers 
and readers; they enjoyed great success in the literary market. That the fad for ghost 
complaints dwindled in the early seventeenth century should not mean we take them less 
seriously; rather, since such poems are bound so closely to Elizabethan tastes, they 
represent a unique register of preoccupations specific to the era.5 The lamenting figures 
in these poems have much to tell us about how Elizabethan literature constructs history
gender, and death—concerns central to the period’s poetics. 
, 
                                                 
4 As Elizabeth Human notes, the 1610 edition was reprinted in 1619 and 1620, but the 1610 edition was the 
last in a series of expansions and alterations to the text (“House of Mirrors,” 11–12). Lily B. Campbell also 
discusses the textual history in her introduction to The Mirror for Magistrates.  
5 Even if ghost complaint poetry tapers off in the early seventeenth century, writers remain fascinated by 
speaking ghosts in other contexts. Seventeenth-century prose and poetry offers a multitude of figures rising 
from the dead to weigh in on matters from international politics to advice for the lovelorn. In Thomas 
Scott’s Sir Walter Rawleighs Ghost (1626), for example, the specter of Raleigh appears to Count 
Gondomar of Spain to berate him for threatening England. On the less serious end of the spectrum, Ovid’s 
ghost is invoked to provide a “remedy for love-sick gallants” in Ovid’s Ghost (1657). Other ghosts who 
return in seventeenth-century texts include Elizabeth I, Richard III, King James, Oliver Cromwell, Thomas 
Nash, and more.  
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 The bulk of my dissertation examines poems featuring women protagonists. The 
Mirror volumes provide the backdrop from which the 1590s female ghost complaints 
emerge and against which they react. The complaints of the last decade of the sixteenth 
century supply the revivified figures of famous women from legend and chronicle history 
with new venues and new modes of speaking. The poems feature an identification of the 
male poetic persona with a lamenting woman who has risen from the grave to bemoan 
her loss of chastity in life as well as the reputation that has followed her in death. I ask 
what it means to be haunted in this way by historical and legendary figures such as 
Lucrece, Elstred, Jane Shore, and Rosamond, and why this haunting should produce such 
an excess of pathos—a keening that sometimes exceeds even that of the lovelorn, 
fractured Petrarchan sonneteers.  
Many of the complaining women—Jane Shore, Elstred, and Rosamond, for 
instance—serve as examples of unchaste behavior. But whether the poems feature 
unchaste women or those whose chastity comes under threat through no fault of their 
own, like Lucrece and Matilda, they all also chastise tyrants. Jane Shore is tormented by 
Richard III, Lucrece by Tarquin, Rosamond by Henry II, and so on. The chaste Lucrece 
and Matilda bemoan the gendered conditions—the lure of feminine beauty, the 
inevitability of masculine lust—that lead to their deaths. And even as ghosts such as Jane 
Shore and Rosamond purport to serve as negative moral exempla for living women, they 
implicitly or explicitly undermine their own aims by resisting the very morality that 
condemns them. They too, according to their poems, suffer in a world in which the ideal 
of chastity succumbs to the corruption of courtly life and the tyranny of princes. The 
poems therefore represent a gendered site of contest. To be sure, we can read the terms of 
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 this contest as a summary of renaissance misogynistic discourses, including the rhetoric 
of chastity, that of the silence proper to (or garrulity improper to) women, the 
commoditization and exchange of female bodies, and so on. Whether or not the female 
characters in complaint poems recapitulate or resist these misogynistic discourses has 
been called into questioned by critics.6 My dissertation argues that, in fact, a sustained 
examination of 1590s complaint poems and their historiographic and literary 
backgrounds reveals the way in which the female ghosts complicate and resist the 
moralizing, didactic discourses that would inscribe them into history. Not only do these 
female ghosts contest the patriarchal histories that condemn them to an afterlife of 
infamy, but the ostensibly masculine voice of the poetic persona is often fractured or 
subsumed by the voice of the female ghost.7 I suggest that part of what makes the 1590s 
ghost complaint poems unique and interesting is the way they challenge such normativity 
by calling attention to the constructedness and fungibility of the gendered voice, whether 
coded as masculine or feminine. 
                                                 
6 Still, we might take this statement by Jennifer Laws as a common estimation of 1590s ghost complaints: 
“the poems are unremittingly moralistic and didactic, with ruin and death for the woman as the inevitable 
outcome of failing to guard her chastity or at least preferable to losing that virtue” (84). We can read the 
critical tension between whether complaining women capitulate to or revise patriarchal systems most 
clearly in the criticism surrounding Shakespeare’s The Rape of Lucrece. Catherine Belsey, for example, 
suggests that Lucrece acts to secure her own “symbolic future.”  In committing suicide, “the ultimate act of 
self-determination,” Lucrece is the “agent of her own judicial execution” (331). Debates surrounding 
Shakespeare’s depiction of Lucrece often revolve around whether or not Lucrece’s agency can be imagined 
in terms of her relation to authorship. Recently, for example, Amy Greenstadt has argued that Lucrece is an 
“extremely powerful authorial figure” (46). See also Mary Jo Kietzman. Foundational to this debate are 
considerations of the degree to which Lucrece is caught in a homosocial or patriarchal rhetorical system 
(see Joel Fineman, Nancy Vickers, and Lynn Enterline). Similar debates are detectable in the critical 
estimation of other complaint poems. In fact, Shakespeare’s Lucrece (1594) is often grouped with the 
1590s complaints. 
7 Critics, however, have also seen this as a one-sided contest in which male literary voices appropriate the 
“feminine voice” only to secure the border between genders. Speaking of The Ghost of Lucrece, for 
example, Wendy Wall suggests that “the vivid narration of the loss of chastity…constructs a pattern 
whereby the writer establishes an identification with and a renunciation of femininity” (The Imprint of 
Gender, 272). In Wall’s view, Middleton uses Lucrece’s shame to represent his own as a writer in the 
public eye, which “ironically marks more clearly the distinction between genders.” See my chapter on 
Middleton for an alternative reading.  
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 The methods, effects, and popular appeal of 1590s complaint, however, will 
remain largely opaque to interpretation without reference to the Mirror for Magistrates. 
Ghost complaint poetry in the Elizabethan period owes its peculiar properties to the first 
editions of the Mirror published in 1559 and 1563. Here I work to show that it is no 
overstatement to say that Elizabethan ghost complaint poetry was invented by the Mirror. 
By this I do not mean to deny the Mirror’s precursors. I do not mean that complaint 
poetry did not exist before 1559, that poems featuring speaking ghosts were unheard of, 
or even that any of the individual themes of the Mirror poems are new ones. Yet the 
Mirror takes up the various modalities of its predecessors in a new way. It creates a new 
genre by cobbling together elements of others and adding topical concerns. Baldwin and 
his fellow writers put a new formal twist on works by Lydgate, Boccaccio, and many 
others. In the process, they create what deserves to be called a new genre. Complaint 
poetry may have a venerable tradition, as does ghost poetry, but Elizabethan ghost 
complaint poetry was invented in the 1550s by William Baldwin and the other authors of 
the Mirror. 1590s ghost complaints follow that patent.  
 While I argue that the 1590s ghost complaint poems must be read in the context 
of the Mirror, they also elaborate on that tradition by drawing on Ovidian rhetoric. Ghost 
complaint takes a distinctly Ovidian turn in the late sixteenth century. Like their cousin 
forms, the epyllia, and like the sonnet sequences with which they were often published, 
1590s complaints owe a debt to Ovid’s works, the Metamorphoses and Heroides in 
particular. Throughout this dissertation I remain attentive to the ways in which ghost 
complaint poems take up problems of gendered voice for which Ovid’s corpus remains 
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 an indispensible referent.8 Nevertheless, I also propose to correct a common assumption 
in our criticism: namely, that we can draw an unbroken line of influence between Ovid’s 
texts, particularly his Heroides, and 1590s female complaint. The journal Renaissance 
Studies recently devoted a special issue to precisely this connection. The essays gathered 
under the issue’s title, “The Rhetoric of Complaint: Ovid’s Heroides in the Renaissance 
and Reformation,” offer excellent examinations of Ovid’s deep influence on the literature 
of the early modern period.9 Yet such privileging of Ovidian rhetoric should not obscure 
the clear debt that 1590s ghost complaint poetry owes to the Mirror tradition. In every 
chapter, this dissertation works to show the ways in which ghosts such as Rosamond, 
Elstred, and Jane Shore emerge from, elaborate on, and contest the Mirror tradition even 
as they adopt Ovidian rhetoric. Ovid’s influence is important, even crucial at points, but it 
is not uniquely responsible for Elizabethan ghost complaints.  
We can draw a distinction between poetic projects directly inspired by the 
Heroides and those in the Mirror tradition by using Michael Drayton’s work as an 
illustration. Drayton writes not one but two poems featuring Matilda: one is an epistle in 
the style of Ovid’s Heroides and one a ghost complaint in the Mirror tradition. In his 
England’s Heroical Epistles (1597), Drayton tells us in his introduction that he uses the 
word “heroical” in the “sence Ouid (whose imitator I partly professe to be) dooth also vse 
heroicall.”10 The Matilda of England’s Heroical Epistles begins her letter to King John in 
response to his letter to her: 
No sooner I receiu’d thy letters heere, 
Before I knew from whom, or whence they were, 
But suddaine feare my bloodlesse vaines doth fill, 
                                                 
8 See Lynn Enterline, The Rhetoric of the Body from Ovid to Shakespeare.  
9 Renaissance Studies 22.3 (2008). 
10 Michael Drayton, Englands Heroicall Epistles, sig. A2r. 
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 As though diuining of some future ill;  
And in a shyuering extasie I stood, 
A chyllie coldnes runnes through all my blood: 
Opening thy letters, I shut vp my rest,  
And let strange cares into my quiet brest,11  
 
By contrast, Drayton’s complaint poem featuring Matilda begins with these words from 
its protagonist: 
If to this time some sacred Muse retaine, 
Those choise regards by perfect vertue taught, 
And in her chast and virgine-humble vaine, 
Doth kindly cherrish one pure Mayden thought, 
In whom my death hath but true pitty wrought, 
     By her I craue my life may be reueald, 
     VVhich blacke obliuion hath too long conceald.12 
 
The two poems differ radically in form and address. In his Heroides-inspired epistle, 
Drayton uses heroic couplets. In his ghost complaint poem (published in quarto three 
years before the first edition of England’s Heroical Epistles) he uses rhyme royal, a 
stanza pattern George Gascoigne called “best for grave discourses.”13 Formal differences 
aside, Drayton’s two poems offer radically different perspectives. In the epistle, the living 
Matilda writes in anticipation of the tragedy to come, “diuining…some future ill”; in the 
ghost complaint, the dead Matilda speaks retrospectively of that tragedy (her suicide) and 
wishes to be rescued from “blacke obliuion” by having her story retold. The hallmark of 
ghost complaint poetry is precisely this kind of metaleptic perspective: the ghosts speak 
as figures simultaneously of the past and present. Drayton’s Matilda carries on in the 
                                                 
11 Drayton, “Matilda to King Iohn,” in Englands Heroicall Epistles, fol. 12v–13. 
12 Drayton, Matilda, sig. B1r.   
13 Sometimes called the Troilus meter, the seven line rhyme royal stanza was popularized by Chaucer in his 
Troilus and Criseyde. “Rhyme royal” is said to have been so named for its use by James I (OED), but 
George Gascoigne has this to say about it in his “Certayne Notes”: “Rythme royall is a verse of tenne 
sillables, and seven such verses make a staffe, whereof the first and thirde lines do aunswer (acrosse) in like 
terminations and rime, the second, the fourth, and fifth, do likewise answere eche other in terminations, and 
the two last do combine and shut up the Sentence: this hath bene called Rithme royall, & surely it is a 
royall kinde of verse, serving best for grave discourses” (471).  
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 ghost complaint tradition by asking the poet to take up her story with his “mortall pen.” 
She even invokes other complaints, including “Faire Rosamond, of all so highly graced, / 
Recorded in the lasting Booke of Fame, / And in our Sainted Legendarie placed” (B1v) as 
well as Lucrece, Jane Shore, and Elstred.14 The epistle and the complaint differ in form, 
structure, perspective, and effect. They may share aspects of narrative content, but that is 
hardly enough for us to interpret them as interchangeable. Drayton’s two Matilda poems 
point out that when we invoke Ovid’s Heroides (or Ovidian verse more generally) as an 
interpretive reference point for ghost complaints, we must take care not to obscure crucial 
differences between those poems that follow directly in the footsteps of the Heroides and 
those that, although they adopt aspects of Ovidian rhetoric, work by reference to the 
Mirror tradition.  
Matilda’s metaleptic perspective from both the past and the present offers an 
example of one of the ways in which ghost complaints cohere as a genre. The speaking 
dead combine a privileged perspective from within the past—a subjective view of past 
events that take place well before the living memory of the poem’s writer or reader—with 
a view informed by the present. Drayton’s Matilda can tell her story from a first person 
perspective as it happened hundreds of years in the past, and at the same time she can 
address Queen Elizabeth in the present as “my dread Soueraigne, rare and princely 
Mayd” (B2v). It is no surprise that perspectives separated by centuries that are made to 
coincide can conflict. Perhaps the best example of this is Thomas Middleton’s The Ghost 
of Lucrece, in which Lucrece mourns both the way she has been stained by Tarquin’s lust 
in the Roman era and the way her soul is damned in the Christian present. The poem 
                                                 
14 According to Edward Phillips’ 1658 lexicon, The New World of English Words, a “legendary” is “the 
Title of a book, containing the lives of the Saints.” The OED concurs, defining the noun form of the word 
as “a collection of legends, esp. of lives of saints.” 
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 articulates this doubled pagan and Christian view as a paradox that threatens to erase 
Lucrece’s identity: “Lucrece, I say, how canst thou Lucrece be, / Wanting a god to give a 
life to thee?”15 In reliving her pagan past, Lucrece takes an anachronistically Christian 
view of her possibilities for redemption. To greater or lesser degrees, ghost complaints all 
invoke and explore similarly jarring clashes of contemporary and historical 
perspectives.16 This is yet another way in which the speech of the dead can always 
compromise the meanings we make of the past—even if the dead are represented as 
making those meanings themselves. 
My use of metalepsis in what I describe as ghost complaint’s “metaleptic 
perspective” requires elaboration to draw out its implications for the complaining ghost’s 
vexed temporality. For early modern rhetoricians, metalepsis is a figure of excess. In his 
Art of English Poesy (1589), George Puttenham feminizes the term, calling it the figure 
of the “Far-fetched.” It is used, he suggests,  
when we had rather fetch a word a great way off than to use one nearer 
hand to express the matter as well and plainer. And it seemeth the deviser 
of this figure had a desire to please women rather than men, for we use to 
say by manner of proverb, things far fetched and dear bought are good for 
ladies. So, in this manner of speech we use it: leaping over the heads of a 
great many words, we take one that is furthest off to utter our matter by, as 
Medea, cursing her first acquaintance with Prince Jason, who had very 
unkindly forsaken her, said: 
Woe worth the mountain that the mast bare 
Which was the first causer of all my care. 
Where she might as well have said, “Woe worth our first meeting,” or 
“Woe worth the time that Jason arrived with his ship at my father’s city in 
Colchis, when he took me away with him”; and not so far off as to curse 
the mountain that bore the pine tree, that made the mast, that bore the sails, 
that the ship sailed with, which carried her away. (267–8)  
 
                                                 
15 Thomas Middleton, The Ghost of Lucrece, ll. 561–2. 
16 This is a poetic rendering of what Linda Charnes describes as the “notorious identity” of characters in 
Shakespeare’s plays: “Always constituted retroactively, famous figures and historical events exist as 
representations, as well as effects, of their own belatedness” (1).  
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 For Puttenham, metalepsis is an extravagance of metonymy leading to a hyperextended 
metaphor—a chain of associations that uses its two most distant links as tenor and 
vehicle, eliding its middle links.17 Puttenham focuses on the expense of this metaphorical 
relation. Rather than making a straightforward, masculine sense, the metalepsis expresses 
a relation in an opaque, expensive, and therefore feminine manner. That Puttenham links 
the extravagance of metalepsis to the cursing and lamenting of a woman aptly 
demonstrates the use that will be made of the trope in Elizabethan ghost complaint.  
The speaking dead in ghost complaint poetry are metaleptic in their extravagantly 
doubled perspective. They enact such a perspective precisely because they are figures of 
figures, metaphors of metaphors. That is, the ghost that sees and speaks from the 
perspective of the present in ghost complaint does so as a metaphor for its referent in the 
history text, and that figure in the history text is already a figuration of the person who 
lived in the past. The figure of Matilda in Drayton’s poem, for instance, is already a self-
conscious adaptation of the Matilda from written English legend, which, in turn, is 
already a figure for the Matilda who lived in the time of King John. The poets who voice 
these ghosts take advantage of this extensive chain of signification. It allows the ghost the 
ability to comment on present circumstances through the lens of the past as well as past 
circumstances through the lens of the present. When ghosts such as Rosamond rise up to 
demand of present poets that their stories be rewritten, they show an awareness of their 
already figured relation to once-living bodies. Ghosts change their destinies in the 
afterlife by understanding that their bodies have accrued signification—fame or infamy—
                                                 
17 Brian Cummings summarizes the early modern use of the term: “metalepsis was a term that was used to 
describe a process of transition, doubling or ellipsis in figuration, of replacing a figure with another figure, 
and of missing out the figure in between in order to create a figure that stretches the sense or which fetches 
things from far off” (219). 
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 through various iterations of their lives in history and literature. Since they understand 
how they have been written into history, how their lives have been given significance 
through historically contingent lenses, they presume that rewriting their stories will 
resignify those contingent significations. The metaleptic perspective of the ghost, in 
short, allows it to rewrite its history. Prosopopeia, meanwhile, allows the ghost to speak 
of its own accord, giving the spectral voice an immediacy that elides the complicated 
metonymic chain of referentiality upon which its metaleptic perspective relies.18  
From “prosopon,” signifying face, countenance, mask, or person, and “poeia,” 
make, prosopopeia is a rhetorical device whereby the poet impersonates an inanimate 
object, an animal, an abstraction, a fictional figure, or the dead. Quintilian’s influential 
Institutio oratoria describes prosopopeia at work when the orator places “words of 
advice, reproach, complaint, praise, or pity into the mouths of appropriate persons.” 
“Nay, we are even allowed in this form of speech,” he continues, “to bring down the gods 
from heaven and raise the dead, while cities also and peoples may find a voice.”19 Henry 
Peacham’s Garden of Eloquence (1577) follows Quintilian in describing prosopopeia as a 
voicing of abstractions or absent people. Prosopopeia “raiseth againe as it were the dead 
to life, and bringeth them forth complaining or witnessing what they knew” (136). It is 
worth noticing that Quintilian, Peacham, and other authors of rhetorical texts link 
                                                 
18 For modern theorists, metalepsis is a frame breaking figure. In his Narrative Discourse, Gérard Genette 
characterizes the figure as “any intrusion by the extradiegetic narrator into a metadiegetic universe (or by 
the diegetic characters into a metadiegetic universe, etc.)” (234–35). Also qtd. in Gerald Prince, 
“Disturbing Frames,” 625. Genette describes this “intrusion” or “transgression” of one “narrative level” 
upon another as a “double temporality of the story and the narrating” times, “as if the narrating were 
contemporaneous with the story and had to fill up the latter’s dead spaces.” That Genette describes such 
frame breaking in terms of “transgresssion” and “dead spaces” hauntingly echoes the stakes involved early 
modern prosopopeia.   
19 “…et suadendo, obiurgando, querendo, laudando, miserando personas idoneas damus. Quin deducere 
deos in hoc genere dicendi et inferos excitare concessum est; urbes etiam populique vocem accipiunt” 
(9.2.30–31).  
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 prosopopeia both to raising the dead and to lamentation. Ghost complaint poetry takes 
full advantage of prosopopiea’s potential for such animation and keening.        
 Prosopopeia also carries ghostly consequences for the poet’s persona. As with the 
poem that begins my introduction, “Not Waving but Drowning,” speaking for the dead, 
giving voice to an absence, threatens the presence of the poetic voice. Although the poet 
attempts, on one level, to authorize himself by demonstrating his skill in voicing that 
which has no voice, that very act challenges the authenticity of the voice per se. Put 
another way, when the poet takes on the prosopon, the “face” of an absence, and gives it 
a voice, he calls attention to the already self-consciously constructed nature of the poetic 
persona. In ghost complaints, as we will see, taking on the face of the dead threatens to 
deface the poet.20 Throughout this dissertation I work to describe the ghostly effects 
generated by this conundrum. It is important to note here that writers of the ghost 
complaints I study in this dissertation are fully aware of the potential effects generated by 
the use of prosopopeia. For some, exploring these complications of voice and the effects 
they produce seems to have been a very good reason for writing ghost complaint poetry 
in the first place. Looking back over the trajectory of sixteenth-century complaints, we 
can detect a growing emphasis on complex vocal effects. We need only recall 
Shakespeare’s A Lover’s Complaint, published after the height of the trend for ghost 
complaints, with its dizzying play of voices—its “re-worded…double voice”—to remind 
ourselves how intimately acquainted early modern writers were with the challenges, 
                                                 
20 Here I am influenced by Paul de Man’s essay, “Autobiography as De-facement.” De Man writes that 
“language, as a trope, is always privative.” Prosopopeia ostentatiously writes voice as representation, 
“language as a figure,” and thus calls attention to the fact that our only recourse to the world is through 
tropes. “As soon as we understand the rhetorical function of prosopopeia as positing voice or face by means 
of language, we also understand that what we are deprived of is not life but the shape and the sense of a 
world accessible only in the privative way of understanding. Death is a displaced name for a linguistic 
predicament, and the restoration of mortality by autobiography (the prosopopeia of the voice and the name) 
deprives and disfigures to the precise extent that it restores” (930).     
 22   
 rewards, and pitfalls of speaking for and as an abject other (1–3). This is a highly 
concentrated version of a phenomenon so pervasive we sometimes forget to mention it: 
early modern literature obsesses endlessly about what it means to put on a mask.  
If ghost complaint poems are recognizable through their shared use of the 
rhetorical devices, metalepsis and prosopopeia, they also share what I will call 
“historiopoetic” rhetoric. In order to fully appreciate the paradoxical power that ghost 
complaint writers assign to these voices from outside of time, it is necessary to 
understand the poems within the context of the era’s penchants for memorializing and 
moralizing—tendencies poetry and historiography share. Memorialization seeks to both 
preserve and bury the dead; it erects monuments that assign meaning to past lives, 
dealing with loss through attempts to entomb and idealize. Moralization attempts a 
mastery of the past through received understandings of history, whether religious or 
secular, by which to evaluate past lives. Rather than authorizing the memorializing and 
moralizing discourses which inform their appearance, the 1590s ghost poems I examine 
complicate, contest, and revise their traditions. Samuel Daniel’s Rosamond, for instance, 
unhappy with her place in history as an example of vice, asks the poet to retell her story 
so that her reputation might be redeemed. Rosamond cites Jane Shore, another royal 
mistress and pattern of unchaste behavior. Rosamond suggests that Shore “did such 
compassion finde” by having her story retold that she now “passes for a Saint.” “Her 
Legend,” claims Rosamond, “iustifies her foule attaint.”21 In this way, the female ghosts 
of the 1590s, voiced by their male poets, attempt to revise history. An understanding of 
1590s complaint within the context of the Mirror tradition is crucial here as well. The 
Mirror represents itself as both history and poetry—drawing on the shared concerns of 
                                                 
21 Samuel Daniel, Delia with The Complaint of Rosamond 1592, sig. H3v. 
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 historiography and poetics. My chapter on the Mirror examines the close relationship 
between history and poetry in the sixteenth century. As they are imagined in this period, 
both foreground memorializing and moralizing.  
 The Mirror and the complaints to follow complicate the gendered memorializing 
and moralizing rhetoric common to history writing in the period. Edward Hall’s history, 
The vnion of the two noble and illustre famelies of Lancastre & Yorke, opens with a 
diatribe against “Oblivion,” described as “the cancard enemie to fame and renoune” and 
“the dedly darte to the glory of princes” (“The Preface”). Hall opposes Oblivion, a 
“sucking serpent” and “dedly beast,” to “memory by litterature…the verie dilator and 
setter furth of Fame.” It is no accident of rhetoric that Fame is a woman who will be 
“dilated” and set forth before us. I treat Hall’s text and others in my first chapter to show 
how such gendered, memorializing, and moralizing rhetoric haunts early modern 
historiography and poetry. In the shadow of figures such as Ovid and Petrarch, what 
counts as poetry in the early modern period is rarely very far from a no-holds-barred 
obsession with the tortuous permutations of gender. Nor is the renaissance obsession with 
memorializing difficult to conjure up, as visible as it is particularly in amorous and 
elegiac poetry. And we need only think of the most ambitious poem of the sixteenth 
century, Edmund Spenser’s Faerie Queene, to recall (as if we needed such a reminder) 
how closely the aims of early modern poetry can resemble those of moral philosophy. I 
am interested here in what happens to these common discourses when they collude to 
complicate the seemingly absolute border between the dead and the living—or when the 
crossing of that border complicates those discourses. In ghost complaint poetry from the 
first editions of the Mirror to the 1590s complaints, concerns with gender, 
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 memorializing, and moralizing come together in that interruption of temporality and 
historicity, the figure of the ghost.     
 Marking out the literary territory of ghost complaint poetry in this introductory 
way raises one of the main questions this dissertation addresses. What is it about 
complaint poetry from A Mirror for Magistrates to A Lover’s Complaint that appeals so 
strongly to early modern tastes? And why do we no longer seem to share those tastes? 
Modern scholars tend to find the Mirror didactic, confused, and awkward. As C. S. Lewis 
writes, “no one lays down the Mirror without a sense of relief.”22 Exceptions to this 
opinion are sparse in the criticism from the time of Lewis’s writing to the present. 
Scholarship on 1590s ghost complaint has also been, for the most part, less than 
laudatory. That dubious reception extends to early modern complaints more generally. 
Edmund Spenser’s volume of complaints might be the least examined of his works. And 
as Catherine Bates has noted, A Lover’s Complaint has been routinely “slighted, 
sidelined, passed over, ignored…” with “not so much polite indifference as an 
embarrassed aversion of the gaze.”23 This embarrassment, Bates argues, results in 
periodic attempts to push the poem out of the Shakespearean canon, as if to distance the 
genius of Shakespeare from such a weirdly excessive piece of vulgarity. Yet ghost 
complaint poems, including those of the Mirror, were highly valued in their era. The 
Mirror secured the reputations of William Baldwin and Thomas Sackville, among others, 
as great poets worthy of emulation. And poems such as Daniel’s The Complaint of 
Rosamond and Churchyard’s Shore’s Wife were widely admired and imitated by 
contemporaneous writers. A sustained examination of this radical difference between 
                                                 
22 C. S. Lewis, English Literature in the Sixteenth Century, 246. 
23 Catherine Bates, Masculinity, Gender and Identity, 174–6. 
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 early modern and modern tastes with respect to complaint literature is overdue. In the 
pages that follow I use the phrase “spectral aesthetics” both to summarize the shared 
preoccupations of the complaint poems I study and to capture their appeal to 
Elizabethans. Spectral aesthetics, I argue, is an effect of the interaction between sixteenth 
century social preoccupations and what I will describe as the “ghostly” rhetoric of literary 
genres such as (but not limited to) ghost complaint poetry. If we see ghost complaints as 
a group and note their rise to popularity, we can begin to appreciate the growing taste for 
this particular set of effects as well as a growing awareness among authors of what 
working in this new genre might entail. That growing awareness of the pleasures ghost 
complaint poems provide and how they do it constitutes an important current in early 
modern literature and its reception.  
 The spectral aesthetic cannot be separated from the wider cultural and literary 
concerns of the era, since it has to do with historically situated notions of beauty, 
experiences of pleasure in reading, and changing tastes. This inseparability raises 
questions. To what degree can we say that ghost complaints—particularly the Mirror 
poems—prompt the trend for ghosts in revenge tragedy? Is the new and growing 
predilection for literary ghosts in the latter half of the sixteenth century a symptom of a 
cultural trauma in the wake of the Henrician disavowal of purgatory? These kinds of 
questions are well worth asking. Indeed, they will come up again throughout this 
dissertation. But my argument overall hesitates to decide these questions about the 
relation between the social and the literary (or generic influence) in terms of cause and 
effect. The poems I study here become popular, I argue, precisely because they repudiate 
historicisms that rely on causal relations promising to authorize progressive narratives. 
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 When a ghost appears—when the past manifests itself inside the present—time goes 
awry. The temporal coordinates of cause (past) and effect (present) become unmoored, 
resisting teleologies. To read through a historicism that would understand ghost 
complaints as effects (or symptoms) and link them with social causes (or cultural trauma) 
would therefore perversely privilege the kind of analysis that the poems themselves 
question.  
 Theodore Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory allows us to think through the 
historiopoetics of ghost complaint and, more broadly, spectral aesthetics in the sixteenth 
century. “Art,” Adorno writes, “can be understood only by its laws of movement, not 
according to any set of invariants. It is defined by its relation to what it is not. […] Art 
acquires its specificity by separating itself from what it developed out of; its law of 
movement is its law of form” (3). As Adorno makes clear, this does not mean that “art” 
(or in the Mirror’s word, “Poesie”) ever succeeds in fully separating itself from the 
social. In fact, it means precisely that such a separation never succeeds: “the unsolved 
antagonisms of reality return in artworks as immanent problems of form” (6). “This,” 
Adorno claims, “not the insertion of objective elements, defines the relation of art to 
society.” That is, the aesthetic in art is contingent upon the process of separation from 
that part of the social to which the art refers, and that very process of separation means 
that the social referent returns to haunt the artwork not only in its content but also in its 
form. “Art’s double character as both autonomous and fait social is incessantly 
reproduced at the level of its autonomy” (5). Adorno’s aesthetic theory informs my work 
throughout this dissertation as an a priori assumption.  
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 Yet in order to extend Adorno’s thinking to ghost complaint poetry, we must add 
another moment to the relation between “art” and the “social.” We must add history. 
Ghost complaint poetry is not only concerned with how it figures the social in poetic 
terms; it also takes up the way in which history has already figured social events and 
bodies. The ghosts in these poems are poetic refigurations of historical figures—historical 
figures that, in turn, represent bodies once in the world. The metaleptic perspective of the 
ghosts in these poems work by virtue of the ghost’s (and the poet’s) awareness of how 
they have been inscribed into history. Spectral aesthetics, therefore, operates at a double 
remove from the social. The aestheticizing process that Adorno describes nonetheless 
holds true. In ghost complaint poetry, “the unsolved antagonisms of reality return…as 
immanent problems of form,” yet insofar as the “social” returns to haunt the form of 
these poems, it does so as a palimpsest. This is what allows Middleton to ask, through the 
ghost of Lucrece, “how canst thou Lucrece be, wanting a god to give a life to thee?” The 
social constraints that shape history’s pagan Lucrece are legible under (before) those that 
shape the present’s Christian Lucrece. Doubly circumscribed by past and present social 
codes, Lucrece’s spectral address must be formulated as a paradox, as she herself is a 
“paradoxical incorporation,” a “becoming-body,” an embodiment of absence.24 As 
Adorno’s formulation helps clarify, ghost complaint poetry separates itself from the 
history writing upon which it draws even as that history haunts its form. As we will see 
throughout this dissertation, the poems continually insist on the autonomy of poetry over 
and against history—relying on what the Mirror will call the “auncient liberties” of the 
poet—even as the poems animate their ghosts precisely as historical figures that vex 
                                                 
24 Derrida, Specters of Marx, 5. In Derrida’s words, “…le spectre est une incorporation paradoxale, le 
devenir-corps, une certaine forme phénoménale et charnelle de l’esprit” (Spectres de Marx, 25). 
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 historical interpretation. The emergence of a ghost from the pages of history to speak in 
poetry’s present means that the ghost itself becomes a temporal problem immanent to the 
form of its own address. Ghost complaint is structured by the way its ghosts emerge from 
the social in the encoded form of history even as the poems declare their independence 
from the constraints of the social real.  
 Sixteenth-century spectral aesthetics bears comparison to our modern 
theorizations of the ghostly in historiography. Recent queer theory, for instance, seeks to 
complicate historicist methodologies by suggesting ways of reimagining our relation to 
the past. In Queer / Early / Modern, Carla Freccero draws on theorists such as Michel de 
Certeau (The Writing of History, Heterologies) and Jacques Derrida (Specters of Marx) to 
suggest that understanding the relation of the past to the present as “haunting” provides 
an alternative to progressive, teleological (and thus heteronormative) histories that rely on 
differentiation. Haunting (or “hauntology”) promises an affective, erotically charged, 
spectral relation to the past activated by sameness rather than difference. As I note in my 
preface, queer theorists such as Freccero have written provocatively about the ways in 
which a queer historiography implies “a willingness both to be haunted and to become 
ghostly.”25 Questioning historicist methodologies that rely on marking the difference 
between past and present, queer historiography holds out the promise of a disintegration 
of that difference in a “reciprocal penetrability” that yields a “commingling of times as 
affective and erotic experience” (488–9). The poems I study, as I have said, enact that 
haunting reciprocity; yet the ghosts in these poems also help us elaborate on its 
implications. I argue that sixteenth-century ghost complaint poetry does, in fact, critique 
heteronormative, progressive historicisms. The poems also perform a palimpsestic 
                                                 
25 Carla Freccero, “Queer Times,” 488.  
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 commingling of past and present that resonates with strong affect, registers the intensity 
of desire, and charges its language with the erotic. Yet ghost complaint incessantly raises 
questions about affect, desire, and eros that its spectral address complicates rather than 
simplifies: whose affect, whose erotic investment, whose desire is at stake? When a ghost 
rises from the past to possess the poet and speak in the present, the desires of the poet, the 
ghost, and the reader contest and inform each other.  
 In Specters of Marx, Jacques Derrida discusses “haunting” as that which is 
“neither living nor dead, present nor absent,” that which “spectralizes” (202).26 Such a 
phenomenon, according to Derrida, “does not belong to ontology.” Derrida’s word for a 
“haunting” that is prior to (and enables) “ontology” is “hauntology.” This concept as well 
as the use Freccero and others make of it will illuminate the ghostly phenomena that I 
examine. Derrida’s terms “hauntology” and “spectrality” describe the way in which, in 
ghost complaint poetry, haunting becomes the mode through which an ontology of the 
speaking subject is both generated and questioned. In turn, hauntology helps us question, 
in the words of Danielle Clarke, “the ontological stability of the female speaking subject” 
in ghost complaints.27 Indeed, any stable gendering of the speaking subject in ghost 
complaint poetry as either feminine or masculine is complicated in the extreme by the 
simultaneously present and absent body of the ghost, the disembodied voice of the poetic 
                                                 
26 In Of Grammatology, Jacques Derrida uses concepts such as “the supplement” to describe the play of 
presence and absence in speech and writing. Indeed, such play turns out to be at the root of metaphysics, 
which “consists of excluding non-presence by determining the supplement as simple exteriority, pure 
addition or pure absence” (167). Derrida’s encounter with the figure of the ghost in Specters of Marx, by 
contrast, aims at something more radical than supplementary relation. By now this language should sound 
familiar: “…the specter is a paradoxical incorporation, the becoming-body, a certain phenomenal and 
carnal form of the spirit. It becomes, rather, some “thing” that remains difficult to name: neither soul nor 
body, and both one and the other. For it is flesh and phenomenality that give to the spirit its spectral 
apparition, but which disappear right away in the apparition, in the very coming of the revenant or the 
return of the specter. […] …one does not know what it is, what it is presently. […] One does not know if it 
is living or if it is dead” (5). 
27 Danielle Clarke,  “‘Form’d into words by your divided lips’: Women, Rhetoric and the Ovidian 
Tradition,” 62. 
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persona, and their possession of each other. But it is not only the way in which 
Elizabethan poets compose their haunting poems that is at stake here, but also how we as 
readers and scholars are, in turn, haunted by those literary artifacts.  
 Complaint poetry occupied a prominent place in sixteenth-century literary 
production and consumption. The poems were widely read and admired. Yet they have 
since faded from view. Through demonstrating the complexity, force, and appeal of these 
literary artifacts in the following pages, this dissertation attempts to increase the visibility 
of ghost complaint in accounts of sixteenth-century literary history. The female ghosts in 
these poems, supposed outsiders (in both a temporal and a social sense), make their 
voices heard in the most sacred spaces of sixteenth-century literature and history. They 
claim the center ground of those privileged places that threaten to abject them. With the 
help of their poets, they rewrite their own histories, in relation to which they are both 
center and margin.  
 CHAPTER I 
 
THE HISTORIOPOETICS OF THE MIRROR FOR MAGISTRATES 
 
The Mirror for Magistrates was first published in 1559, soon after Queen 
Elizabeth I ascended to the throne. Written by a group of poets under the direction of 
William Baldwin, the volume was conceived as a historical “poesy” that would instruct 
the current English nobility by conjuring the ghosts of past political figures to give 
accounts of their lives and deaths. The Mirror’s ghosts rise from the grave in historical 
order to tell of their falls from power, beginning with figures from the reign of Richard II 
and ending with those in the time of Edward IV.1 The authors interpose prose links 
between the poems, often in order to comment on the moral lesson of the previous poem 
and sometimes to introduce the next. From these linked exercises in prosopopeia in which 
poets voice historical figures, current magistrates are supposed to learn virtue. As 
Baldwin explains in his dedication, the ghosts are meant to provide examples of how 
providence works in English history, detailing “[h]ow [God] hath delt with sum of our 
countrymen your auncestors, for sundrye vices…” These historical examples of vice, 
Baldwin suggests, “will be a good occasion to move you to the soner amendment.”2 The 
ghosts of the Mirror, however they may strain against the didactic historiography that 
                                                 
1 The sequel in 1563 extend that chronology into the reign of Henry VI.  
2 William Baldwin et al., The Mirror for Magistrates, edited by Lily B. Campbell (65–66). All citations of 
the Mirror are from Campbell’s edition. Several versions of the project were produced from 1559 to 1610. 
Some of them (1574, 1578, 1587) reach back in time to depict ghosts from Roman history and early 
English legend. But the individual ghost poems, be they representations of Caligula or Richard III, retain a 
recognizable pattern, and the didactic intent of the volumes remains clear through changes in historical 
location. Each aimed to expand on the exemplary history of Boccaccio’s De casibus virorum illustrium, 
which was adapted into English by John Lydgate as The Fall of Princes in the 1430s (through the 
intermediary of a French translation of Boccaccio by Laurent de Premierfait).  
 32   
 invokes them, are called upon as examples of vice and recipients of a divine retribution 
achieved through the inexorable turning of fortune’s perilous wheel. The title page reads:  
A Myrrovre for Magistrates. Wherein may be seen by example of other, 
with howe greuous plages vices are punished: and howe frayle and 
unstable worldly prosperitie is founde, euen of those, whom fortune 
seemeth most highly to fauour. Foelix quem faciunt aliena pericula 
cautum.  
 
The Latin sentence reads, “happy are they who are made cautious by the dangers of 
others.” The emphasis on punishment and divine intervention leads readers to assume 
that in these ghost stories, Fortune will serve as the handmaiden to God. Baldwin and his 
fellow writers promise ghost poems that will comprise a history of providential justice. 
Many of the ghosts, however, fail to deliver on that promise.  
Midway through the first edition of the Mirror for Magistrates the ghost of 
Salisbury rises in a poem entitled “How Thomas Montague the earle of Salysbury in the 
middes of his glory, was chaunceably slayne with a piece of ordinaunce.” The ninth in a 
series of nineteen ghosts, Salisbury tells the story of his accidental death at the siege of 
Orleans. In so doing, he calls into question the didactic purpose of the Mirror. The poem 
demonstrates not divine providence but fickle fortune, simple chance that neither the 
authors nor the ghost can interpret as a providential account. “Now Baldwin,” Montague 
says, “note mine ende”: 
 I stoode in vewing where the towne was weake, 
And as I busily talked with my frend, 
 Shot fro the towne, which al the grate did breake, 
 A pellet came, and drove a mightly fleake, 
 Agaynst my face, and tare away my cheeke, 
 For payne wherof I dyed within a weeke. (152)   
 
Salisbury dies as the result of standing too close to a window struck by a cannonball. 
Neither the writers of the Mirror nor the Earl himself know how to interpret this ill 
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 fortune because Salisbury does not seem to deserve his end. A valiant soldier and loyal 
servant to the King, he is loved by nobles and commoners alike. After the poem ends, the 
authors are nonplussed. As they say in the prose link following the poem, “This straunge 
aduenture of the good erle drave vs al into a dumpne, inwardly lamenting his wofull 
destynye….” (154) Soon they snap out of their reverie: “To what end (quote one) muse 
we so much on this matter. This Earle is neyther the first nor the last whom Fortune hath 
foundered in the heyth of their prosperitye.” The poets resolve to henceforth skip over 
stories of “many whych haue bene likewise serued, whose chaunces sith they be marcial, 
and therefore honorable, may the better be omitted.” This ghost, they admit, has done 
nothing to further the didactic purpose of the collection. In fact, Salisbury’s ghost 
scandalously speaks against the entire project of reading providential lessons into history:  
…how many shall we find 
For vertues sake with infamy opprest? 
How many agayn through helpe of fortune blind,  
For yll attemptes atchiued, with honour blest? 
Succes is wurst ofttimes whan cause is best, 
Therefore say I: god send them sory happes, 
That iudge the causes by their after clappes. (144) 
 
For this ghost, we can read the pattern of human destiny only as chance. Fortune “gideth 
al the game” (143). Interpreting after the fact, judging by “after clappes,” does not 
provide reliable moral lessons, much less an understanding of God’s divine plan. “God 
doth suffer that it should be so, / But why, my wit is feble to decise” (145). Historical 
interpretation produces only “uncertaynty”; our best intentions and most praiseworthy 
desires may fall when “sodayne mischief dasheth all to dust” (153).  
Stories such as Salisbury’s have contributed to the difficulties modern scholars 
have encountered in attempting to categorize and evaluate the Mirror. If viewed as a 
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 form of history writing, the Mirror may appear as an odd and “lackluster” step between 
the medieval chronicle and modern “objective” history.3 If examined as poetry, the 
volume’s putative didacticism seems difficult to embrace. And if understood as moral or 
religious philosophy, the text seems inconsistent. As Paul Budra claims of the Mirror’s 
critical reception, 
either the individual tragedies are shown to be predictable stories of the 
schematic retribution inflicted upon the morally or politically corrupt, and 
are therefore consistent and tedious, or they are shown to be a haphazard 
assortment of tales mixing divine Providence with irrational Fortune, and 
are therefore inconsistent and tedious. (303) 
 
The accusations that the Mirror poems are either tediously consistent or tediously 
inconsistent betrays the degree to which scholars have been unable to reach a consensus 
about what exactly these poems are supposed to be and do. Yet by all accounts the 
Mirror was widely read and much appreciated in its time. It was reissued and expanded 
often over the course of more than fifty years. Sir Philip Sidney ranks its poetry with 
Chaucer and Surrey, calling it “meetly furnished of beautiful parts.” Sir John 
Harrington’s translation of Ariosto’s Orlando includes a reference to the volume, “in 
which the life and fall of many great persons is very well set downe, and in a good 
verse.” And Jasper Heywood doubts that his poetic abilities measure up to those of 
William Baldwin, the editor and principle writer, “whose Myrrour doth of Magistrates, 
proclayme eternall fame.”4 Elizabethans clearly enjoyed the Mirror’s blend of poetry, 
history, and moral philosophy. Given the difference between the modern and early 
                                                 
3 In his classic study, F. J. Levy suggests that the Mirror’s “lackluster poetry and carelessness with sources 
should not be allowed to overshadow an honest and quite successful attempt to solve the problems facing a 
historian who whished to preserve man’s free will and God’s providence together” (217). Levy’s overall 
project is to show how “the rather formless narrative of the medieval chroniclers was hammered into a new, 
more organized, form” (ix). For history writing’s supposed “objectivity” (the positivist assumption before 
the postmodern turn) see Michel de Certeau, The Writing of History.  
4 The responses of Sidney, Harrington, Heywood, and many more are recorded by Wilbraham Fitzjohn 
Trench in A Mirror for Magistrates: Its origin and influence (71–88). 
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 modern reception of the Mirror, Jim Ellis asks the right question: “what did the 
Elizabethans find so fascinating about the poem that the rest of us have been missing?” 
(1033). 
Scholars have dealt with the most flagrant of the Mirror’s inconsistencies, the 
fluctuation between fortune and providence, in a number of ways. Some attempt to 
understand the Mirror as consistent in its belief structure, others admit and explain its 
inconsistency.5 The former critics understand the volume as didactically consistent: 
following classical and renaissance dialectic, the Mirror authors intend opposing voices 
and points of view to be synthesized into truth—the moral lesson that the dedication 
promises. The exceptions, in other words, prove the rule.6 By contrast, I suggest that 
Baldwin’s editions of the Mirror are better described as dialogic—conversational, 
multivocal, happy to present contradictions and question their own premises, reflecting 
what Baldwin in the prologue to his Treatise of Moral Philosophy (1547) calls the 
“mutuall conuersation of lyfe,” and what one scholar, Jessica Winston, calls a 
“collaborative conversation” (395). I suggest that the “inconsistencies” and contradictions 
that have so troubled critics of the Mirror are, in fact, part of its purpose and appeal. If 
we reevaluate the Mirror’s spectral effects in order to appreciate its dialogic sensibility 
we may better understand why the collection was so well-loved in Elizabethan England 
as well as the influence it exerted on the era’s literature. The Mirror’s poetic effects, I 
                                                 
5 Frederick Kiefer attempts to understand the relation between the two in “Fortune and Providence in the 
Mirror for Magistrates.” See also Budra, “The Mirror for Magistrates and the Shape of De Casibus 
Tragedy.” As Jessica Winston notes, “critics have attempted to resolve some of the contradictions in the 
depiction of fortune and providence in the Mirror, arguing for the compatability of the two ideas, or 
suggesting that the contradition reveals that the Mirror was written in a period of transition from the 
dominance of one idea to the other” (393). I agree with Winston that the relation between fortune and 
providence in the Mirror is neither clear nor consistent. This essay is an attempt to explain the effects of 
such inconsistency and how those effects are achieved.  
6 See, e.g., Peter Mack, Elizabethan Rhetoric, 141ff. 
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 argue, arise from its historiopoetic engagement. Baldwin and his fellow writers use 
ghostly effects to fashion a politically engaged, dialogic text that prompts a conversation 
about the interpretation of history even as it pretends to be a didactic lesson in history’s 
meanings. In so doing, they provide models for ghost complaint poetry as it is practiced 
in the Elizabethan period. 
The 1559 and 1563 versions of the Mirror edited by Baldwin prompted many 
editions, expansions, and spinoffs over the course of several decades. Among the most 
intriguing trends generated by the Mirror was a vogue for ghost complaint poetry in the 
1590s. These late Elizabethan works took the Mirror poems as their pattern. Works such 
as Samuel Daniel’s The Complaint of Rosamond (1592), Thomas Lodge’s The Complaint 
of Elstred (1593), Thomas Churchyard’s rewrite of the 1563 Mirror’s Jane Shore poem 
as The Tragedie of Shore’s Wife (1593), Michael Drayton’s Matilda (1594), John 
Trussell’s The First Rape of Fair Helen (1595), and Thomas Middleton’s The Ghost of 
Lucrece (1600) proliferated in the era.7 In these poems, as in the Mirror, historical and 
legendary figures rise from the dead in order to contest the chronicle accounts in which 
their stories have previously been encoded. The Elizabethan demand for these poems, 
which John Kerrigan identifies as “female complaint,” markedly influenced literary 
history in the early modern period. Shakespeare’s The Rape of Lucrece and A Lover’s 
Complaint, for instance, owe a debt to the complaint tradition. And as Richard Helgerson 
notes, among the most famous of the women from complaint poetry, Jane Shore, “went 
on to be made the subject of plays that redrew the generic map of European drama even 
                                                 
7 See John Kerrigan’s book, Motives of Woe: Shakespeare and ‘Female Complaint’, which remains an 
indispensable overview and analysis of the tradition of female voiced complaint poetry. Poems such as 
William Shakespeare’s The Rape of Lucrece (1594) and A Lover’s Complaint (1609) are indebted to this 
trend. See Heather Dubrow, “A Mirror for Complaints.” 
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 more remarkably than her story had redrawn the generic map of Elizabethan poetry” 
(461). Helgerson and Wendy Wall point out the ways in which early seventeenth century 
domestic tragedy was measurably influenced by complaint poems such as Jane Shore’s. 
Wall suggests that the “Shore’s Wife” story demonstrates a growing interest in “the 
household as an alternative historical space to chronicle” (124). Scholarly work 
proceeding in this direction convincingly demonstrates the need for further investigation 
into the influence of the Mirror on later literary trends.8    
Why did Baldwin’s Mirror volumes prove intriguing enough to later Elizabethan 
poets to serve as objects of imitation? I suggest that part of what intrigues poets such as 
Daniel, Drayton, and even Shakespeare about the Mirror poems is the way in which the 
figure of the ghost revives, in the Mirror authors’ words, the “auncient liberties” of the 
poet (359). The poems continually insist on the autonomy of poetry over and against 
history even as the they animate their ghosts precisely as historical figures that vex 
historical interpretation. This dynamic becomes highly influential for later articulations of 
the power of literary representation such as that of Sir Philip Sidney’s Defence of Poesy 
as well as for later literature.9 The Mirror’s ghost stories, as critics have noted, influence 
literary complaint, domestic tragedy, autobiographical writing, and even index a trend for 
                                                 
8 Recent criticism has focused productively on the Mirror’s aftereffects and its place in Elizabethan culture. 
Meredith Skura, for instance, sees the volume as precursor to autobiography or “life writing” (27), Jim Ellis 
suggests that the Mirror registers the change from “a residual feudalism” to “an emergent capitalism” 
(1052), and Scott Lucas writes about “the role of the Mirror as a text of political critique and commentary” 
(52). Such recent readings are excellent and highly influential for my work here. These critics are 
attempting to combat decades of relative neglect in order to show that the Mirror is both culturally relevant 
and influential for later trends.  
9 Sidney famously makes the case that poetry preceeds and enables history: “historiographers, although 
their lips sound of things done and verity be written in their foreheads, have been glad to borrow both 
fashion and perhance weight of the poets” (5). Part of the argument of this essay is that the Mirror precedes 
and enables Sidney’s argument for the priority of poetics over historiography.  
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 a more inclusive “public political discourse.”10 I am interested here in describing the 
foundational move through which the Mirror exerts such influences. I suggest that the 
resistance to history, the assertion of independence from the perceived biases and 
determinations of the chronicle tradition, constitutes that move. 
I began this chapter with the Earl of Salisbury not only because his poem disputes 
the Mirror’s avowed providentialism, but also because in doing so it perfectly captures 
the way in which the volume’s speaking ghosts can challenge and critique the ways in 
which chronicle history produces meaning. These ghosts are not only fictionalized 
simulacra of past ‘real’ figures; at their most scandalous, they can break their enabling 
frame and question the historicity they represent. Moments of interpretive impasse such 
as the one in the Salisbury poem occur many times in Baldwin’s editions of the Mirror. 
Uncertainty about the volume’s didactic message and its reception by readers becomes a 
motif in the poems. The ghost of the poet Collingbourne, for instance, pleads with 
Baldwin to end the project, citing the uncontrollability of interpretation: “Ceas therefore 
Baldwyn… / Withdrawe thy pen, for nothing shalt thou gayne / Save hate, with losse of 
paper, ynke and payne” (349). In fact, the very first poem of the first edition, featuring 
Robert Tresilian, takes interpretation as its theme—specifically, Tresilian’s penchant for 
“wrest[ing] the sence” from words and therefore misinterpreting the law (73). And two of 
the poems, featuring Owen Glendower and George, Duke of Clarence, are also about 
interpretation and misinterpretation—both cite Merlin and bemoan “false...prophecies / 
That go by letters, siphers, armes, or signes: / Which all be foolish, false and crafty 
lies...” (228). Such poems, depicting limit cases, problems of interpretation, and 
challenges to the volume’s overarching message, occur alongside poems that more 
                                                 
10 Jessica Winston understands the Mirror to “facilitate public political discourse” (400), 
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 straightforwardly demonstrate divine providence. The cumulative effect of this 
uncertainty is less to secure a comforting, providential view of history than to 
demonstrate the difficulty of doing so. The moralizing mode of the Mirror for 
Magistrates, at least in Baldwin’s editions, prompts many questions. Conflicts abound 
between Fortune and Providence, Human and Divine law, and so forth. The Mirror’s 
moralizing is less dogmatic than dialogic. The volume complicates preconceived notions 
of how providence directs historical progress and reveals historical meaning, less 
concerned with unfolding history’s absolute moral truths than with the lament produced 
by our inability to securely know either what history teaches or what God’s lesson plan 
might be. Despite its insitently didactic introduction, the Mirror as a whole is more 
concerned with the questions that history raises than with providing answers to such 
questions.   
Unlike in the modern world, as Blair Worden remarks, in the early modern period 
“Poets and historians were…the same individuals” (72).11 Both a collection of poems and 
a history book, the Mirror for Magistrates exemplifies the way in which sixteenth 
century historian poets felt free to combine the ars historica and the ars poetica. We 
might add that these individuals often, and without contradiction, saw themselves as 
moral philosophers. Baldwin’s other famous and often reprinted work, we might recall, 
was a work of moral philosophy. Later in his life he became a preacher.12 Certainly the 
Mirror promises to be a moral guidebook in the tradition of princely conduct manuals. 
The Mirror, then, is an attempt to write in discourses that were not yet firmly separated in 
the sixteenth century: history, poetry, and philosophy. Though the borders between these 
                                                 
11 Paulina Kewes notes that “Renaissance poetry, drama, and prose historiography, which were often 
written by the same people, routinely shared aims and preoccuptations” (7–8).  
12 John N. King, “Baldwin, William,” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. 
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 fields had been contested since antiquity, early modern humanists would once again 
address the need to define them.13 Such fields would grow into distinct disciplines in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Sir Philip Sidney would famously insist on the 
borders between disciplines in his Defence. In his Novum Organum, Francis Bacon would 
distribute knowledge into the time-honored categories of memory (history), imagination 
(poetry), and reason (philosophy). And seventeenth-century historians from Degory 
Wheare to John Milton (History of Britain) would revive classical distinctions in order to 
keep historical “truth” separate from poetic invention.14 While we may argue about how 
these borders were redrawn or who drew them, few would argue that by the eighteenth 
century these kinds of writing had acquired distinct procedural and formal identities.  
The mid-sixteenth-century Mirror, however, attempts to use the poet’s pen in 
order to write history as moral philosophy. Its well-educated writers could not have been 
unaware of the long standing debates between the practitioners of such discourses since 
Plato. Indeed, they would have considered the ars historica and the ars poetica related 
but distinct,15 and distinct in turn from moral philosophy or a religious doctrinal writing 
they would have termed “divinity.” Yet in writing the Mirror, Baldwin and his cohorts 
were more interested in the shared aims of poetry, history, and philosophy (secular or 
religious) than in respecting the borders between those discourses. For the purposes of 
                                                 
13 The seminal study of the development of early modern historiography is that of F. J. Levy, Tudor 
Historical Thought (1967). See also Herschel Baker, The Race of Time (1967). For recent approaches that 
expand on Levy’s legacy, see the excellent essay collection, The Uses of History in Early Modern England, 
edited by Paulina Kewes (2006). Kewes’ introduction to the volume is cited above. In The Uses of History, 
see particularly Daniel R. Woolf, “From Hystories to the Historical: Five Transitions in Thinking about the 
Past, 1500–1700”; Ian W. Archer, “Discourses of History in Elizabethan and Early Stuart London”; and 
Blair Worden, “Historians and Poets.” The essays in this book are reprinted from Huntington Library 
Quarterly 68.1–2 (2005).   
14 In The Method and Order of Reading Both Civil and Ecclesiastical Histories, Degory Wheare registers 
this growing separation by suggesting that historians are those who write “explications,” “relations,” or 
“narratives” as distinct from “chronicles” or “lives” (17–18).  
15 See Donald R. Kelley and David Harris Sacks, “Introduction” to The Historical Imagination in Early 
Modern Britain. 
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 this chapter, I am less interested in the early modern development of these disciplines—
whether the growth of historiography, the territories defensively staked out by poetry, or 
the move from moral philosophy to more “scientific” approaches—than in what the 
Mirror envisions as their shared aims. The historiopoetic Mirror knowingly performs its 
work in the shared terrain of discourses that were in the slow process of becoming 
separate disciplines.  
With this in mind, we can investigate the memorializing and moralizing aims that 
the Mirror shares with the historiography of the period and the way in which the Mirror 
puts those aims into operation differently. One productive way to do this is to look at 
Hall’s chronicle, one of the history texts that Baldwin and his fellow writers claim to 
have open in front of them as they select their ghosts. As Lily B. Campbell notes, “The 
prose links state explicitly that the work was based upon the histories compiled by 
Fabyan, Halle, and Sir Thomas More. Wherever the chronicles disagreed, the authors 
accepted the authority of Halle” (10). Among the most influential of sixteenth-century 
chronicle histories, Edward Hall’s The Union of the two noble and illustre famelies of 
Lancastre & Yorke opens by inveighing against “Oblivion,” described as “the cancard 
enemie to fame and renoune” and “the dedly darte to the glory of princes.” Hall opposes 
Oblivion, a “sucking serpent” and “dedly beast,” to “memory by litterature…the verie 
dilator and setter furth of Fame.” For Hall, as for early modern historians to follow, such 
memorializing has a moral purpose:    
If no man had written the goodnesse of noble Augustus, nor the pitie of 
mercifull Traian, how shoulde their successours haue folowed ther steppes 
in vertue and princely qualities: on the contrarie parte, if the crueltie of 
Nero, the vngracious life of Caligula had not beene put in remembrance, 
young Princes and fraile gouernors might likewise haue fallen in a like pit, 
but by redyng their vices and seyng their mischeueous ende, thei bee 
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 compelled to leaue their euill waies, and embrace the good qualities of 
notable princes and prudent gouernours: Thus, writyng is the keye to 
enduce vertue, and represse vice. 
 
In this vision, writing about the past becomes the means by which morality and proper 
governance are defined in the present. Indeed, this kind of exemplarity is the hallmark of 
early modern historiography. Whatever else it does and however it changes from the late 
medieval period to the enlightenment, early modern history writing retains this emphasis 
on memory and morality—above all else, early modern historiography preserves and 
moralizes. As Thomas Blundeville writes in 1574, “All those persons vvhose lyues haue 
beene such as are to bee follovved for their excellencie in vertue, or else to be fledde for 
their excellencie in vice, are meete to be chronicled.”16 And Degory Wheare explains that 
history writing is “undertaken to the end that the memory of [particular affairs] may be 
preserved, and so Universals may be the more evidently Confirm’d, by which we may be 
instructed how to live well and Happily” (15). In Hall’s account, history writing bestows 
meaning on past lives by bringing those lives into the present. Princes, governors, and 
nobles may shuffle off their mortal coils, “yet thei by writyng and Fame liue and bee 
continually present: Thus fame triumpheth vpon death, and renoune vpon Obliuion, and 
all by reason of writyng and historie.” Hall’s introduction to The Union of the two noble 
and illustre famelies of Lancastre & Yorke thus previews a central preoccupation of the 
ghost complaint poems of the Mirror: the moral effect of memorializing the dead.  
But a glance at the Salisbury story in the chronicle shows how very differently it 
employs the historiopoetic aims of memorializing and moralizing. When Hall’s chronicle 
comes to the freak accident that kills Salisbury, it does everything it can to both 
                                                 
16 Thomas Blundeville, The true order and Methode of writing and reading Hystories, C2r.  
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 memorialize the Earl and securely moralize his death.17 Hall calls Salisbury a man of 
“wit, strength and pollicio”: 
…in whose power (as it appeared after his deathe) a greate part of the 
conquest consisted and was estemed, because he was a man both painful 
and diligent, redy to withstand thynges perilous and imminent, and prompt 
in counsail, and with no labor be weried, nor yet his corage at any tyme 
abated or appalled, so that all men put no more trust in any one man, nor 
no synguler person gat more the hartes of all men.  
 
This panegyric prepares the reader for the meanings that Hall will make of Salisbury’s 
sudden death. The phrase “as it appeared after his deathe” reminds us that the florid 
praise to follow depends upon a retrospective view of events. Hall’s post-mortem 
memorializing of Salisbury elegiacally speaks for the dead man: his death, “although it 
semed harde and straunge to all other, and to hym as it wer a thyng predestinate very 
easie.” One mourner in Hall’s account laments his loss: “dedde men cannot with sorowe 
be called again, nor lamentacion fordedde bodies cannot remedy the chaunces of men 
liuyng.” We should note here the language of memorializing elegy. Even if Hall’s 
introduction makes much of literature’s ability to make the dead live again, those dead 
live a qualified existence in fame or infamy; they must be safely contained in moralizing 
writing. Unlike the Mirror’s ghostly historiopoetics, Hall’s historiography cannot allow 
“fordedde bodies” to shamble out of the grave to interrupt its narrative, the meanings it 
makes of death. This is the double gesture of elegy: with one hand it buries and with the 
other it praises and eternizes. After Hall describes Salisbury’s death, he tells us about its 
effect: 
what losse succeded to the Englishe publique wealthe, by the sodain death 
of this valiaunt capitain, not long after his departure, manifestly apered. 
For high prosperitie, and great glory of the Englishe nacion in the parties 
beyond the sea, began shortely to fall, and litle and litle to vanishe awaie: 
                                                 
17 The following account cites Hall, fol. ciiii–cvi.  
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 which thing although the Englishe people like a valiant & strong body, at 
the firste tyme did not perceiue, yet after that they felt it grow like a 
pestilent humor, which succesciuely a litle and litle corrupteth all the 
membres, and destroyeth the body. For after the death of this noble man, 
fortune of warre began to change, and triumphant victory began to be 
darckened.  
 
For Hall, Salisbury’s death is the turning point in the Hundred Years’ War. It marks the 
moment at which the English begin to lose by suggesting that the nation becomes 
demoralized by the death of such a highly valued leader. It begins to explain the loss of 
the battle at Orleans in the context of the larger historical narrative. There is, therefore, 
much at stake in moralizing Salisbury’s death: no less than the trajectory of the wars with 
the French.   
 Hall’s historical narrative may appear naively moralizing to us from our historical 
distance, but it is worth remembering that moralizing haunts history writing whether 
ancient, early modern, or modern. As Hayden White suggests in The Content of the 
Form:  
If every fully realized story, however we define that familiar but 
conceptually elusive entity, is a kind of allegory, points to a moral, or 
endows events, whether real or imaginary, with a significance that they do 
not possess as a mere sequence, then it seems possible to conclude that 
every historical narrative has as its latent or manifest purpose the desire to 
moralize the events of which it treats. (14) 
 
White reminds us that narrativity itself is inseparable from “the impulse to moralize 
reality.” No narrative history can therefore escape it. For modern historians this desire 
may be more or less “latent” under whatever disciplinary cover of objectivity is available. 
Hall’s “desire to moralize” is certainly not latent. Yet as hyperbolic as his moralizing 
may appear, he uses it in service of an authoritative account. In reading Salisbury’s death 
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 as a signal moment in the larger historical narrative, Hall’s authority arises from what 
Michel de Certeau calls a “will to objectivity”: 
Even though historiography postulates a continuity (a genealogy), a 
solidarity (an affiliation), and a complicity (a sympathy) between its 
agents and its objects, it nevertheless distinguishes a difference between 
them, a difference established in principle by a will to objectivity. 
(Heterologies 4)  
 
This “will” works to make a “clean break between the past and the present” even as it 
relies on strong sutures across that break. That is, Hall’s account relies on two kinds of 
appeal. The first establishes connections to the past, those Certeau names genealogy, 
affiliation, and sympathy. Hall must see the Salisbury episode as part of a genealogical 
story that will lead, as his title suggests, to the end of the wars (both civil and 
international) in a marriage of the houses of Lancaster and York. What Certeau calls 
“affiliation” we can read in Hall’s account as nationalism: “the great glory of the 
Englishe nacion.” And “complicity” or “sympathy” in Hall’s chronicle is evident in his 
use of pathos—in the Salisbury story, the lament for the dead (and battles lost) that 
includes the audience in shared affective response. If these appeals are to similarity, the 
second kind of appeal is to difference. Certeau writes about the “will to objectivity”:  
The space it organizes is divided and hierarchical. That space has an 
“own” [un propre] (the present of this historiography) and an “other” (the 
“past”) under study. …the discourse of interpretive knowledge subjugates 
the known, cited, represented past. 
 
Hall’s knowledge relies on the historian’s perspective from the present, subjugating the 
past as other. The events he describes have a telos to which he has access—the union of 
warring factions—and Salisbury’s death must be interpreted in that frame. Salisbury’s 
death must mean something relative to the larger narrative, which can only be grasped 
from the retrospective position of the historian. In order to signify in this way, it cannot 
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 be chalked up to the vagaries of Fortune. What’s past is prologue. Understanding the 
Salisbury episode in this sense requires a privileging of the narrative end, the perspective 
of the present, in order to create knowledge from past events.  
 That history creates a break with the past even as it draws connections to it will 
not surprise scholars, least of all historians. And Hall’s particular brand of historical 
melodrama—distinguishing virtue and vice, identifying heroes and villains—is common 
to sixteenth-century exemplary history. In this sense, the problems raised by Hall’s 
historiography are perfectly banal. For the purposes of this study, however, it is worth 
giving a name to this kind of history writing in order to see clearly how the ghosts of 
complaint poetry employ and contest it. Let us borrow a term from Friedrich Nietzsche, 
then, and call Hall’s history “monumental.”18 The word “monumental” modifies 
“history” in much the same way as “elegiac” modifies “poetry.” Monumental history 
stands for the object that historians such as Hall have made of the past—the way they 
have buried the dead, mourned them, and resignified their lives as calls to greatness. For 
Nietzsche, monumental history works because we “are strengthened and made happy by 
gazing on past greatness,”  
as though man’s life were a lordly thing, and the fairest fruit of this bitter 
tree were the knowledge that there was once a man who walked sternly 
and proudly through this world, another who had pity and loving-kindness, 
another who lived in contemplation, but all leaving one truth behind 
them—that his life is the fairest who thinks least about life. The common 
man snatches greedily at this little span with tragic earnestness, but they, 
on their way to monumental history and immortality, knew how to greet it 
with Olympic laughter, or at least with a lofty scorn; and they went down 
to their graves in irony—for what had they to bury? Only what they had 
always treated as dross, refuse, and vanity, and which now falls into its 
true home of oblivion, after being so long the sport of their contempt. One 
thing will live, the sign manual of their inmost being, the rare flash of 
                                                 
18 Nietzsche, The Use and Abuse of History, 12–17. 
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 light, the deed, the creation; because posterity cannot do without it. (13–
14)     
 
Memorialization seeks to both preserve and bury the dead; it erects monuments that 
assign meaning to past lives, dealing with loss through attempts to entomb and idealize; 
and moralization attempts a mastery of the past through received understandings of 
history, whether religious or secular, by which to evaluate past lives. Nietzsche’s poetic 
rendering of this memorializing and moralizing direction as “monumental history” nicely 
captures this elegiac set of concerns and its use value for the living. Hall memorializes 
Salisbury as a monument to the battle of Orleans, the point at which the martial fortunes 
of the English take a turn for the worse. Hall moralizes Salisbury’s life as one of the 
honored and heroic dead that line the road to the ultimate triumph of the “Englishe 
people.” In Hall’s story, the English, “like a valiant & strong body,” suffered through 
sickness and war to get to marriage and prosperity. We may say, then, that Hall renders 
the Salisbury story as monumental history. In light of Nietzsche’s reading of what this 
means, we can understand better Hall’s rendering of Salisbury’s death as, to the Earl 
himself, “a thyng predestinate very easie.” Like Nietzsche’s imagined hero stoically 
greeting his own death with “Olympic laughter,” Hall’s Salisbury faces death with ease. 
Hall reads back the ethic of his own discourse onto the dead. As we have seen, it is 
precisely this monumental quality of Hall’s narrative that the Salisbury ghost in the 
Mirror contests.     
Both Hall’s chronicle and the Mirror memorialize the dead and moralize their 
lives. For Hall, memorializing promises to bring the dead back to life, but that turns out 
to be a mode of monumental historicism. Hall brings back the dead only insofar as he can 
freeze them in the amber of moralizing writing. History writing—what Hall calls 
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 “litterature”—provides the dead with a moralized story, a “fame” that eternizes them as 
figures of either virtue or vice. From the perspective of the living, the dead survive in 
memory because historians have pronounced on the moral value of their stories, their 
ability to either “enduce vertue” or “represse vice.” The memorializing of ghost 
complaint poetry, on the other hand, is more likely to destabilize the moralizations of the 
present than to secure them. Hall’s monumental historicism, like any such elegiac 
discourse, must founder when the dead return to speak on their own behalf.  
The conceit of Baldwin’s 1559 Mirror is that the authors are in a room together 
one evening selecting their subjects from Fabyan’s and Hall’s chronicles. They pretend to 
be choosing from the histories which stories to represent in ghost poems, then reading the 
poems to each other. This mythical night of exchanging ghost stories is a framing fiction, 
a conceit giving the impression that the poems are composed on the spot as the ghosts 
possess their poets. The imagined gathering represents the voices of eight poets. More 
often than not the voices are detached from particular names with phrases such as “quoth 
one,” “another said,” “the company said,” and so on, making a ghostly octet of which we 
are given only two names in the first Mirror: William Baldwin and George Ferrers.19 In 
the narrative frame, the poets have agreed that each of the ghosts will speak to Baldwin. 
As Baldwin himself writes in the introduction, the poets “al agreed” that “the wretched 
princes” should “complayne unto me” (69). Baldwin’s Mirror, in other words, employs a 
self-conscious prosopopeia that fictionalizes the voices of the poets as they voice their 
                                                 
19 Only these two names are given in the 1559 edition. Later editions name others (such as Chaloner, 
Sackville, and Phaer), though only sporadically; many of the poems still go without attribution. See 
Campbell’s introduction (9–10). Throughout this chapter, I will refer to only the first edition of 1559 and its 
sequel in 1563, both edited by William Baldwin, with the phrase “the Mirror.” Other editions, copies, and 
expansions also called Mirror for Magistrates followed the first two as other editors took over the project. 
None of the editions to follow, however, would have the impact of Baldwin’s. 
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 ghosts. Keeping this conceit in mind, we can profitably ask how it is that the poets are 
taken aback when the Salisbury ghost refutes their providential project. 
In the prose link following the Salisbury poem, the Mirror writers (again, as 
imagined and penned by Baldwin) bemoan their inability to moralize Salisbury’s 
accidental death: “this straunge aduenture of the good erle drave vs al into a dumpne, 
inwardly lamenting his wofull destynye.” When, on the other hand, the Duke of Suffolk 
falls, the authors “reioyce[] to heare of a wicked man so righteously punished.” The prose 
links model the reader’s response in feigned lamenting and rejoicing after the ghost 
speeches. Such affective modeling invites readers to participate in a conversation about 
the meaning of history by assuring them that not even the authors know beforehand what 
the ghosts will say or how to moralize their speeches. If Baldwin and his cohorts had 
desired a simpler, perhaps less poetic kind of moralizing—a “looking glass” in which 
vice is punished, as the dedication promises—they could easily have chosen only those 
figures in whose righteous punishment they could rejoice—figures which would simply 
and consistently reinforce the providential model. But, as they say, the Mirror “is a 
Poesie and no diuinitye” (346). 
We can also see prosopopeia at work to its full, ghostly potential when 
Salisbury’s speech causes surprise in the chorus of poets. Speaking for dead works as 
temporal palimpsest, creating the possibility that the voices of the dead may contest those 
of the present. As in a ventriloquist’s act, the object ventriloquized is most interesting and 
uncanny when it seems to take the ventriloquist by surprise—when it seems to speak 
without the ventriloquist’s volition and against his or her design. Clearly the Salisbury 
poem aims for similar effects. The poem, however, complicates and accentuates this 
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 effect by spectralizing the poet. Though Salisbury addresses Baldwin, the prose link that 
precedes his poem denies us knowledge of the author. Though the prose link cites him, it 
does so anonymously: “quoth one…I wyll take vppon me the person of Thomas 
Mountague earle of Salysburye…” (142). We never find out who this “one” is. What 
happens when anonymous voice takes on the voice of a ghost? At this level of 
complexity, prosopopeia creates harmonics and dissonances between absent (past) and 
present voices, threatening the seemingly secure borders between past and present, dead 
and living. It invites the kind of disturbance Jacques Derrida describes as “spectrality” in 
Specters of Marx, in which the past operates inside the present. The more effective the 
prosopopeia, the greater the sense that the poet’s voice is possessed by the ghost’s and 
dispossessed of his own intention.20  
Salisbury’s opening speech to Baldwin amply demonstrates the way in which the 
figure of the ghost embodies a doubled, metaleptic perspective. The ghost spends the 
bulk of the poem recounting the events of its life from a first person perspective, but it 
also looks back on those events from the distance of Baldwin’s present. In the following 
stanza, the ghost speaks directly to the poet figure of the way in which events are 
resignified in hindsight: 
The ende in dede, is iudge of euery thing, 
Which is the cause, or latter poynt of time: 
The first true verdyct at the first may bryng, 
The last is slow, or slipper as the slime, 
Oft chaunging names of innocence and crime. 
Duke Thomas death was Iustice two yeres long, 
And euer sence sore tiranny and wrong. (144) 
 
                                                 
20 In fact, “voice” and “intention” are close to interchangeable here; Paul de Man reminds us that the former 
is a metaphor for the latter (Allegories of Reading, 18). 
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 This passage and those like it slip between cause and effect in a way that is difficult to 
interpret. Salisbury speaks of two kinds of causes. The first is the reason for action. The 
opening of the poem is dedicated to clearing the name of the Earl’s father, John, who 
took up what the ghost claims was a noble cause inspiring action that happened to 
contribute to events that turned out badly. The second kind of “cause” is historical, an 
inciting incident—regardless of motivational causes that may prompt individuals to 
action—that leads to the present. This second kind of cause represents the way 
providentialism tries to make sense of history. Salisbury suggests that “the cause” (the 
first kind) and not the “causal spede” (the second kind) “is to be wayed in euery kinde of 
dede.” Moral lessons change with time and circumstance, and we revalue past actions 
given our ability to view them in hindsight. History, then, according to Salisbury (and he 
is not the only Mirror ghost who says so), is created after the fact, and events will be 
given the valence of “innocence” or “crime” by those in the present who seek to control 
interpretation of the past according to changeable current values and power structures. 
Using the same emphasis on memorializing and moralizing reconfigured by 
ghostly poetics, the Mirror plays havoc with Hall’s monumental historicizing. As 
Nietzsche says, the object of monumental history “is to depict effects at the expense of 
causes—‘monumentally,’  
that is, as examples for imitation; it turns aside, as far as it may, from 
reasons, and might be called with far less exaggeration a collection of 
‘effects in themselves’ than of events that will have an effect on all ages. 
The events of war or religion cherished in our popular celebrations are such 
‘effects in themselves’; it is these that will not let ambition sleep, and lie 
like amulets on the bolder hearts—not the real historical nexus of cause 
and effect, which, rightly understood, would only prove that nothing quite 
similar could ever be cast again from the dice-boxes of fate and the future. 
(15)  
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 When Salisbury’s ghost returns from the dead in the Mirror, he disavows the “causal 
spede” that Hall relies on to create historical narrative. By insisting on the rule of fate, 
which “gideth al the game” (143), Salisbury insists on what Nietzsche calls the “real 
historical nexus of cause and effect,” a crapshoot that cannot authorize monumental 
history. 
 Salisbury’s musings about causes and “causal spede” occur in a conversation with 
the poet that takes place in the present looking back on historical events. “Baldwin,” the 
ghost demands, “waye the cause.” The ghost pleads with those in the present to take 
intention into account when judging past figures, not the resulting events or the way in 
which history has made its heroes and villains after the fact. The authority for such a plea 
is based on the point of view of a ghost who was a participant in events and now also 
understands the use history has made of those events. Such a perspective—that of both 
the eyewitness and the historian—imaginatively trumps the singular perspective from the 
present. In this respect, the poet triumphs over the historian. At stake is the way in which 
moral lessons are drawn from the past. A later poem in the 1559 Mirror takes up the issue 
of “causes” again. This time, the speaker is not an innocent victim of Fortune but one 
who clearly deserves death, as we can tell from the title of the poem, “The infamous ende 
of Lord Iohn Tiptoft Earle of Wurcester, for cruelly executing his princes butcherly 
commanundementes” (197). For this ghost, stories about the past should be told truly, 
“Feare, nor favour, truth of things to spare,” but the biases of those who tell them prevent 
it, so that “stories never can be true” (198). The ghost accuses chronicle writers in 
particular of writing useless or partial history: 
Vnfruytfull Fabyan folowed the face 
Of time and dedes, but let the causes slip: 
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 Whych Hall hath added, but with double grace, 
For feare I thinke least trouble might him trip: 
For this or that (sayeth he) he felt the whip. 
Thus story writers leave the causes out, 
Or so rehears them, as they wer in dout. 
 
The two chronicle histories that the volume as a whole claims as source materials are 
here put in question. Fabyan presents no historical “causes” and Hall’s are overly 
influenced by his desire to appease the powerful and elude punishment. The ghost 
continues: 
And therefore Baldwin eyther speake vpright  
Of our affayres, or touche them not at all: 
As for my selfe I waye al thinges so light, 
That nought I passe how men report my fall. 
The truth wherof yet playnly shew I shall, 
That thou mayst write, and other therby rede, 
What thinges I did, wherof they should take hede. (199) 
 
Here we can see both the doubling of perspective (perspectival metalepsis) and voice 
(prosopopeia) at work. The ghost claims authority over historians by virtue of its first 
person narrative. It tells us it will speak the truth about its life. The poet persona, 
Baldwin, will take dictation. The audience will read and learn. The confusion between 
speech and writing, however, is no accident. Baldwin is asked to both “write” and 
“speake” here. And again we are not told in the prose links who of the eight poets writes 
(or speaks) the poem. The authority over the historian ostensibly results from the first 
person quality of the narrative. However, any authority (moral or otherwise) that such a 
narrator might provide for the reader is put in doubt not only because of the ghost’s 
ostentatiously fictionalized doubled perspective as a figure of the past occupying the 
present but because the poetic voice (and writing) that gives it form and presence bears a 
forged signature, “Baldwin,” that draws attention to its own forgery. In the Mirror, poetic 
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memorializing in the form of prosopopeia and perspectival metalepsis deconstructs the 
poem’s ability to apply doctrine and demand judgment.        
Critics have sometimes understood Baldwin’s Mirror as oppressively moralistic 
in contrast to the seemingly more complicated, ambiguous, and irreverent poetic 
productions of the late sixteenth century superstars such as Spenser, Sidney, and 
Shakespeare. But by crafting the Mirror poems as a conversation—creating a dialogic 
exchange with both the prose links and the varied ghost speeches—its authors employ a 
kind of moralizing that challenges the audience to interpret. The Mirror authors 
understand something of what Spenser sees as the necessity of “darke conceit” in framing 
moral lessons. They “like it the better,” as Baldwin writes after the Lord Hastings poem, 
because it is “very darke, and hard to be understood.” It is “written for the learned.” This 
quality promises to “cause it to be the oftener reade, and the better remembred.”21 In fact, 
the learned poets of the 1590s do read and remember the Mirror. Baldwin’s volumes 
prompt the kind of conversation they model. In so doing, they exert a marked influence 
on sixteenth-century literary history. When Sidney’s famous Defence valorizes poets, 
who “borrow nothing of what is, hath been, or shall be; but range, only reined with 
learned discretion, into the divine consideration of what may be and should be” (11), 
against historians, whose work is “captived to the truth of a foolish world” (21), it seems 
fair to say that the Mirror has already made the same argument.  
 
 
 
 
21 “When I had read this, one sayd it was very darke, and hard to be vnderstoode: excepte it were diligently 
and very leasurely considered. I like it the better (quoth an other.) For that shal cause it to be the oftener 
reade, and the better remembred. Considering also that it is written for the learned (for such all Magistrates 
are or should be) it can not be to hard, so long as it is sound and learnedly wrytten” (297). 
 CHAPTER II 
 
AETHETICIZING JANE SHORE 
 
Anyone living in England between the early sixteenth and the eighteenth centuries 
could scarcely have avoided encountering some version, even multiple versions, of the 
story of Jane Shore.1 Jane, the story goes, was the pretty, young wife of a London 
goldsmith named Shore. She caught the eye of the lascivious King Edward IV, became 
his mistress, and rose to a position of prominence at court. When Edward died, Jane was 
vilified by his successor. The notorious tyrant Richard III, then Protector of the Realm, 
imprisoned her and confiscated her possessions. She lived out the remainder of her life in 
poverty. “Shore’s wife,” as she came to be known, would have her story written and 
rewritten many times over in the early modern period into the eighteenth century. She 
would figure prominently in histories, poems, plays, and ballads.2 To read the Jane Shore 
story, then, is to read a palimpsest. In fact, to call Shore’s wife “Jane” already reads her 
in this way, since that forename comes from two stage plays by Thomas Heywood 
published in 1599. It was not “Jane,” but “Elizabeth” Lambert, born circa 1450, who 
would marry the goldsmith William Shore and become King Edward’s concubine.3 
                                                 
1 D. F. Rowan suggests that “for over two centuries the tragic story of Jane Shore was familiar to every 
Englishman” (447). 
2 For an enumeration of the many versions of the Jane Shore story, see James L. Harner, “Jane Shore in 
Literature: A Checklist.”  
3 See Nicholas Barker, “The Real Jane Shore,” esp. 385. Heywood names Shore’s wife “Jane” in his plays, 
The First and Second Partes of King Edward the Fourth (1599).  
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 Elizabeth is all but lost to history and literature, though her protean avatar, Jane, persists 
in both.4  
Scholars such as Richard Helgerson and Wendy Wall have read Jane Shore as a 
figure for an emergent bourgeois class in its struggle with monarchical hierarchies, or, 
similarly, for the growing importance of a domestic sphere that increasingly registers as a 
crucial political and historical category.5 In this narrative, Jane becomes a figure for 
assaulted domesticity. The changing iterations of her story index the rise of Jacobean 
domestic tragedy, prefiguring what Nicholas Rowe calls “she-tragedy” in the Restoration 
and “domestic” or “bourgeois” literature of the eighteenth century (Helgerson 456). This 
draws a developmental line between Jane Shore and Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa or 
other sentimental novels featuring fallen women. If we pan out to view the Jane Shore 
palimpsest in the longue durée, such an evolutionary pattern begins to look undeniable. 
Indeed, it seems possible to read for the roots of that story even in Jane’s first appearance 
in chronicle history. As with many such developmental narratives, however, a wide lens 
threatens to obscure local detail and force a particular reading of origins. Upon closer 
inspection, readings of Jane Shore as a domestic or bourgeois figure turn out to read 
backwards from Jane’s appearance in dramatic literature. Jane’s story first makes a 
                                                 
4 For descriptions of representations of Jane Shore from the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries, see Maria 
M. Scott, Re-Presenting “Jane” Shore. 
5 See Richard Helgerson, “Weeping for Jane Shore,” for an indispensible analysis of the story as it develops 
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. As Helgerson incisively observes, “That the story of an 
adulterous middle-class woman would dare aspire to the aristocratic and largely masculine realms of 
history and tragedy has always been felt (whatever the story’s popular success) as profoundly 
transgressive” (453). I agree. In fact, one of the aims of 1590s ghost complaints will be to enact such 
transgression and consider its implications. Overall, Helgerson sees the evolution of the Jane Shore stories 
in a Marxist frame. In his words, “Shore’s wife is a representative figure whose troubling encounter with 
history suggests the possibility that tragic emotion may not be the exclusive province of the great, that 
something like what would later be called “bourgeois” or “domestic” tragedy is not simply a ridiculous 
misnomer” (456). See Wendy Wall, “Forgetting and Keeping,” in which Wall also relies on Thomas 
Heywood’s Edward IV plays (1599) to make the case for Jane as a domestic paragon and for “the 
household as an alternative historical space to chronicle, one that allows citizens to write themselves into 
national history” (124). 
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 sustained effort to depict the domestic realm in conflict with the court in Thomas 
Heywood’s Edward IV plays at the very end of the Elizabethan period. Before that, the 
case for Jane as a domestic icon is more difficult to make. In this chapter I do not mean to 
contest the reading of Jane Shore in relation to the emergent bourgeois sphere. Rather, I 
want to leave it in place, but carefully bracketed. I am concerned here with how Jane 
becomes widely known in the first place, before she becomes a figure for assaulted 
domesticity in dramatic literature. Jane’s rise to prominence through the sixteenth century 
reveals the path through which she becomes appropriable for later literary movements. 
Jane’s emergence as a popular figure, as it turns out, is a ghost story.          
In this chapter I show how Jane Shore haunts the Tudor period and what that 
haunting means for the era’s spectral aesthetics in general and the trajectory of ghost 
complaint poetry in particular. I read the two accounts of Jane Shore that become by far 
the most influential for the sixteenth century, Thomas More’s and Thomas Churchyard’s. 
Jane is first written into chronicle history by More in his History of King Richard the 
Third (c. 1520). More’s becomes the accepted historical account, adopted by chronicles 
throughout the sixteenth century such as those of Hall and Hollinshed.6 Jane first appears 
in poetry as a ghost in Thomas Churchyard’s “Shore’s wife,” included in the 1563 Mirror 
for Magistrates. Churchyard’s poem then becomes the pattern for ghost complaints of the 
1590s, a decade in which Jane reappears in many literary settings, ghostly and otherwise. 
The competing figurations of Jane Shore in More’s chronicle history and Churchyard’s 
ghost poem give rise to a number of interrelated concerns that occupy ghost complaint 
                                                 
6 See George M. Logan’s “Introduction” to The History of King Richard the Third, esp. xliii–li. “Reprinted 
more often than any other historical work of the era, and highly admired, the History was in one sense 
enormously influential: presenting with surpassing eloquence the damning early view of Richard, More’s 
work sealed the historical fate of an English king” (xliv). All citations of Thomas More in this chapter are 
from Logan’s edition.  
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 poetry and therefore this dissertation. These concerns include the related and sometimes 
conflicting work of pathos and moralizing; the fraught relation between the poet (or the 
historian) and the woman he voices (or narrates); and the slippery rhetorical relation 
between praise and blame and therefore, for ghosts such as Jane who rely on fame or 
infamy for their continued existence, redemption and damnation. I understand each of 
these concerns in relation to the way in which Jane’s story participates in an agonistic 
interplay between historiography and poetics. I am interested here in the way in which 
sixteenth-century poets like Churchyard attempt to draw their subjects from the grasp of 
history and refigure them as a literary artifacts. This chapter will show how Churchyard, 
through such aestheticizing processes, substitutes the authority of a woman’s word for 
that of the historian.  
I draw on Theodor Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory when I suggest that, in the 
sixteenth century, history exerts a structuring force on ghost complaint poems that 
constitute themselves precisely in the attempt to achieve autonomous distance from that 
history. Yet my use of Adorno’s work here is faithful neither to the complexity of his 
theory as a whole nor the terms in which he articulates it. With apologies to Adorno 
purists, then, I will summarize what I find useful in Aesthetic Theory then promptly 
modify it. I adapt Adorno’s general theory of aesthetics in order to outline a specific 
theory of the spectral aesthetics of ghost complaint poetry. Adorno suggests that “art 
acquires its specificity by separating itself from what it developed out of; its law of 
movement is its law of form” (3). But by no means do works of art ever fully escape that 
from which they “developed out of”—“it is precisely as artifacts, as products of social 
labor, that they also communicate with the empirical experience that they reject and from 
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 which they draw their content” (5). “The unsolved antagonisms of reality return in 
artworks as immanent problems of form” (6). Adorno’s principles are sound for the 
aesthetics of Elizabethan ghost complaint, but the terms must first be altered. The ground 
that ghost complaint poems push away is not “empirical experience” but already encoded 
history.7 Such poems remain sensitive to the fact (indeed, they rely on it) that history is 
by no means “reality” or a transparent version of the “social.” The spectral aesthetic 
arises in refiguring histories that writers know are already suspect rather than inevitable 
figurations of the “real” or the “social.” The addition of the category of history to 
Adorno’s formulation responds to ghost complaint’s mode of operation, in which 
characters from chronical accounts return from the dead to contest the third-person 
narratives of their lives and deaths by offering their first-person retellings of those events. 
Yet Adorno’s formulation usefully reminds us that even as poets distinguish their 
rewritings from the historical accounts, and, in many cases, contest the imagined biases 
of the historians, the “unsolved antagonisms” generated by the historical narratives 
structure the poetic ones. The ghosts return from the dead to address the problems 
generated by the way in which they have been encoded in historical narratives. 
Furthermore, like any aesthetic object ghost complaint poetry is necessarily a product of 
the time in which it is written; it is structured by both the concerns that emerge from the 
historical record from which it separtes itself and the “social” concerns of the moment of 
writing.  
                                                 
7 Throughout this essay, I use “history” to refer to a retrospective view of social events or ‘real’ people as 
that view is encoded in narrative form, “historiography” to refer to the methodologies and techniques used 
to create history, and “historicity” to refer to the quality through which something or someone comes to 
register as authentically historical.  
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 Early modern writers call upon a rich array of statements on the beautiful and the 
sublime from Plato and Aristotle to Horace and Longinus. Renaissance authors from the 
Italian Neoclassicists to English writers such as Sir Philip Sidney also advance such 
statements. Even so, the word “aesthetic” carries modern theoretical weight. Thus loaded, 
Adorno’s theory threatens wrenching anachronisms in an early modern context. By 
excerpting Aesthetic Theory rather than adopting it in its systemic fullness, however, we 
can contextualize Adorno’s insights in early modern poetics. For the English Tudor 
period in particular, adding the category of history to Adorno’s theory contextualizes 
aesthetics in the ever-deepening distinctions between historiography and poetics that 
become crucial to early modern understandings of the work of each of these sibling 
domains. The early modern arts of history and poetry find themselves locked in a tug of 
war that will result (albeit haltingly and over the course of many decades) in a much 
greater distance between the two. Historiography makes increasingly strident claims to 
“scientificity,” to use Michel Foucault’s word, in the age of Bacon and Descartes, while 
poetics emphasizes its relation to the supranatural and to the divine.8 We can easily detect 
the struggle that will prompt such disciplinary separation in Sir Philip Sidney’s “Defence 
of Poesy” (1595). In the following passage, for instance, Sidney claims that “poesy” 
precedes and enables historiography: 
                                                 
8 See F. J. Levy, Tudor Historical Thought. See also the references in my “historiopoetics” discussion (xx–
xx). In thinking about the ars historica and ars poetica as “discourses” that struggle to separate, I draw on 
Michel Foucault’s Archaeology of Knowledge. Foucault identifies a chronology of “thresholds” crossed by 
“discursive formations,” involving ever greater determination and reification. In increasing order of 
determination, these are “positivity,” “epistemologization,” “scientifictiy,” and “fomalization” (186–87). 
Following Foucault, we can point out the way in which the discourse of historiography separates from 
poetics by gaining more “scientificity” and formalizing itself. In a progressive model, this would lead to 
eighteenth-century narrative histories, which make claims to greater objectivity than their chronicle 
predecessors. Though, to do justice to Foucault, such formations are not necessarily predictably 
progressive: “their chronology, in fact, is neither regular nor homogenous” (187). On the break between 
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century systems of representation and the emergence of empiricism, see also 
Foucault’s The Order of Things, esp. pp. 46–76. 
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 …historiographers (although their lips sound of things done, and verity be 
written in their foreheads) have been glad to borrow both fashion and, 
perchance, weight of poets. So Herodotus entitled his History by the name 
of the nine Muses; and both he and all the rest that followed him either 
stale [sic] or usurped of poetry their passionate describing of passions, the 
many particularities of battles, which no man could affirm; or, if that be 
denied me, long orations put in the mouths of great kings and captains, 
which it is certain they never pronounced. So that truly neither philosopher 
nor historiographer could at the first have entered into the gates of popular 
judgements, if they had not taken a great passport of poetry…9  
 
This is one of the ways in which Sidney argues for the superiority of poetics over 
historiography. Throughout the “Defence,” Sidney aims to show that the historian 
produces the “less fruitful doctrine” (221). If “truth” is at issue, history has no great claim 
to it. Poetry, on the other hand, provides “true doctrine” by virtue of its “weight”—its 
greater access to the timeless meaning of contingent events (240). And if what is at stake 
is the “passionate describing of passions” or the influencing of “popular judgements,” 
poetry simply does these things better than history does. Sidney’s insistence on 
continually returning to historiography against which to define poetry nevertheless 
highlights the close kinship between the two fields.    
In his Advancement of Learning (1605), Sir Francis Bacon echoes Sidney’s claims 
even as he attempts to reinstall the distinction between “feigned” poetry and “true” 
history: 
…because true history propoundeth the successes and issues of actions not 
so agreeable to the merits of virtue and vice, therefore poesy feigns them 
more just in retribution and more according to revealed providence; 
because true history representeth actions and events more ordinary and 
less interchanged, therefore poesy endueth them with more rareness and 
more unexpected and alternative variations: so as it appeareth that poesy 
serveth and confereth to magnanimity, morality, and to delectation.10 
 
                                                 
9 Sir Philip Sidney, “The Defence of Poesy” in Sir Philip Sidney: The Major Works, 214 (my emphasis). 
10 Sir Francis Bacon’s The Advancement of Learning excerpted in Critical Theory Since Plato, 193.  
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 Bacon cites a catalogue of poetic imitations of history, such as “feigned chronicles, 
feigned lives, and the appendices of history, as feigned epistles, feigned orations, and the 
rest.” Such poetic endeavors, as the repetition of the word “feigned” insists, work as 
“mere imitation of history.” For Bacon, poetry clearly has its uses. As he says, echoing 
Sidney, it can “raise and erect the mind” and offer itself more auspiciously to “man’s 
nature and pleasure.” Yet Bacon, famous for his “empirical method,” cannot allow poetry 
the range and force that Sidney does. Sidney and Bacon typify an ongoing conversation 
about the relative merits and priority of history and poetry. Any notion of the aesthetics 
of sixteenth-century poetry must be informed not only by well-known classical and 
neoclassical theories of poetic power, but also by expressions of the grounds and limits of 
that power in an age in which poetics and historiography struggle to define themselves 
against one another. The sticking point in this struggle, as the conversation between 
Sidney and Bacon makes clear, is truth-value. Of course, conversations about the truth-
value of art (as opposed to whatever seemingly more reliable epistemological system 
comes to hand) begin with Plato and never seem to go out of fashion. What is important 
to notice here is that in the sixteenth century, writers and readers habitually measure the 
kind of “truth” that poetry offers against historical “truth.” 
These sixteenth-century parameters lend an aesthetic charge to poetry’s ghosts. 
Framed in relation to the historical world, aesthetic objects deliver what Sidney famously 
calls a “golden world” (216) that lifts up the mundane—in Bacon’s words, “actions and 
events…ordinary”—into the “rareness” of what both authors call the “divine.” Poetry 
escapes the tyranny of time to which history is more closely tied. As Sidney puts it, 
speaking of a painting of Lucrece, the “imitation” of painters “borrow nothing of what is, 
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 hath been, or shall be; but range, only reined with learned discretion, into the divine 
consideration of what may be and should be.” The figure of the ghost, perhaps more 
explicitly than any other aesthetic phenomenon in the period, escapes “what is, hath been, 
or shall be”—the material inevitability of birth, development, decay, and death. In its 
very appearance, the ghost exceeds such material contingencies. When the specters in 
ghost complaint poetry speak from this extracorporeal position, they do so from not only 
the first person perspective of their living years but also a perspective from the present 
looking back on those years as well as the way in which history has encoded their lives 
and deaths. The writer’s prosopopeia of the ghost, in short, enables a metaleptic 
perspective that exceeds the “ordinary” experience of the writer as well as the reader. 
This too is an effect that Adorno ascribes to aesthetic objects. Wolfram Schmidgen 
suggests that for Adorno, the aesthetic experience involves “the escape from 
determination and reification” which takes “the form of a loss of subjective agency in the 
encounter with a powerfully animated object.”11 Sixteenth-century literary ghosts 
represent this kind of encounter. Fleeing the “determination and reification” of history, 
the “powerfully animated” ghosts materialize through prosopopeia and speak 
metaleptically. To the degree that these animations succeed in producing ghostly effects, 
the writer of ghost complaint poetry necessarily gives over “subjective agency” to the 
ghost. And to the degree that such ghostly effects succeed for audiences, they threaten a 
similar loss of agency. In his encounter with the ghost that claims to be his dead father, 
Hamlet famously models this kind of loss.  
Yet if an aesthetic object like a ghost functions by robbing us of subjective 
agency—and leads us, like so many Hamlets, not to prompt judgment but to 
                                                 
11 Wolfram Schmidgen, “Reembodying the Aesthetic,” 64. 
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 philosophical speculation and dehiscence—how does it direct us toward, in Sidney’s 
words, “true doctrine”? Or put another way, once the ghost has taken over control of 
history precisely by breaking its rules, once she has dismantled the field of difference 
through which she appears by virtue of her escape from the past, on what basis can she 
speak the truth either of the past or the present? This is a question ghost complaint poetry 
ceaselessly asks of itself. It is a question that each writer of ghost complaint must 
encounter and to which each must find his own answer. Perhaps it is one version of a 
perennial question about the power and use value of the aesthetic; yet, more locally, it is 
the defining question—sometimes the paradox—of ghost complaint, as I hope to make 
clear in what follows by tracing sixteenth-century spectral aesthetics through one 
particular figure that would prompt the trend for 1590s female voiced ghost complaint.      
Elizabeth “Jane” Shore, who would become such an influential specter, was still 
living in the early sixteenth century. The first writer to encode her in a historical 
narrative, Thomas More, knew her in her latter days as an “old, lean, withered, and dried 
up” remnant of the “fair face” she once was (65). Even as he knew her to persist in the 
realm of the living, More began the tradition of appropriating her body for use in 
chronicle history. Though the forename does not appear in More’s text, the legendary 
figure who would become “Jane” Shore appears first in his History. More, as we will see, 
first provides the aestheticizing hints that poets will take up when they refigure Jane as a 
literary object. More is constrained, however, by a third-person narrative form that relies 
on the authoritative gaze of the historian. As much as he uses her “fair face” to generate 
pity, for instance, and therefore nurture the reader’s disapproval of her tormentor, 
Richard III, More nevertheless must present the historical facts—or at least the 
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 convincing appearance of facticity—required by his form of address. Poets who are not 
similarly constrained will provide Jane with a forum for her ghostly reappearances. By 
the 1590s, when Samuel Daniel’s ghost complaint claims that Jane “passes for a Saint,” 
she will have become a sign for much more than she or her first chronicler would have 
been likely to imagine.12 How does a woman known originally for her adulterous 
relationship with a king become a saint, even if only in a self-consciously secular, literary 
sense? Such a transformation seems unlikely, especially in a culture that so highly values 
moralizing exemplarity and patriarchal standards of chastity for women. In order to 
understand this counterintuitive result, we need to first understand the contests that play 
out under cover of that false and proper name, Jane Shore.  
Versions of the Jane Shore story from More’s to the 1590s worry about what it 
means to give such a woman a place in a historical narrative. As King Richard himself 
has it when he rises from the grave in one 1590s ghost complaint poem, Giles Fletcher’s 
The Rising to the Crowne of Richard the Third (1593),  
Shores wife, a subject, though a Princesse mate,  
Had little cause her fortune to lament.  
Her birth was meane, and yet she liv’d with State,  
The King was dead before her honour went.  
     Shores wife might fall, and none can justly wonder,  
     To see her fall, that useth to lye under.  
[…] 
Nor weepe I nowe, as children that have lost, 
But smyle to see the Poets of this age: 
Like silly boates in shallow rivers tost,  
Loosing their paynes, and lacking still their wage.  
     To write of women, and of womens falles,  
     Who are too light, for to be fortunes balles.13  
 
                                                 
12 Samuel Daniel, Delia with the Complaint of Rosamond 1592, H3v. 
13 Giles Fletcher, Licia, or Poemes of loue in honour of the admirable and singular vertues of his lady, to 
the imitation of the best Latin poets, and others. Whereunto is added the rising to the crowne of Richard the 
third, sig. L2r–v. 
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 The pun on “fortune’s balls” implies that women unjustly usurp the traditional privileging 
of male subjects in historiopoetic endeavors. To be history’s tennis balls, the pun 
suggests, subjects must possess the anatomical counterpart. Poets who write about 
“women’s falles” take up low subjects unworthy of a place in history. Richard Helgerson 
writes that “Mistress Shore’s” claim to fame rests, “paradoxically enough, on her very 
unfitness for the social, political, and literary domains to which adultery raised her” 
(453). I draw upon and reorient Helgerson’s analysis by suggesting that, at least for the 
sixteenth century, it is precisely Jane’s “unfitness” for history that makes her story a 
favored literary subject.  
To make Jane a saint promises a literary apotheosis. Writers such as More and 
Churchyard rescue her from a tawdry existence as an adulterous merchant’s wife and 
royal concubine to make her a significant part of the historical record and then the literary 
canon—to canonize her. Churchyard’s Jane Shore then becomes a pattern for female 
figures in 1590s ghost complaints. The story of Jane Shore as it is reiterated in the 
sixteenth-century registers the fraught relation between historical and literary 
imperatives, between the interpretation of social relations (or ‘real’ events) and their 
aesthetic reinterpretation. That Jane Shore—like figures to follow such as Rosamond, 
Elstred, Helen, Matilda, and Lucrece—becomes a ghost haunting her own history as well 
as the present only intensifies the agonistic interplay between history and poetry that 
informs her appearance.  
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 “Her great shame won her much praise” 
Churchyard’s contribution to the 1563 version of the Mirror for Magistrates bears 
the title, “Howe Shores wife, Edwarde the fowerthes concubine, was by king Richarde 
despoyled of all her goodes, and forced to do open penance.”14 The poem follows another 
featuring the ghost of Richard III. In fact, Churchyard’s “Shore’s Wife” is a sequel of 
sorts. The prose link introducing Jane Shore suggests that her poem will “supplye that 
whych is lackinge in him.” Shore is “an eloquent wentch, whyche shall furnishe out both 
in meter and matter, that which could not comlily be sayd in [Richard’s] person” (372). 
Jane Shore, the first female historical figure to appear in the Mirror, thus rises from the 
dead, in part, as a supplement to the ghost of Richard III. Indeed, it is easy to understand 
how Jane Shore, as a hapless victim of Richard’s political scheming, would be able to 
voice a critique that the King himself would not utter. Jane Shore is a beautiful woman 
cast out of her social sphere and impoverished by a notoriously tyrannical hunchback. 
Her pathetic tale, told from her point of view as victim, underscores Richard’s 
remorseless use of power. “Shore’s Wife” supplements Richard’s story not just in 
“matter,” however, but also in “meter”—not only thematically, but also stylistically. Jane 
Shore will “furnishe out” Richard’s poem in both content and aesthetic appeal. Richard’s 
“howlinge” speech, the Mirror poets tell us, issues in “vncertayne Meter” from “so cruell 
and prophane a mouth as his” (359; 371).  Jane, “whose words a world hath delighted in” 
(372), becomes at once a figure for physical beauty opposed to beastly tyranny and a 
figure for eloquence in the face of barbarous howling.   
                                                 
14 Churchyard’s poem, known as “Shore’s Wife,” is printed in The Mirror for Magistrates, pp. 373–86.  
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  The Mirror aestheticizes Jane Shore as a figure for both physical and poetic 
beauty.15 But the Mirror is not the first text to elevate Jane Shore and vilify the deformed 
King through such rhetoric. Thomas More’s History of King Richard the Third 
capitalizes on the Jane Shore story’s potential for defaming Richard. More’s history as a 
whole sets out to show “what manner of man” Richard was: morally and physically bent, 
“malicious, wrathful, envious, and, from afore his birth, ever froward” (8; 10). More’s 
Richard is a petty tyrant who would be laughable if he were not so lethal. As the historian 
tells it, Richard sends Jane to jail for adultery, then forces her into the role of a penitent. 
Richard condemns her as “nought of her body,” a harlot.16 But More reminds us that “all 
the world” already knew Shore’s wife was an adulteress. That Richard belatedly blusters 
over this well-known fact causes amusement:  
he laid heinously to her charge the thing that herself could not deny, that 
all the world wist was true, and that nevertheless every man laughed at to 
hear it then so suddenly so highly taken. 
 
Richard’s attempt to make Jane a signifier for Edward’s sexual excess backfires. Instead 
of righteous indignation, the accusation inspires only sardonic laughter. More emphasizes 
the irony of Richard’s insistence on punishing Jane: the hunchback’s supercilious 
condemnation reveals his own hypocrisy.   
...as a goodly continent prince, clean and faultless of himself, sent out of 
heaven into this vicious world for the amendment of men’s manners...he 
caused the bishop of London to put her to open penance.... (64) 
 
The irony here is thick. Richard’s priggish accusation of Jane Shore points out that he is 
anything but “clean and faultless” himself. The people, More tells us, see through this 
                                                 
15 Following on this pattern, the rhetoric of beauty and tyranny in Elizabethan ghost complaints will rely on 
both physical and linguistic referents. 
16 As More’s editor points out, the Latin version uses the word “meretrix” (64 n.4).    
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 charade, realizing that Richard’s treatment of Jane owes more to political machinations 
than moral scruples. 
And many good folk, also, that hated her living and glad were to see sin 
corrected, yet pitied they more her penance than rejoiced therein, when 
they considered that the protector procured it more of a corrupt intent than 
any virtuous affection.  
 
Richard’s condemnation of Jane Shore’s “sin,” ironically, exposes his own Machiavellian 
scheming. As pious as they may be, “good folk” pity Jane’s plight to the degree that they 
understand her as the victim of “corrupt intent.” The relations among sin, empathic 
response, and tyrannical behavior will structure Jane Shore stories throughout the 
sixteenth century.    
More’s history insists that Jane’s faults pale next to Richard’s. The account 
everywhere implies a comparison of transgressions that works to exculpate the adulteress 
and vilify the cruel King. More relies on an affective calculus: the greater the reader’s 
sympathy for Jane, the more Richard’s debasement of her reads as excessive tyranny and 
the less Jane’s adultery registers as “sin” worthy of punishment. That is, Richard’s 
tyranny has a redemptive effect on Jane. To weight this formula in Jane’s favor, More 
employs devices in addition to the overt irony of Richard’s accusation. For instance, he 
gives her a sympathetic back-story.  
This woman was born in London, worshipfully friended, honestly brought 
up, and very well married (saving somewhat too soon), her husband an 
honest citizen, young and goodly and of good substance. But forasmuch as 
they were coupled ere she were well ripe, she not very fervently loved for 
whom she never longed. Which was haply the thing that the more easily 
made her incline unto the king’s appetite when he required her. Howbeit, 
the respect of his royalty, the hope of gay apparel, ease, pleasure, and 
other wanton wealth was able soon to pierce a soft, tender heart. (64–5) 
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 Here Jane is a well-raised young girl too quickly married. Her inexperience and the lure 
of pleasure, along with the King’s demand, lead her into the “wanton” world of the court. 
The suggestion that she is trapped in an untimely and loveless marriage lends a note of 
tragic inevitability to her story. What’s a young girl to do? She becomes an easy mark for 
the glitter of courtly life and the voracious King Edward. If her marriage finds her not 
“well ripe,” she soon becomes a “soft, tender” meal suitable for the King’s “appetite.” 
The court, the gustatory metaphors lead us to believe, devours the young, hapless Jane. 
More also makes much of Jane’s allure for men. Perhaps the most remarkable 
aspect of his gossipy rendition of the Jane Shore story is the sly way in which he narrates 
her sex appeal. “Proper she was and fair,” More tells us, “nothing in her body that you 
would have changed, but if you would have wished her somewhat higher” (65). This 
compliment is curiously oblique given his description of Jane as a penitent. 
 [Richard] caused the bishop of London to put her to open penance, going 
before the cross in procession upon a Sunday, with a taper in her hand—in 
which she went in countenance and pace demure, so womanly, and albeit 
she were out of all array save her kirtle only, yet went she so fair and 
lovely, namely while the wondering of the people cast a comely rud in her 
cheeks (of which she before had most miss), that her great shame won her 
much praise among those that were more amorous of her body than 
curious of her soul. (64) 
 
Jane’s public penance, far from making her an object of derision, increases her appeal. 
More’s sidelong glance at her beauty—at the “nothing in her body that you would have 
changed”—is displaced here onto the naked ogling of a Sunday crowd taking a prurient 
interest in Jane’s state of undress and her “womanly” promenade. The sin of sexual 
transgression that Jane’s penance ritual is presumably meant to expiate ironically exposes 
her to the same sort of gaze that drew her into transgression in the first place. The 
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 crowd’s lascivious drooling recapitulates King Edward’s. Jane’s shame, as it gives her a 
“comely” blush, makes her up as an object of desire.  
The scopic interest that More generates is instrumental: behind Jane’s shaming 
lies Richard, the real target of More’s venom. More tempts us to view Jane’s abasement 
with pity and desire. She is all the more “demure,” “comely,” “lovely,” and “womanly” 
for her shaming at the hands of such a malicious schemer. The phrase, “her great shame 
won her much praise,” although it is qualified to refer to those spectators with baser 
motives, nevertheless encapsulates the counterintuitive work More asks his Jane to do in 
his account. Paradoxically, Jane’s sin and punishment makes her praiseworthy; not 
necessarily because her penance itself purges her, but because that penance puts her in 
the position of a martyr tormented by an evil tyrant. Jane’s body, her beauty, is here a 
lure designed to draw out our investment in seeing Richard punished. In this way, the 
chastening of Jane becomes a figure for the castigation of Richard. Martyred beauty 
enters into figural relation to unnatural tyranny.  
In his discussion of eighteenth-century executions, Michel Foucault usefully 
demonstrates the way in which public punishment spectacles, in insisting on the absolute 
power of the monarch over the body of the subject, can produce such carnivalesque 
results as we see in More’s account: “In these executions, which ought to show only the 
terrorizing power of the prince, there was a whole aspect of the carnival, in which rules 
were inverted, authority mocked and criminals transformed into heroes. The shame was 
turned round….”17 Here Foucault could well be speaking of the punishment of Jane 
Shore. Richard punishes her, publicizing her unchastity in an attempt to consolidate his 
                                                 
17 Michel Foucault, Discipline & Punish, 32–69; 61. See also Rebecca W. Bushnell, Tragedies of Tyrants, 
on the “improper authority” of the tryant (3–5).    
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 power and (ostensibly) purify the state. Yet More’s account of this episode suggests that 
Jane is all the more chaste—more “demure” and “womanly”—for her chastisement at the 
hands of Richard, whom we are meant to see as unchaste insofar as he becomes a figure 
of the sinful excesses of tyranny. Ghost complaint poems such as Thomas Churchard’s 
Jane Shore poem will make much of this carnivalesque reversal of chastity’s terms and 
the exculpatory effect it can have on the woman who suffers at the hands of the tyrant.  
 But More is not finished praising Jane. She may be a meretrix, as More calls her, 
but she is a harlot with a heart of gold. Of three concubines, she was the favorite of King 
Edward, “whose favor…she never abused to any man’s hurt, but to many a man’s 
comfort and relief.” 
Where the king took displeasure, she would mitigate and appease his 
mind; where men were out of favor, she would bring them in his grace. 
For many that had highly offended, she obtained pardon. Of great 
forfeitures she gat men remission. (66) 
 
Jane’s position gives her a power at court that she uses for the “comfort and relief” of 
others. She becomes an intercessor figure for supplicants. She works to “mitigate” 
imagined faults and to achieve “grace,” “pardon,” and “remission.” The language of 
sanctification on which Jane Shore poems will come to rely is thus already present in 
More’s account. More’s word choice gestures at figuring Jane as a saint to whom sinners 
appeal for pardon. Such a figuration may remain merely a rhetorical gesture here, yet that 
gesture it is the hint upon which the ongoing sixteenth-century sanctification of Jane 
Shore will build.18   
                                                 
18 Ironically, Thomas More becomes a canonized saint in the twentieth century while Jane Shore, still a 
wanton woman, becomes the subject of bodice-ripper novels. Jane is the heroine of novels such as The 
Merry Mistress (1952), The King’s White Rose (1988), and The Goldsmith’s Wife (1950), novels that by 
and large treat Jane as a sexually forward Scarlett O’Hara type trapped in an overly pious age. See Maria 
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  Finally, More’s Jane anticipates the “eloquent” and “talkative wench” she will 
become in complaints. Of Edward’s concubines, More writes, “the merriest was this 
Shore’s wife, in whom the king therefore took special pleasure.”  
For a proper wit had she, and could both read well and write; merry in 
company, ready and quick of answer, neither mute nor full of babble, 
sometimes taunting without displeasure and not without disport. (65–66) 
 
Calling upon this hint about her wit, learning, and conversational aptitude, Jane can say 
in her Mirror complaint, “since without blushing I haue so long beene a talkatiue wench, 
(whose words a world hath delighted in) I will now goe on boldly with my audacious 
manner” (372).  
The spectacle of Jane’s punishment in More’s account is the culmination of a 
melodrama of desire. Jane’s ripening desires as a young woman seeking love and 
pleasure give her over to the voracious King Edward. Richard’s Machiavellian hunger for 
power is laid bare by his punishment of Jane after Edward’s death. And that very 
punishment, which is supposed to chastise Jane for sexual excess, inspires the desiring 
gaze of the crowd. Over this covetous interplay presides perhaps the most important 
desire to consider: More’s. The historian signals his own desirous investment even as he 
tempts us to look upon her youthful beauty. 
Proper she was, and fair…. Thus say they that knew her in her youth, 
albeit some that now see her (for yet she liveth) deem her never to have 
been well-visaged. Whose judgment seemeth me somewhat like as though 
men should guess the beauty of one long before departed by her scalp 
taken out of the charnel-house: for now she is old, lean, withered, and 
dried up, nothing left but riveled skin and hard bone. And yet, being even 
such, whoso well advise her visage might guess and devise which parts 
how filled would make it a fair face. (65)  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
M. Scott, “The More We Change” in Representing “Jane” Shore, for a discussion of these novels and other 
twentieth century representations of the Jane Shore Story (117–29).   
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 Having told his readers that she was “proper” and “fair,” and casting (by proxy) an 
appreciative gaze over her imagined body, More imagines “men” reading the past, gazing 
not at youthful beauty but at a charnel-house scalp. More attempts here to take his 
narrative out of the economy of desire circulating in the past—Jane’s, Edward’s, 
Richard’s, the crowd’s—and set it in retrospective relation to that historical moment. He 
and those naysayers in the present who “deem her never to have been well-visaged” can 
only consider her in withered age and guess at the beauty that so electrified those in the 
past. This narrative move distances More from the economies of desire he creates in two 
ways. First, his insistence on his own present point of view insulates him from the 
desiring gazes of those in the past. He may report Jane as others have described her, but 
he is not one of “those…amorous of her body” who drool over her as she passes by in her 
loose gown. Second, he distances himself even further by coolly commenting on those 
“men” in the present who guess at Jane’s beauty by considering her “dried up” form in 
age. Yet even as he doubly removes himself from the lure of Jane’s captivating beauty, 
he encodes another kind of desire—that of the historian. As Hayden White suggests,  
we can comprehend the appeal of historical discourse by recognizing the 
extent to which it makes the real desirable, makes the real into an object of 
desire, and does so by its imposition, upon events that are represented as 
real, of the formal coherency that stories possess.19  
 
More tells us a coherent, appealing story—not just a desirable story, but one about desire: 
the poor, beautiful Jane is swept up by the glamour of the court and the lust of a King; 
she tries to make the best of her fall from chastity by helping those in need; and she 
suffers the injustices of a power-hungry tyrant. 
                                                 
19 Hayden White, The Content and the Form, 21. 
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 If Jane’s beauty engages More’s desire (or that beauty glimpsed through a death 
mask) it manifests only under an alibi of objective distance. Narrating “those” captured 
by beauty as it walks as well as those “men” who try to call up beauty from its grave 
allows More to authorize himself as an objective observer even as he attempts to engage 
the reader’s affective and erotic interest. He engages sympathies not only by way of the 
reader’s imaginative view of the young Jane caught in the web of tyrannical royal desire, 
but also in the register of elegy. The loss of beauty—its inevitable destruction at the 
hands of time—adds piquancy to the hunchback’s cruel oppression of Jane in the past. 
The desire for Jane that circulates on the surface level of the text covers More’s desire—
implicit and explicit—to create an ‘official’ version of past events that would define 
tyranny against a proper governance that inspires, in More’s words, “a willing and loving 
obedience.” More’s narration of the Jane Shore story thus structures itself as elegy, which 
seeks to bury the past and encode it in service of a hopeful future. History and elegy both 
rely on a differential break between the dead and the living, the present and the past. As 
Michel de Certeau reminds us in Heterologies: 
Even though historiography postulates a continuity (a genealogy), a 
solidarity (an affiliation), and a complicity (a sympathy) between its 
agents and its objects, it nevertheless distinguishes a difference between 
them, a difference established out of principle by a will to objectivity. The 
space it organizes is divided and hierarchical. That space has an “own” [un 
propre] (the present of this historiography) and an “other” (the “past” 
under study). The dividing line between them affects both the practice (the 
research apparatus distinguishes itself from the material it treats), and the 
enactment in writing (the discourse of interpretive knowledge subjugates 
the known, cited, represented past). (4)  
 
By layering the gazes that mediate his own, More’s account demonstrates a “will to 
objectivity”. The word “will” is important here. At stake is not an imagined (and 
anachronistic) empirical gaze—an a priori truth captured by an objectivity shomehow 
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 insulated from human judgment. At stake is the convincing appearance of moral truths in 
framing the past and the authority granted by that appearance—not fact so much as 
facticity; not history so much as historicity; not objectivity so much as the will to it. More 
gazes directly upon those in the present who look upon the withered Jane. He gazes 
imaginatively upon those in the past who look upon Jane’s martyred and sexy 
promenade. He implies that his eye is set on the truth even as his narration explicitly 
exposes Jane to the reader’s scopic, erotic interest. To use Certeau’s words, More invites 
a “continuity,” a “solidarity,” and a “complicity” between himself as historical agent and 
his object, Jane (who supplements Richard), and all by virtue of securing his distance, 
“difference,” from that object. 
At the end of the Jane Shore passage, More returns to the image of Jane’s 
destitute old age.      
I doubt not some shall think this woman too slight a thing to be written of 
and set among the remembrances of great matters—which they shall 
specially think that haply shall esteem her only by that they now see her. 
But meseemeth the chance so much the more worthy to be remembered, in 
how much she is now in the more beggarly condition... (66)  
 
Jane’s story is as worthy to be remembered as those of “other men...which be now 
famous only by the infamy of their ill deeds.” Lives such as Jane’s, More argues, are “not 
so evil” and therefore not generally recorded in history: “For men use, if they have an 
evil turn, to write it in marble; and whoso doth us a good turn, we write it in dust, which 
is not worst proved by her, for at this day she beggeth of many at this day living, that at 
this day had begged if she had not been.” The repetition of “at this day” once again 
emphasizes More’s historical distance. And More once again writes in the language of 
moral comparison. Here and throughout the passage, Jane serves as a supplement to 
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 Richard. Her beauty, its oppression by tyranny, and its tragic loss moves her from a “not 
so evil” adulterer to someone “worthy to be remembered” for the “good turn[s]” she has 
done. More’s account here takes an elegiac turn insofar as employs a lament for a lost 
past and gives meaning to that loss for the present.  
The need to elegiacally record good deeds that would otherwise go unheralded, 
however, is perhaps not the only consideration that leads More to defend the place he 
gives Jane Shore in history. Like other humanist historians of his era, More receives a 
twin historiographic mandate: on the one hand, history should tell the unvarnished truth; 
on the other, history should delight audiences with rhetorical artifice. Perhaps nowhere 
else in The History of King Richard the Third does More give in to the second of these 
directives more than in the Jane Shore interlude. George M. Logan describes the 
sixteenth-century historian’s dilemma: 
Among the studia humanitatis, rhetoric—the art or craft of verbal 
persuasion—was the architectonic discipline; and the key fact about both 
classical and humanist historiography is that their practitioners regarded 
history as, for the most part, a branch of rhetoric. Moreover, as Cicero 
(106–43 B.C.)—the greatest of Roman rhetoricians and thus the god of 
humanism—explains, history belongs to demonstrative (or epideictic) 
rhetoric, the species most concerned with virtuoso stylistic display. 
Demonstrative is the rhetoric of praise or blame, comprising, as Cicero 
says, “eulogies, descriptions, histories, and exhortations,” and, in general, 
works that are produced as “showpieces,” primarily “for the pleasure they 
will give.”20 
 
Here Logan usefully reminds us of the centrality of rhetoric in humanism and the place of 
historiography within epideictic rhetoric. History should please audiences with its 
rhetorical display. Logan also reminds us, however, of Cicero’s insistence that even as 
“historical writing must be highly eloquent,” it must be truthful. “Who does not know” 
                                                 
20 Logan, xxxi–xxxii, citing Cicero, Orator, 11.37. For a more complete discussion of the early modern 
debate about “truth” versus rhetorical amplification, see Herschel Baker, The Race of Time, 15–41. 
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 Cicero tells us, “history’s first law to be that an author must not dare to tell anything but 
the truth? And its second that he must make bold to tell the whole truth?”21 Perhaps 
sensing that he has gone too far in his use of rhetorical effects, More employs a 
distancing “will to objectivity”—a differential break with the past that would give his 
account the ring of truth—when he abstracts his investment in Jane’s story from that of 
others in the present and past who look upon her. More’s bid for the authority of 
retrospective distance is transparent: his account accentuates rather than obscures the way 
in which the rhetorical comparison between Jane and Richard functions by elegiacally 
aestheticizing Jane while his narration breaks with the past. Ghost complaint poetry 
functions by reading this transparency and ostentatiously reversing the terms that grant 
the historian authority. In ghost complaint, the authorizing voice belongs to the dead.  
 
“My selfe for proofe, loe here I nowe appeare” 
 
 More’s account of the Jane Shore story involves several concerns that 
Churchyard’s complaint will take up and refigure for his poem in Jane’s first-person, 
spectral address. Among these concerns are Jane’s eloquence and beauty, her sexy 
shame, her agency in her downfall or lack thereof, her supposed unfitness for historical 
discourse, her candidacy for sainthood, and her relation to tyranny. To begin a 
comparison between More’s account and Churchyard’s, however, it is necessary to note 
the radical shift in context involved in taking Jane out of More’s chronicle history and 
placing her in the Mirror. As its editor Lily B. Campbell reminds us, the Mirror’s “prose 
links state explicitly that the work was based upon the histories compiled by Fabyan, 
Halle, and Sir Thomas More” (10). But the authors carefully select the characters they 
                                                 
21 Quoted in Logan, xxxii, citing Cicero, De orator, 2.15.62. 
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 import from history. As the principle writer of the volume, William Baldwin, admits, the 
authors comb chronicle histories for apt examples of how God “hath delt with sum of our 
countreymen your auncestors for sundrye vices” (64–65). True to its name, the Mirror 
aims to hold a mirror up to current magistrates, to coax them to moral “amendment.” In 
this way the Mirror shares the general aim of More’s History: both argue against bad 
government, the most legible form of which is tyranny. They take as their premise the 
idea that exposing and judging the evil behavior of past leaders will inspire a more 
judicious use of power in the present.  
Yet everywhere the individual poems of the Mirror generate tensions between the 
pathos inspired by the plight of the ghosts, as morally bankrupt as they may be, and the 
moral certainty with which these historical figures are meant to be judged. This conflict 
between pathos and moralization remains in suspension throughout the Mirror volumes, a 
naturalized contradiction.22 In his rhetorical manual, Henry Peacham notes the following 
examples of how “Pathopeia” (pathos) is supposed to work: 
…the Oratour by declaring some lamentable cause, moueth his hearers to 
pitie and compassion, to shew mercy, and to pardon offences. To moue 
compassion, lamentable histories are oftentimes vsed, and likewise the 
liuely descriptions of wofull sufferings, and pitiful miseries, and how they 
may be artificially expressed. Poets complaints may giue apt examples.23  
 
Complaints and histories, Peacham suggests, use pathos in order to prompt pardoning. 
That Peacham puts history and complaint side by side indicates how closely related these 
discourses were in the sixteenth century. Yet it seems clear that “to pardon offences” is 
not exactly what the Mirror has in mind, as its first editor reminds us by suggesting that 
                                                 
22 See David Mikics, The Limits of Moralizing, for a literary history of the conflict between disabling 
pathos and moralizing judgment (the kind of conflict the Dido story embodies in Virgil’s Aeneid, for 
example) along with an examination of how this conflict plays out in Spenser and Milton. 
23 Peacham, The Garden of Eloquence, fol. 144. 
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 the ghosts are examples of vice. Baldwin prompts us to judge them, reject their ways as 
sinful, and do better. This would seem to require a break from the past. The juridical 
difference established between the present reader and the text of the past promises to 
guarantee a future without vice. Yet the pathos that the poems attempt to create demands 
an affective identification across time which threatens to collapse the difference required 
for judgment. While it seems entirely possible to entertain a cognitive dissonance that 
would allow the reader to empathize with past others and still reject their behaviors as 
inappropriate for emulation, the two activities nevertheless fit uncomfortably together in 
the same moment. How pardonable is an offense if one defines it as “vice”? And how 
effectively can one exercise moral judgment if one is moved to pardon by a pathetic 
appeal? It is precisely this tension between moralizing and pathos that the ghost 
complaints of the Mirror exploit.  
 Historiography and poetics share the aim of moralizing. As Thomas Blundeville 
writes of historiography in 1574, “all those persons whose lyues haue beene such as are 
to bee followed for their excellencie in vertue, or else to be fledde for their excellencie in 
vice, are meete to be chronicled.”24 Sidney and Bacon share a similar notion about 
poetry. In Sidney’s words, “it is that feigning notable images of virtues, vices, or what 
else, with that delightful teaching, which must be the right describing note to know a poet 
by” (219). Both historiography and poetry, then, claim to teach by moral example. As 
Thomas More’s version of the Jane Shore story points out, however, historiography’s 
rhetorical display can force a kind of moral carnivalesque—it can, for instance, turn an 
adulteress into a saint and paint a king as a barbarous monster with the biting irony of 
comparison. That is, rhetorical artifice can threaten the stable, demonstrative moral truth 
                                                 
24 Blundeville, The true order and Methode of wryting and reading Hystories, sig. C2r. 
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 for which the historian’s account aims. Similarly, the moral certainty for which poetry 
ostensibly aims, as Churchyard’s poem and others in the Mirror demonstrate, can fracture 
under the pressure of its “passionate describing of passions,” its production of pathos.25 
For sixteenth-century poetics and historiography, this is the slippery problem of 
epideictic, rhetorical persuasion that aims to praise or blame and therefore produce 
exemplary objects for readers: its deployment and context can threaten its aim. But 
whereas More’s historiography seeks to control the force of its rhetorical display by 
insisting on the retrospective distance of the historian, poetry actively refuses such 
distance. Poems such as Churchyard’s pointedly confuse or collapse the differential 
breaks upon which historiography relies—breaks between past and present, poet and 
ghost, even, in the case of Jane Shore, beautiful victim and tyrannical oppressor. While 
poems like those in the Mirror claim the didactic aim of providing moral exempla, that 
claim is more often than not a cover for the creation of “powerfully animated objects” 
that challenge the reader’s moral orientation.26  
 The tension in ghost complaint between moralizing and pathos is perhaps 
nowhere so evident as in the poem that features Jane Shore, the first woman to be 
featured in the Mirror’s largely male catalogue of historical figures. Appearing in the 
second, expanded edition of the Mirror (1563), Jane tells us that she “sought to hygh to 
clyme”: 
    My selfe for proofe, loe here I nowe appeare,  
In womans weede with wepyng watered eyes, 
That bought her youth and her delyghtes ful deare. 
                                                 
25 Sidney, The Defence of Poesy, 6. 
26 In fairness to Sir Philip Sidney, it should be noted that he also makes the case that poetry functions by 
challenging the reader to think through moral ambiguities rather than presenting (as he claims history does) 
examples as uncomplicated models of behavior: “how will you discern what to follow but by your own 
discretion…?” (224). 
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 Whose lowde reproche doth sound vnto the skyes 
And byds my corse out of the grave to ryse, 
As one that may no longer hide her face, 
But nedes must come and shewe her piteous case. (374) 
 
Jane asks us to pity her fate, yet she gives us reason to believe that the “lowde reproche” 
her reputation has garnered is not undeserved. In her last line she asks us to “[b]eware by 
me, that spent so yll her dayes” (386). Like Jane, the other Mirror ghosts gesture at 
offering themselves on the altar of the project’s moralizing exemplary history; yet their 
spectral laments are filled with tears, cries for pity, and confession, all of which work to 
qualify and complicate moral judgment.   
1590s complaint poems will take up this exculpatory aspect of ghostly lament and 
confession as a primary concern. As I have mentioned, when Samuel Daniel’s Rosamond 
rises from the grave in the first of the 1590s ghost complaints, The Complaint of 
Rosamond, she will point to Jane Shore as an example: Shore “did such compassion 
finde” by having her story retold that she now “passes for a Saint.” And Drayton’s 
Matilda, in turn, will claim that “Faire Rosamond, of all so highly graced,” is now “in our 
Sainted Legendarie placed.”27 Jane Shore’s “wepyng watered eyes” thus haunt 1590s 
ghost complaints. Again and again, poets will follow the precedent of Churchyard’s Jane 
Shore poem and take up the challenge of rewriting a fallen woman’s history with such 
compassion that she is transformed from an example of vice into a saint. Thomas More 
only hints at the sanctification of Jane Shore, and that by virtue of her implicit martyrdom 
at the hands of Richard. Churchyard’s contribution to the Mirror expands on the project 
of sanctifying Jane that More begins. 1590s ghost complaints like The Complaint of 
                                                 
27 Drayton, Matilda, sig. B1v.  
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 Rosamond follow Churchyard in making the sanctification of their speakers a structuring 
concern. 
 Churchyard’s Jane closely follows More’s account in storyline even if the form of 
her address in the Mirror reshapes the story’s effects. The Mirror’s most radical change 
to the Jane Shore story is also the most obvious: the poet brings Jane back from the dead 
to speak for herself. The elegiac authority of the historian’s third-person narration gives 
way to dramatic monologue in which the voice of the author is subsumed by that of the 
ghost he voices.28 And yet, in a feat of formal adaptation, Churchyard’s Jane manages to 
touch upon each and every one of the themes in More’s account, even without the 
historian’s coercive narration. Jane tells us she deserves a place in history, for instance. 
“Among the rest by Fortune overthrowen,” she tells us, “I am not least, that most may 
wayle her fate” (373). As in More’s account, her beauty adds to the tragedy of her fall: 
“For natures gyftes was cause of all my griefe” (376). She is lured into the wanton court 
in the same way. The “ease and wealth” (378) of Edward’s court tempts her, and the 
“puissant kynges desyre” compels (376). More opines that Jane is “somewhat too soon” 
married to someone she could not love. Churchyard’s Jane corroborates that speculation: 
“In maryage, a prentyse was I bound, / When that meere love I knewe not howe to vse” 
(377). The Mirror account also gives Jane the eloquence, good deeds, and opposition to 
Richard’s tyranny upon which More’s story relies.  
Even as Jane closely follows the career mapped out for her by More’s History, 
however, her plaintive, poetic address ratchets up the pathos of her situation. If More’s 
account relies on an implicit affective calculus—the greater the sympathy for Jane, the 
                                                 
28 See my preface, in which I argue that the elegiac impulse authorizes itself by virtue of the absence of its 
object. The return of the ghost from the dead scuttles the elegiac project.  
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 less for Richard—that equation is made hyperbolically explicit in Jane’s account. This 
serves to erase the cool irony of the historian and replace it with an overt bid for the 
reader’s sympathy from Jane herself. Richard, seen directly through Jane’s eyes, becomes 
a foul beast, a “raging wolfe” who “would spare no gylteles bloud” (384). This would 
seem to elide the subtleties of More’s story, the crafty way his account employs an 
adulteress to make the case for Richard’s greater immorality. But in baldly laying out the 
terms of those subtleties, Churchyard’s Jane reinstalls the problem of extracting moral 
sententiae from historical material. In More’s account, Jane is a ruse, a figure for the 
chastisement of Richard. In the Mirror, Jane puts off that figuration. As much as she still 
curses the beastly hunchback, Richard is no longer the only villain with whom she 
contends. The affective appeal of beauty in relation to beastly tyranny remains, but the 
terms of that contested interplay change. 
Jane’s first target upon rising from the grave, in fact, is not Richard but her own 
historical account. The first stanza, like so many of those in the Mirror, prepares the 
reader for lamentation. 
 Among the rest by Fortune overthrowen, 
 I am not least, that most may wayle her fate: 
My fame and brute abrode the world is blowen, 
Who can forget a thing thus done so late? 
My great mischaunce, my fall, and heauye state, 
Is such a marke whereat eche tounge doth shoote, 
That my good name is pluckt vp by the roote. (373) 
 
That Jane begins by lamenting what has become of her “good name” might surprise the 
reader, especially since the two previous poems and the interposed prose links have 
featured a direct attack on Richard’s bad name, his tyranny. Though it is worth guarding 
against demanding too much narrative continuity from the Mirror’s eclectic compilation 
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 of ghost poems, it is certainly notable that before Jane appears in the volume, the poet 
Collingbourne has risen from the grave to warn us to “Beware, take heede, take heede, 
beware, beware / You Poetes you, that purpose to rehearce / By any arte what Tyrantes 
doings are” (347). Collingbourne, as the title of his poem reminds us, “was cruelly 
executed” by Richard “for making a foolishe rime.” And in the next poem, the one before 
Jane’s, the child-killer, Richard himself, volunteers for the reader’s scorn: 
What hart so hard, but doth abhorre to heare 
The ruful raygne of me the thyrd Rychard? 
King vnkindely cald though I the crowne dyd weare, 
Who entred by rigour, but ryght did not regard, 
By tyranny proceding in kyllyng kyng Edward, 
Fyft of that name, ryght heyre vnto the crowne,  
With Rychard his brother, prynces of renowne. (360) 
   
The cruelties and excesses of tyranny—its persecution of princes and poets, among 
others—are at the center of the conversation when Jane Shore takes the stage. Given 
More’s well-known version of her story and the way she is introduced (as an “eloquent 
wentch” who will “furnishe out” Richard’s speech “in meter and matter”) we might 
expect her to launch an all-out attack on the tyrant. Apparently, however, she is worried 
less about blackening Richard’s name than what has become of her own. Protesting that 
she belongs “among the rest” of the complaining male ghosts, she laments that her story 
has become “a mark whereat eche tounge doth shoote.” 
  Even in death, Jane has heard how her “good name” has been abused. “Yea 
though ful dead and lowe in earth I laye,” she tells us, “I heard the voyce of me what 
people sayd” (373). In fact, that very “lowde reproache” has prompted her “corse out of 
the grave to ryse” (374). To defend herself against this slander, she universalizes her 
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 plight. In the first several stanzas of her lament, Jane tells us that the “wandryng worlde 
bewitched” her, as it must everyone. 
Oh darke deceyt with paynted face for showe, 
Oh poysoned baite that makes vs egre styll, 
Oh fayned frende deceyuing people so, 
Oh world of thée we can not speake to yll  
 
The “whyrling whele” of the world—its inevitable deceits and lures—is to blame for her 
fall. But what can be done—“who can stop the streame that runnes full Swyft”? Our falls 
are inevitable:  
The thirstye drinkes, there is no other shyft, 
Perforce is such, that nede obeyes no lawe, 
Thus bound we are in worldly yokes to drawe, 
And can not staye, nor turne agayne in tyme, 
Nor learne of those that sought to hygh to clyme. 
 
The tyranny that so concerns More’s account is here displaced onto the lawless world and 
pitiless, irreversable time. Of course, Jane’s claim that one cannot “turne agayne in tyme” 
is belied by her speaking. She has escaped the tyranny of time precisely in order to help 
us “learne” from her.  
And nowe a time for me I see preparde, 
I heare the lives and falles of many wyghtes: 
My tale therfore the better may be heard, (375)  
 
The work of the Mirror has prepared a time for Jane to speak; it has managed to open a 
metaleptic time outside of historical time. In using this imaginative space, Jane claims to 
tell “that truthe” that “shal witness” for her. Only through the poetic appropriation of her 
story can she speak historical “truth.” Given the poet Churchyard’s creation of a new 
“nowe” in which to speak, she addresses the Mirror’s editor: “Wherefore geve eare, good 
Baldwyn do thy best, / My tragedy to place among the rest.” Still, the new time that 
Churchyard opens for Jane does not seem to make it easier for readers to “learne” from 
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 her as one who “sought th hygh to clyme.” Instead of clear historical truths that would 
lead us to clear moral dictums, Jane presents us with contradictions.29 She worries at 
every turn about who or what should be blamed for her tragedy. With her last words, she 
can finally tell us only to “defye this world, and all his wanton wayes,” again 
universalizing her fall as the inevitable result of acting in the world at all (386). In the 
meantime, each separate conclusion or lesson she derives from her experience turns out 
to be contingent and contested.  
The source of this moral confusion and contingency lies in an irresolvable tension 
in Jane’s address—a tension between the prerogatives of beauty and forms of tyranny. 
Jane tells us that she was born “of the meanest” social standing; she was not “of noble 
bloud.” She was, however, beautiful.  
Fortune ne gave to me the gyftes of golde:  
But I could bragge of nature if I would, 
Who fyld my face with favour freshe and fayer, 
Whose beautie shone like Phebus in the ayer. (375)    
 
The enthusiastic alliteration, fyld-face-favour-fresh-fayer, returns fivefold More’s 
description of Jane as a “fair face.” Jane follows this with a blazon of her own “chaste” 
beauty: her “shape” was “seemely to eche sight,” her “countenance” had a “sober grace,”  
Myne eyes in lookes were never proved lyght, 
My tongue in wordes were chaste in every case, 
Myne ears were deafe, and would no lovers place, (375) 
 
In short, she paints herself as a paragon of the shamefast woman, beautiful and 
uncommunicative—a stately fortress. Her chaste beauty is assaulted and ruined by King 
Edward.   
                                                 
29 As I discuss in the previous chapter, this is the hallmark of the Mirror poems of the 1559 and 1563 
editions. Rather than present us with clear moral conclusions, more often than not the ghosts raise questions 
about the moral sense that can be made of their stories.  
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           …(alas) a prynce dyd blot my browe, 
Loe, there the strong did make the weake to bowe. 
 
Here proper beauty withers in the face of royal compulsion.30 Jane’s next stanzas lament 
the power of kings. “Who can withstand a puissaunt kynges desyre?” (376). Her enticing 
beauty, in Jane’s Mirror account, dooms her from the start. If she had not been so 
beautiful, her “name and good renowne” would not have been threatened. “For nature’s 
gyftes was cause of all my griefe.” She admits that her beauty made her prideful; a 
“peacocks pryde” leads her to forgo her “shamefast waies.” But each time she approaches 
the question of which is most responsible for her fall, royal power or her own decisions, 
she equivocates. 
Who is in fault? The offendour yea or no, 
Or they that are the cause of all this wo? 
 
This construction typifies Jane’s irresolution when it comes to the moral lessons the 
reader might expect to glean from her story. She admits that she offends, yet, like a 
defendant pleading for a reduced sentence, she cites one “cause” after another to mitigate 
her imagined offenses.31 Tyranny, in the form of both Edward’s lustful coercion and 
Richard’s “lewde and false entent” (383), is chief among these mitigating factors. 
Jane cites other factors that also conspire to ruin her name. Again drawing on her 
account in More’s History, she accuses those around her of forcing her to marry too 
young. 
But cleare from blame my frendes can not be found, 
Before my time my youth they did abuse: 
In maryage, a prentyse was I bound, 
When that meere love I knewe not howe to vse. (377) 
                                                 
30 We can draw an interesting comparison to More’s account here. More’s History lavishly praises Edward 
IV. 
31 This aspect of Jane’s story is reminiscent of the long tradition of “complaint” in legal discourse. See 
Wendy Scase, Literature and Complaint in England 1272–1553.  
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“Note wel,” Jane tells us, “what stryfe this forced maryage makes, / What lothed lyves do 
come where love doth lacke.” Again, however, she equivocates: “But wealaway, that can 
not me excuse.” In this way she vacillates between exculpatory lament and self-
condemnation. “I was entyste by traynes, and trapt by trust,” she tells us:  
Though in my power remayned yeas or nayes 
Vnto my frendes yet nedes consent I must, 
In every thing, yea lawfull or vniust… (378) 
 
Jane’s contradictory lament here devolves into an oxymoronic doubling of “consent.” Her 
claim that she had no choice flatly contradicts her claim to the right to “yeas or nayes.” It 
is again worth noticing the language of law and justice here. The “forced maryage” that 
overrides the consent of the woman parallels, in this account, royal force that overrides 
the will of the people. Jane’s capitulation to Edward’s desire presents us with a paradox 
of consent and will. When she gives in, it is not only because of the lure of promised 
luxury, of “ease and wealth,” but also out of “the hope of will (that women seeke for 
all).”         
 Jane’s pleading does explicitly what her beauty does implicitly; it bids for the 
reader’s pity and thus qualifies judgment. Taking a cue from Churchyard’s Jane Shore 
poem, Samuel Daniel’s 1592 Complaint of Rosamond voices another royal mistress who 
rises from the grave to plead for pity. Rosamond uses legal language as well. Her ghost 
“comes to sollicit” the poet, to beg him to “register [her] wrong” (H3v).32 Rosamond 
suffers because she remains encoded in history as an example of “sin,” because “time 
hath wrong’d” her good name; her “soule is nowe denied…sweet Elisean rest” where she 
                                                 
32 The word “solicit” has a range of early modern connotations, including to plead a case in court (OED). 
Edward Phillips defines “register” as “a Memorial or Record, more particularly our ancientest book of Law, 
containing the Original Writs of the Common Law.” The verb “register” suggests formally recording in 
writing, such as in a book of history or law (OED).   
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 might be “repurified” (H3r). If the poet’s beloved, Delia, will “offer vp her sigh” of pity 
for poor Rosamond’s fate, that sigh will waft Rosamond over the river into Elysium. 
Rosamond’s fall, her appeal, and her deliverance in the afterlife have to do with “beauty”: 
So I through beautie made the wofull’st wight, 
By beautie might haue comfort after death: 
That dying fayrest, by the fayrest might 
Finde life aboue on earth, and rest beneath… (H4r) 
 
Beauty both causes Rosamond’s downfall and, in the form of Delia and her sighs, 
promises to redeem her. Rosamond’s proposed contract between beauties both expands 
on the implications of the 1563 Jane Shore poem and inspires Churchyard to offer a 
rewrite. In 1593, the year following the publication of The Complaint of Rosamond, 
Churchyard expands and reissues the Jane Shore poem (thirty years after its initial 
publication). In his dedication to “Lady Mount Eagle and Compton,” Churchyard writes,  
good Madame because Rosimond is so excellently sette forth (the actor 
whereof I honour) I haue somewhat beautified my Shores wife, not in any 
kind of emulation, but to make the world knowe, my deuice in age is as 
ripe & reddie, as my disposition and knowledge was in youth…33     
 
Churchyard disingenuously disavows “emulation” here. His revision of the Jane Shore 
poem clearly capitalizes on Daniel’s recently released ghost complaint and its emphasis 
on the work of beauty. 
 Churchyard’s 1593 version of “Shores wife” expands rather than revises the 
original. Leaving what he has already written all but unaltered, Churchyard inserts 
additional stanzas at strategic points. The first of these insertions is telling. After Jane’s 
description of herself as “fresh and faire,” her poet gives her four additional stanzas of 
lavish encomium on her own beauty. “My beauty blasd,” she tells us, “like torch or 
twinckling starre” (129). Comparisons follow to the sun, summer days, pearl, gold, 
                                                 
33 Churchyard, Churchyard’s Challenge, fol. 126. The italics are mine. 
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 flowers, and so on. Apparently jealous of the beautiful Rosamond, in fact, Jane directly 
compares herself to her rival ghost: 
The Damaske rose, or Rosamond the faire, 
That Henry held, as deere as Jewells be, 
Who was kept close, in cage from open ayre: 
For beauties boast, could scarse compare with me… 
 
As Wendy Wall makes clear, the contest between the ghosts Jane and Rosamond stands 
in for a contest between the poets Churchyard and Daniel. In Wall’s words, “complaining 
women generated a discursive site for literary competition and authorization.”34 
Churchyard’s introductory claim to have “beautified” his Jane, especially as it is followed 
by Jane’s claim to greater beauty than Rosamond, certainly supports Wall’s view. But we 
need to examine what makes that allegorical reading possible in the first place. Jane and 
Rosamond signify as avatars of their poets because they first become figures for poetic 
achievement—eloquence, or the power and beauty of poetry—in its struggle against, in 
Schmidgen’s words, the “determination and reification” of history. 
In his first version of the Jane Shore poem, Churchyard picks up on More’s hint 
about Jane’s “wit” and expands upon it to make Jane eloquent. 
The Nightingale, for all his merry voyce,  
Nor yet the Larke, that still delights to sing, 
Did neuer make the hearers so reioyce, 
As I with wordes haue made this worthy King.   
 
These lines are in each edition of the poem, but it is worth noting that this is another 
strand of thought that Churchyard chooses to emphasize in his expanded, 1590s edition of 
the poem. He adds three stanzas on the power of music and love. “Sweet are the tunes,” 
Jane tells us in the later edition, “that pleaseth kings.” This praise of music leads to the 
                                                 
34 Wall, The Imprint of Gender, 252. 
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 image of a musical duet sung by Jane and King Edward. Two in love “sing at will, the 
treble or the meane”: 
The king and I, agreed in such concorde, 
I ruld by loue, though he did raigne a Lord. 
 
But this “concorde,” however, soon threatens to discordantly upend the relation between 
governer and governed. “I bare the sword,” Jane brags, “though he did weare the 
Crowne.” This phallic image of Jane bearing the sword, based on the oft-repeated dictum 
that words are more powerful than weapons, might well be something like what Fletcher 
has in mind when he objects that women should not be (or have) “fortune’s balles.”   
 Female ghosts become aestheticized figures of poetic ‘beauty’ or ‘eloquence’ (and 
to that extent, figures for the poet’s will and achievement) precisely as a result of their 
struggle to authorize themselves as the privileged speakers of the historical record 
against, to some degree, the historian’s will. In ghost complaint, first-person accounts of 
historical events signify as privileged and primary, as accounts that can be ‘true’ enough 
to reorient moral judgment. Such speech acts rely upon and contest the determinations of 
the historical record. What counts as poetic authorization does so precisely to the degree 
that it pushes away from historical authority. The object of More’s account is to authorize 
an interpretation of the past, to write the book of history in which Jane will signify as a 
supplement to Richard. Ghost complaint poems like Churchyard’s and Daniel’s, on the 
other hand, aim to inscribe Jane and Rosamond in another book: a literary saints 
legendary. Tyranny, as Jane and Rosamond make clear, is also the tyranny of the 
historical record that threatens to fix them forever in elegiac amber. Both Jane and 
Rosamond worry at length about their reputations—the fate of their good names—as they 
negotiate with their poets to change those afterlives. Daniel and Churchyard, then, are not 
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 the only competitors in this drama of beauty and tyranny. The historian, More, stands 
behind them as a third term against which their competition unfolds. Churchyard 
reanimates the “Jane” that More encodes, Daniel’s Rosamond reads both, and 
Churchyard’s Jane reads Rosamond. In this fraught interchange, the terms of beauty and 
tyranny are reoriented so that history—insofar as it represents the fixity of time—
becomes the tyrant that the principle of beauty opposes and at whose hands beauty 
suffers. 
 
“The unsolved antagonisms of reality” 
In transforming Jane into a spectral aesthetic object, Churchyard opens a 
conversation about the transformative power of poetry—coded in his poem as Jane 
Shore’s beauty and eloquence—in its contest with the tyranny of time and the historical 
record through which time is revealed and given meaning. This is the conversation that 
1590s ghost complaint writers are anxious to join. The form of ghost complaint poetry, its 
prosopopeia and metaleptic address, affords an opportunity to think through and 
challenge the exemplary historiography of the era. The stakes of this contest between 
sixteenth-century poetics and historiography are high. In the Tudor period historical 
precedent is one of, if not the primary means through which contemporary culture 
structures and defends its rapidly changing institutional hierarchies. Justifying these 
hierarchies is a particularly pressing project in a nation staggering through the effects of 
the Reformation, a movement for which the rewriting of religious and secular histories is 
commonplace. The future of the nation in the aftermath of the Henrician and Edwardian 
Reformation, in fact, is not entirely certain to improve upon the past, since Queen 
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 Elizabeth I shows no signs of generating an heir to perpetuate the relative peace of the 
Tudor regime. Throughout the sixteenth century, then, thinking deeply about what it 
means to draw moral lessons from the past in order to influence the present and future 
would seem to resonate deeply with contemporary concerns.    
Thomas More’s The History of Richard the Third can be read as a celebration of 
the end of civil war in the defeat of tyranny. Chronicles such as Edward Hall’s The Union 
of the Two Noble and Illustrate Famelies of Lancastre and Yorke similarly take up this 
celebration of the emergence of the Tudor regime as a national destiny narrative. The 
story of Richard III and his hapless victim, Jane, signaling as it does at the end of the bad 
old days, threatens to rather neatly consign tyranny to the past and rely on a hopeful 
future. Ghost complaint poetry reopens those old wounds. By bringing Jane into the 
present to suffer once again and even revise her narrative, it puts history back into 
question. In the process, it opens Jane’s tragic story to contemporary concerns. As 
Adorno writes, “the unsolved antagonisms of reality return in artworks as imminent 
problems of form.” Jane’s first-person, spectral address not only reconsiders the meaning 
of her story as Thomas More encodes it but also encompasses worries about tyranny 
inflected by the present moment.  
Churchyard’s Jane expands, for instance, on More’s comments regarding Jane’s 
early and loveless marriage. In the Mirror, Jane accuses her supposed friends of jostling 
her into marriage. This opens onto a conversation about women’s will—“the hope of will 
(that women seeke for all)” and consent, “what stryfe this forced maryage makes.” This 
also leads to a consideration of the power of women in political matters. When Jane 
claims “she bare the sword” in her relationship with Edward, for instance, and Fletcher’s 
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 Richard rebukes her for such grasping, Jane’s story touches on the kind of controversy 
with which late sixteenth-century writers never seem to tire. Narrative poems by 
Shakespeare such as The Rape of Lucrece, Venus and Adonis, and A Lover’s Complaint, 
for example, relentlessly reexamine questions of women’s agency. And when Jane 
becomes the saint at whose shrine character’s like Rosamond appeal for similar 
sanctification, the Jane Shore story veers dangerously close to the kind of sacrilege to 
which writers like Michael Drayton (Matilda) and Thomas Middleton (The Ghost of 
Lucrece) will strenuously object in their own complaint poems. In short Churchyard’s 
Jane does not merely write herself as another version of history. She enters the present 
and brings with her present concerns. She brings with her “the unsolved antagonisms of 
reality.” 
The writer’s ability to make his ghosts so effectively speak in and of the present 
as well as the past is the great challenge of writing ghost complaint poetry. In this 
dissertation as a whole, I claim that the close proximity of history and poetry in the 
sixteenth century helps produce a spectral aesthetic. That aesthetic registers the close 
relation between historiography and poetics as well as the ways in which the two modes 
define themselves against each other. History and poetry are both branches of rhetoric. 
Poets and historians are often the same people. Writing history involves employing what 
we might now more readily think of as literary techniques and vice versa. The strenuous 
effors of writers such as Sidney and Bacon to identify differences of degree and kind 
between the two rhetorical modes highlights the already uncomfortably close relation 
between those modes. The ghost poetry of the Mirror, including the Jane Shore poem, 
draws on chronicle histories such as More’s in order to offer a competing fantasy of how 
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meaning ought to be derived from past events in an age of exemplarity. In hoping to 
restore what it calls the “ancient privilege” of the poet specifically by writing historical 
poesy, the Mirror precedes, and, I suggest, enables theories of poetic power like Sidney’s 
famous Defense. The spectral aesthetic of ghost complaint poetry can also help us tell the 
story of how history and poetry begin to articulate their differences as emergent, distinct 
disciplines. But more specifically for my purposes, Jane’s aestheticization in the 1563 
Mirror and through the 1590s wrests her from More’s History and makes her a more 
mobile figure. Newly aestheticized, Jane plays a key role in prompting and participating 
in the fad for ghost complaint poems in the late Elizabethan period. She becomes part of 
a discourse capacious enough to sponsor several conversations about the relations 
between historiography and poetry, beauty and tyranny, gender relations and politics, 
consent and will, unchastity and sanctification. And yes, as Heywood’s rendition of her 
story in 1599 testifies, Jane can even prompt a conversation about the emergent bourgeois 
and domestic spheres in opposition to monarchical and patriarchal hierarchies. 
 
 CHAPTER III  
 
SAMUEL DANIEL’S THE COMPLAINT OF ROSAMOND 
 
In the 1587 edition of the Mirror for Magistrates, Thomas Churchyard adds a new 
introduction to his Jane Shore poem: a prose link in the voice of Jane. Referring to her 
initial appearance in the 1563 Mirror over twenty years earlier, Jane tells us that she 
“appeared fyrst to one Baldwine a Minister and a Preacher: whose function and calling 
disdaynes to looke so lowe, as to searche the secrets of wanton women.”1 In the conceit 
of the first volumes of the Mirror, all of the ghosts speak to William Baldwin, the editor 
and lead writer, whether or not he penned the poems in which they appear. The Jane of 
the later Mirror has decided that addressing Baldwin was a mistake, “wherefore,” Jane 
says, “I haue better bethought mee, and so doe sodaynly appeale and appeare to some 
martiall man, who hath more experience both in defending of womens honour, and 
knowes somwhat more of theyr conditions and qualityes.” The new figure to whom Shore 
appeals is Churchyard, who was, of course, her writer all along.   
I now appeare to him that fyrst set mee forth, a writer of good 
continuance, and one that dayly is exercised to set out both matter 
tragicall, and other prophane histories and verses, whose name is 
Churchyard: hee shall not only haue the fame of his owne worke (which 
no man can deny) but shall likewise haue all the glory I can gieue him, if 
hee lend mee the hearing of my woefull tale, a matter scarce fit for 
womans shamefastnes to bewray. But since without blushing I haue so 
long beene a talkatiue wench, (whose words a world hath delighted in) I 
will now goe on boldly with my audacious manner: and so step I on the 
stage in my shrowdeing sheete as I was buried. 
                                                 
1 The Mirror for Magistrates, 372. John N. King notes that William Baldwin became a “Minister and a 
Preacher” late in life. Giving up the career of writer and printer, “Baldwin was appointed vicar of 
Tortington, Sussex, in 1559–60 and rector of St. Michael-le-Querne, London, in 1561; he died some time 
before 1 November 1563” (DNB). 
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The gendered positions cited by this speech are clearly delineated, despite the fact that 
Churchyard here writes in the voice of a woman. Jane secures Churchyard’s masculine 
enterprise. He is a “martiall man” and a defender of “women’s honour” who reserves for 
himself the “glory” of poetic achievement; she is a “talkative wench” with an “audacious 
manner.” Gendered norms allow Churchyard to receive fame for his knowledge of 
women and ability to voice them. In turn, he provides for Jane’s continuing fame as one 
“whose words a world hath delighted in.”  
 This exchange of notoriety imagines the poet and the ghost sharing the goal of 
continuing and enhancing each other’s reputations. Earlier in this same passage, Jane tells 
us that her “tragedy was in question among some that would not spare due commendation 
to the autor therof.” Both Churchyard and Jane must receive proper credit. Both are 
threatened with slander. In fact, when Churchyard revises the Jane Shore poem for 
publication in his collection of 1593, Churchyard’s Challenge, the poet protests in his 
introduction against those who “of meere mallice disdaineth” his efforts. According to 
Churchyard, some have denied him “the fathering of such a worke,” necessitating a 
reiterated claim that “the penning of Shore’s wife” was and is indeed his.2 The slander 
against Churchyard, like that against the adulteress Jane Shore, is gendered. The poet 
claims the “fathering” of a work that would “search” and “bewray” the “secrets of 
women.” The idea that a female ghost from chronicle history and the poet who voices her 
might articulate each other’s problems, authorize each other’s speech, and advance each 
other’s goals appears to have interested Samuel Daniel. Yet Daniel, as we will see, 
achieves very different effects with the relation between poet and ghost.  
                                                 
2 Churchyard, Churchyards Challenge, sig. S4v. 
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 What happens, Daniel asks, when a monument talks back? In addressing this 
question, The Complaint of Rosamond (1592) takes sixteenth-century ghost compliant’s 
spectral aesthetic to a new level, exerting a clear influence on the trend for ghost 
complaints in the 1590s. In the first lines of Daniel’s ghost complaint, Rosamond 
Clifford’s specter leaves behind the confines of her tomb. Her “body found a graue where 
to containe it,” but her “Fame finds neuer tombe t’inclose it in” (5–7).3 Her “poore 
afflicted ghost” rises up from the “horror of infernall deepes” to “plaine it.” She has much 
to complain about. Her experience in life as the mistress of King Henry II was 
unfortunate, to say the least, marking her with “shame” even in the afterlife. Her soul is 
denied access to “sweet Elisean rest”: the boatman will not let her cross the river without 
paying a toll of “sighs” from living lovers, and only a skilled poet can tell her story well 
enough to prompt such sighs.4 But poets have yet to “penne” her “iust complaint” (8–23). 
Rosamond convinces Daniel to write her story by suggesting that Delia, the poet’s lover, 
might sigh for them both. Daniel’s Complaint of Rosamond follows his sonnet sequence, 
Delia, in the same quarto volume. “Delia may happe to deygne to read our story,” 
Rosamond suggests, “And offer vp her sigh among the rest” (43–44). Such a sigh would 
benefit both Daniel and Rosamond. Delia “can blesse vs with one happy breath,” 
Rosamond claims, and  
Giue comfort to thy Muse to doe her best 
That thereby thou maist ioy, and I might rest. (54–56)  
 
Rosamond stakes her claim by virtue of the link between the two works, The Complaint 
of Rosamond and Delia, which are bound in a conversation of voices as well as a physical 
                                                 
3 The Complaint of Rosamond, in Samuel Daniel: Poems and A Defence of Ryme, ed. Arthur Colby 
Sprague. All citations of Daniel’s works in this chapter follow Sprague’s edition. 
4 According to the last two lines of Richard Barnfield’s complaint poem, Cassandra (1595), “Sweet 
Elysium” is “The place for wrongful Death and Martirdum.” 
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 volume. This chapter examines Daniel’s intertwined use of complaint and sonnet 
sequence, two prominent poetic trends of the 1590s. Daniel’s success in combining the 
two forms is evident: writers adopt the combination throughout the 1590s. Thomas Lodge 
appends The Complaint of Elstred to his sonnet sequence, Phillis. Giles Fletcher pairs a 
ghost complaint featuring Richard III to his Licia sonnets. Richard Barnfield offers a 
triptych: Cynthia,  Certaine Sonnets, and The Legend of Cassandra. Michael Drayton 
publishes his Ovidian complaint collection, England’s Heroical Epistles, with his sonnet 
sequence, Idea (along with a historical poem, The Barrons Warres). Later, in 1609, 
William Shakespeare’s Sonnets are published with A Lover’s Complaint. Daniel links 
ghost complaint and sonnet sequence as a way of exploring and further complicating the 
already complex relation between lover and beloved in the Petrarchan tradition. What 
happens, The Complaint of Rosamond seems to ask, when the vexed temporality of 
Mirror-style ghost complaint is combined with poetic language in the tradition of 
Petrarch? In synthesizing these two inheritances, Daniel produces a dense exploration of 
poetic voice and its protean possibilities. Daniel’s Delia and Rosamond volume, as I will 
show in what follows, uses the problems of voice and temporal perspective generated by 
the combination of sonnet sequence and complaint to construct a self radically fractured 
in the temporality of his own verse.  
This chapter can be understood, then, as a gloss on the last line of the volume, in 
which the poet claims, “who made me knowne, must make me liue vnseen.”5 Throughout 
the volume, the poet desires to be made known—known, that is, to be a poet—but at the 
last, the process that has made him known leaves an unseen remainder. The two “me”s 
                                                 
5 Clark Hulse suggests that “the dilemma posed by Daniel’s paradoxical last line is that of the professional 
poet and the professional courtesan.” Hulse, Metamorphic Verse, 64; qtd. in Stephen Guy-Bray, 
“Rosamond’s complaint,” 348. 
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 here stand in temporal relation. The “me” that the poem has given over to knowledge is 
now encoded in poetic language and is therefore already past tense, but this giving over 
to knowledge “must” generate an “vnseen” “me” of the present as well as a “knowne” 
one of the past.6 This stands in contrast to the Delia sequence, in which the temporal 
fantasy imagines a present plea for love that courts an ambivalent future: death for the 
poet and eternal life for the beloved monumentalized in verse. The sonneteering voice of 
Delia claims authenticity by virtue of the immediacy and urgency of its affective 
apostrophe. “Vnto the boundles Ocean of thy beautie,” the poet exclaims in the first lines 
of the sequence, “Runs this poore riuer, charg’d with streames of zeale:” 
Returning thee the tribute of my dutie, 
Which heere my loue, my youth, my playnts reueale. 
Heer I vnclaspe the booke of my charg’d soule, (1.1–5) 
 
This is a conventional rendering of the sonneteering address: the poet exercises his 
zealous and dutiful enthrallment to the beloved by unveiling his “charg’d soule.” That 
enthrallment drives him toward death. On Delia’s brow, the poet says, “I written finde the 
sentence of my death” (10.3). He imagines his death as a “sacrifice” (21.5) that will 
eternize Delia: “this my death shall christen her anew” (27.13). Though her body and his 
give in to “tyrant Times desire,” his “verse…Phenix-like shall make her liue anew” 
(30.7–14). The final poem of the Delia sequence bemoans the poet’s own passing. “My 
liues flourish is decayde,” he tells us, in contrast to his “youth” in the first sonnet, and he 
prepares the ground for the complaint to follow.  
Eccho, daughter of the ayre, 
Babbling gheste of Rocks and Hills, 
Knowes the name of my fearce Fayre, 
And soundes the accents of my ills (An Ode, 13–16) 
                                                 
6 Samuel Daniel, Delia with the Complaint of Rosamond 1592, sonnet 9, line 13. Hereafter I cite Delia 
parenthetically in the text by sonnet number and line.   
 102   
  
The sonnet sequence thus ends in imminent death for the poet by reference to Ovid’s 
Narcissus and Echo story.7 When Rosamond returns from the dead in the ghost 
complaint, she fulfills this allusion by echoing the poet’s sonneteering lament. Rosamond 
knows Delia’s name and “soundes the [poet’s] accents.” The poet empathizes with the 
ghost;  
  …forthwith mou’d with a tender care 
And pittie, which my selfe could neuer finde, 
What she desir’d, my Muse deygn’d to declare, 
And therefore will’d her boldly tell her minde: 
And I more willing tooke this charge assignd, 
Because her griefs were worthy to be knowne, 
And telling hers, might hap forget mine owne.” (57–63)  
 
The arrangement, however, does not work, as this stanza predicts, to distract the poet 
from his own death-inflected lament. Instead of helping him “forget” the “griefs…worthy 
to be knowne” generated by the preceding sonnet sequence, Rosamond ends by 
redoubling them. Like Ovid’s Echo, she fails to draw the poet from his own death-
directed, loving lament. Rosamond’s echo of the poet’s plea for eternizing in a death-
defying temporality allows the poet to encounter his own fantasy in the figure of 
Rosamond, who, like the monuments he promises to create in his sonnets, has exceeded 
death’s limits. 
The Delia sequence works by forever deferring in a repeated, present-tense, 
affective cry the nevertheless everywhere anticipated future—the sacrificial death of the 
speaker and the eternizing of the beloved. In the temporality of ghost complaint, that 
structure of deferral is no longer possible. A reader of Delia might expect that Rosamond 
                                                 
7 Ovid, Metamorphoses, 3.339–510. In Ovid’s story, the disembodied Echo can only repeat what Narcissus 
says—though she repeats with different emphasis—while Narcissus is captured by his own image in a pool. 
Unable to draw his loving gaze from his image, Narcissus dies, amore liquitur, “wasted with love” (489–
90), and Echo reddebat sonitum plangoris, “gives back [his] sounds of woe” (498).  
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 would fulfill the poet’s eternizing promise; Rosamond is, after all, granted post-mortem 
life by the power of poetizing. In this sense, Rosamond occupies exactly the position that 
the poet promises to Delia. Yet the poet’s encounter with a realization of his own 
monumentalizing fantasy undoes rather than completes him. The encounter leads him to 
view himself as spectral, “vnseene,” even as he is “made knowne” by monumentalized 
verse. Far from vindicating the sonneteering temporal fantasy of Delia, Rosamond 
explodes that fantasy precisely by returning it as promised. Rosamond holds a mirror up 
to the poet as she echoes him, and that mirror further divides the poet already fractured in 
his sonneteering address. The burden of this chapter is to show the way in which Daniel’s 
poems create a poetic self fractured in Petrarchan language and undone by the metaleptic 
temporality of ghost complaint. The Delia sonnets threaten to kill the poet even as he 
creates monuments that would defy death; Rosamond completes the project by putting 
him the spectral time of his own monumentalizing. In short, I show that the spectral 
aesthetic of the mirroring Mirror, in Daniel’s hands, spectralizes the poet.     
Even as it aims for more sophisticated effects, Daniel’s Complaint of Rosamond 
draws on the problems generated by the Mirror tradition’s poetic representation of the 
past. As I have discussed in the previous chapter, the speaking of the ghost of Jane Shore 
works to authorize the poet, Churchyard, by virtue of authorizing Jane as the privileged 
speaker of the historical record. Jane will give Churchyard the “glory” and “fame of his 
owne worke” even as she claims authority over her own story, offering her “selfe for 
proofe” against the chronicle account. The ghost of Rosamond promises to authorize 
Daniel in a similar way. “No Muse suggests the pittie of my case,” Rosamond tells the 
poet.  
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 Each penne dooth ouerpasse my iust complaint, 
Whilst others are preferd, though farre more base: 
Shores wife is grac’d, and passes for a Saint; 
Her Legend iustifies her foule attaint; 
     Her well-told tale did such compassion finde, 
     That she is pass’d, and I am left behind. (22–28) 
 
If the poet takes up the challenge of rewriting the ghost’s story, as Churchyard did Jane 
Shore’s, Rosamond will “pass vnto those happy banks” of the Elysian fields a sanctified 
spirit, and future ages will know that “Thames had Swannes as well as euer Po”—that is, 
the English poet will rival Italians such as Dante and Petrarch (734; 728). Like 
Churchyard’s Shore’s wife, The Complaint of Rosamond projects the desire to rewrite the 
historical record upon the ghost, who will benefit from such a retelling by having her 
story inscribed in a saint’s legendary. This will secure her reputation, her afterlife. Unlike 
Churchyard’s poet, however, who emerges normatively gendered and glorified from his 
engagement with the spectral past, Daniel’s poet is unable to find a way of being in the 
time of his monumentalizing poetic language without also becoming caught and divided 
between masculinized and feminized voices, the multiple temporalities of his address, 
private and public, the living and the dead. Daniel’s poet suffers self-division in his 
monumental labor; yet his suffering does not mean he eschews that labor. Rather, he 
views his endeavor as beginning in private feeling and gifted to the world as a loving 
sacrifice—to his patrons, to Delia, to the glory of his culture—even if he is not always 
sanguine about how his sacrifice will be received or how lasting its legacy will turn out to 
be.  
Daniel’s sonnet sequence represents the poet’s effort to take on the voice of the 
fractured, lovelorn sonneteer. In Rosamond, apostrophe gives way to prosopopeia as 
Daniel takes on another persona—that of a seduced and abandoned woman. But the two 
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 personae are part of the same conversation. Sagaser emphasizes the similarity in the two 
projects: “If [Rosamond] wins Delia’s pity, then it accomplishes what the sonnet 
sequence also aims to do.”8 Wendy Wall notes that “the female speaker and the 
Petrarchan lover…have the compatible goal of winning Delia’s heart.”9 Rosamond 
speaks to her poet of these shared aims in relation to Delia. 
Delia may happe to deygne to read our story, 
And offer vp her sigh among the rest, 
Whose merit would suffice for both our glorie 
Whereby thou might’st be grac’d, and I be blest, 
That indulgence would profit me the best; 
   Such powre she hath by whom thy youth is lead, 
   To ioy the liuing and to blesse the dead. (43–49) 
 
In order to convince the poet to tell her story—here imagined as “our story,” both the 
poet’s and the ghost’s—Rosamond cites a shared project that links her with the poet. The 
poet has just complained for fifty sonnets that Delia will not capitulate to his desires. As a 
woeful, pleading man, Rosamond argues, he must empathize with “a wofull womans 
case” (42). Indeed, the poet does empathize, as he is “forthwith mou’d with a tender care 
/ And pittie, which my selfe could neuer finde” (57–8). His own failure to move Delia 
prompts him to adopt Rosamond’s cause.  
As Roche notes, however, Rosamond’s request for the poet to retell her story is 
shot through with “logical contradiction” (345). “What Rosamond wants is fame but not 
fame for her sin, that sin that keeps her from ‘passing’.”  
Rosamond hath little left but her name, 
And that disgrac’d, for time hath wrong’d the same. (20–21) 
 
“Would it be too much to suggest,” Roche asks, “that time can only report what it 
knows?” (346). Furthermore, the more we strive to make sense of the intentions marked 
                                                 
8 Sagaser, “Sporting the While,” 160. 
9 Wendy Wall, The Imprint of Gender, 255. 
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 as Poet, Delia, and Rosamond in the complaint’s terms, the less sense those intentions 
make. Roche suggests that “Delia, if she has any sense at all, will see that if she 
succumbs to Rosamond’s story, she will commit herself to the same predicament that 
Rosamond is speaking so heatedly against” (347). Why, that is, should the chaste Delia 
sigh for the sinful Rosamond, especially since the seduced woman offers an example of 
what might happen should Delia give in to the poet’s amorous advances? “The whole 
affair is so busy,” Roche concludes, “so ‘shady’ that one wonders why we as readers are 
being asked to participate in this ill-assorted triangle.” Even in its frustration with the 
seemingly inscrutable logic of the intentions on offer in Rosamond, Roche’s analysis 
points out that we are, indeed, being asked to participate as readers in this triangle. This is 
an important point to which I return below. But when Roche asks, with a sarcastic edge, 
whether or not it would be “too much to suggest that time can only report what it knows,” 
he inadvertently shows us the way to respond to the intentional tangle of the poem. In 
order to pose his question at all, Roche must personify “time” as a knowing entity. The 
poem demands from the critic a figurative response to its seeming illogic. Whether Roche 
himself intends it or not, the poem has called his language into a phantasmatic register in 
which the speaking of a ghost—or the personification of time—might be the only way to 
make sense of the Delia/Rosamond/Poet contract. 
 The figurative logic of Rosamond does, in fact, have to do with what time may 
know and do, or at least what it can be imagined to know and do. As the volume’s 
monumental eternizing consistently imagines, the greatest triumph of poetry will be to 
escape the time that also conditions and destroys it. As Musophilus writes of the great 
Chaucer,  
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 Since Chaucer liu’d who yet liues and yet shall, 
Though  (which I grieue to say) but in his last 
Yet what a time hath he wrested from time, 
And won vpon the mighty waste of daies, 
Vnto th’immortall honor of our clime, 
That by his meanes came first adorn’d with Baies, 
Vnto the sacred Relicks of whose rime 
We yet are bound in zeale to offer praise. (151–58) 
 
Of course, Chaucer’s time is not that of Musophilus. Chaucer “came planted in the 
spring,” whereas the present is “th’Autumne, in the withering, / And sullen season of a 
cold defect” (165–68). Nevertheless, Chaucer’s achievement wrests a “time…from time.” 
There is little logic in this tautological formulation, yet it is the enabling fantasy of 
Rosamond’s address as well as the rock upon which the poet will split himself yet again.         
 The Complaint of Rosamond offers a figurative logic of “passing.” 
No Muse suggests the pittie of my case, 
Each penne dooth ouerpasse my iust complaint,  
Whilst others are preferd, though farre more base: 
Shores wife is grac’d, and passes for a Saint; 
Her Legend iustifies her foule attaint; 
   Her well-told tale did such compassion finde, 
   That she is pass’d, and I am left behinde. (22–28, my emphasis) 
 
In this stanza, Jane Shore passes for a saint while poets overpass Rosamond. This means 
that Jane can pass over the river to Elysium while Rosamond remains behind. With the 
triple emphasis on pass, the complaint puts the sense of passing over (from one 
metaphysical state to another) in close proximity to the senses overlook (“ouerpasse”) and 
appear to be (“passes for”). In the uses of pass, in fact, we can read the key motifs of the 
poem. In the register of passing for, the poem will make appearance an obsession, 
specifically the powers, limitations, and consequences of beauty. That she will be passed 
over is Rosamond’s chief fear in life as well as death. And the desire to pass into eternity, 
whether figured as Elysium or monumentalized poetry, is the primary impulse toward the 
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 transcendental in the poem. In this multilayered use of pass the poem also calls attention 
to Rosamond’s pastness. That poets’ pens “ouerpasse” Rosamond’s complaint means that 
she is threatened with the oblivion that it is the poet’s task to forestall. Unlike poetry’s 
preserved and sanctified “holy Reliques,” she will be lost to the unredeemed past of 
chronicle history. But Rosamond returns from past in order to make this case about 
passing. She is an ineluctably lost thing, a ghost, crying out against loss and hoping to be 
made present, which will mean that she will pass into eternity justified, sanctified, and 
mourned.      
Sagaser locates this pastness by reading the poem as a lament for the “loss of 
beauty.” 
Rosamond…unfolds a story that is not so much about the loss of 
innocence as it is about the loss of beauty—the untimely loss of beauty, 
which means, we discover, that the tale is very much about the loss of 
beholders of beauty, and the loss of being in a community of beholders. 
Even more explicitly than Delia, the poem is about being seen and being 
read. (160–61) 
 
I agree with Sagaser that the poem figures the tragedy of Rosamond as the loss of 
beauty.10 The poet’s anxiety about loss, in fact, refers both to Rosamond’s beauty as well 
as the poetic endeavor for which she becomes an echo. Sagaser highlights this by 
suggesting the poem is about “being seen and being read.” In the poem’s words, beauty is 
“Sweet silent rhetorique” (121). The poem, in fact, goes to great lengths to connect 
beauty and rhetoric, threatening both with loss in equal measure. Like Delia, Rosamond 
is a natural beauty, a “happy blooming flowre” from the countryside (131). “My beauty 
                                                 
10 This is, in fact, the main point I draw from Sagaser’s essay. She writes of Daniel’s “determination in 
[Delia and Rosamond] and throughout his career, to reconcile momentary pleasure (poetic and erotic) with 
lasting meaning or power, and to do so in a way that does not value pleasure and beauty merely for their 
ability to inspire individuals to virtuous action, but in a way that values pleasure and beauty for their own 
sake—that is, values their ability to enrich those who possess them” (146). 
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 was mine owne, / No borrowed blush which banck-rot beauties seeke” (134–35). Her 
move to the big city and into the court threatens to make her natural beauty into mere 
seeming. The court women, such as the woman who convinces Rosamond to succumb to 
King Henry’s desires, represent the mere appearance of beauty, the way in which 
“shewes deceive, outward appearance lyes” (173). Rosamond’s seductress is even 
introduced as a “seeming Matrone” (216). If we read Rosamond’s beauty and the loss it 
suffers as a figure for poetic power, her ruin as she enters courtly society represents the 
threat to the poet as his verse becomes public. But the relation between the poet and 
Rosamond that the complaint develops is not as hermetic as one of ground and figure or 
tenor and vehicle. Rosamond has her own desires and her own story to tell. She is also a 
reader of the poet’s sonnets, which posits her as external as well as internal to his verse. 
Rather than merely a figure or metaphor for the poet, the poem imagines Rosamond as 
his “Eccho.” 
 Not only does the poem set its context as one of empathic exchange between the 
ghost and the poet, as I have discussed, but when Rosamond begins to tell her story, her 
echoes of the poet’s relationship to Delia in sonneteering becomes clear. Like the poet, 
Rosamond laments the “ruine” of her “youth” (64). At first she is like Delia, an innocent, 
beautiful recluse in the countryside. But when she goes “from Country…to Court,” her 
story returns the poet’s deepest fears about what it means for the private, chaste self to 
engage a degraded society in which power, lust, and iconoclasm rule. Rosamond learns 
the power of beauty to “rauish sence, and play a world in loue” (91, 126). She learns 
falsehood. 
Impiety of times, chastities abator, 
Falshod, wherein thy selfe, thy selfe deniest: 
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 Treason, to counterfeit the seal of nature, 
The stampe of heauen, impressed by the hiest. 
Disgrace vnto the world, to whom thou lyest, 
     Idol vnto thy selfe, shame to the wise, 
     And all that honors thee idolatrise. (141–47) 
 
Beauty forged in seclusion is corrupted by the “impiety of times.” Rosamond’s echo of 
the sonnets is double-edged here. She mirrors the poet’s sonneteering address in its 
concern with preserving inviolate a private self—his “chaste desiers” that he tells us 
“Each byrd sings t’herselfe, and so will I” (49.2, 14)—against the “Barbarisme” 
(dedication) of the world. She also mirrors the poet’s betrayal of Delia in making the 
beloved public. The poet tells Delia not to worry “that these my papers should, / Bewray 
vnto the world howe faire thou art” (36.1–2). This is the sonnet in which he promises she 
will live on, not disgraced in the world but “grau’d in marble” by his “carefull accents” 
(8, 13). The poet of the sonnets has imagined a time in which beauty can have its scope 
and praise—whether the beauty of the poet’s words or that of Delia—but in which both 
the poet and Delia can be imagined as chastely preserved from the vulgar exchanges of 
the world. In Rosamond’s echo, the private “selfe”—the “me” the poet so wishes to 
preserve “consectrated to silence” is voiced and doubled: “thy selfe, thy selfe deniest.” 
Rosamond’s tale reads as a narrative of beauty’s entry into the wanton world that bears 
out the fears of the sonnet sequence; it will not be subject to the poet’s control through 
eternizing preservation fantasies of cloistering and entombment. Ironically, it is precisely 
the poet’s ability to erect monuments to beauty that launches Rosamond’s narrative—a 
narrative that, in turn, echoes the poet’s fears about beauty’s corruption.  
Rosamond’s beauty goes on to reverse and corrupt hierarchies. 
…I wrought on no meane obiect; 
A Crowne was at my feete, Scepters obaide mee: 
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 Whom Fortune made my King, Loue made my Subiect, 
Who did commaund the Land, most humbly praid mee: 
Henry the second, that so highly weigh’d mee, 
     Founde well by proofe the priuiledge of Beautie, 
     That it hath powre to counter-maund all duetie. (155–61) 
 
As with Jane Shore, Rosamond’s very fall from grace gathers worldly power to itself. 
The duty of subjects along with ‘proper’ patriarchal rule is foiled by beauty’s 
“priuiledge.” Uncontained by the sonneteering fantasy, feminine beauty spreads like an 
infection and ravages the field of the proper. “What cannot women doe that know theyr 
powre?” (128). “Th’ adulterate beauty of a falsed cheeke” is “Vil[e] staine to honor and 
to women eeke” (137–38). A parade of evils follows  Rosamond’s release from the 
seclusion of the countryside (in the diegetic narrative) or from the silence of the tomb (in 
the frame narrative). Not only are hierarchies overturned, but the wisdom of age is 
subverted (172–73), “Vulture ambition” feeds on Henry’s “lyuer” (178), youth and nature 
are undermined (203), and honor and reputation are forgotten. “Fame, whereof the world 
seemes to make such choyce,” the Matron tells Rosamond, “Is but an Eccho, and an idle 
voyce” (258–59). The chaste preserves of natural beauty are lost to a world of seeming. 
The subtile Citty-women better learned, 
Esteeme them chast ynough that best seeme so; 
Who though they sport, it shall not be discerned, 
Their face bewraies not what their bodies doe; (274–77) 
 
Rosamond gives in to the false world here represented. Indeed, she seems to have no 
other choice in the face of royal compulsion: “he is my King and may constraine me” 
(337).  
When King Henry locks Rosamond in the labyrinth, she laments that her beauty 
will no longer be seen. The threat to beauty becomes not only that it will become mere 
appearance, but also that it will never be seen at all.  
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 What greater torment euer could haue beene, 
Then to inforce the fayre to liue retired? 
For what is Beautie if it be not seene, 
Or what is’t to be seene vnlesse admired? 
And though admyred, vnlesse in loue desired? 
     Neuer were cheekes of Roses, locks of Amber, 
     Ordayn’d to liue imprisond in a Chamber. (505-11)  
 
Rosamond’s story echoes the poet’s anxiety that his enterprise is an unwinnable scenario. 
Even as the complaint is a bid for literary recognition, it figures a Rosamond whose 
happiness (indeed, her eternal rest) depends upon social recognition.11 Just so, the poet 
may write all he wants, but what do his words signify if no one reads them, if they are 
misinterpreted, or if, as our reading of Delia might lead us to suspect, they fall prey to a 
“gross-sighted” audience more interested in iconoclastic innovation than preserving 
virtue or reverential respect for culture’s monuments? As her beauty encounters the false 
and wanton court, Rosamond echoes the poet’s problematic relation to the social world. 
But King Henry’s actions also mirror the poet’s containment fantasy. Henry’s decision to 
seclude Rosamond, first in a “solitarie Grange” (366) and thereafter in a “stately Pallace 
he foorthwith did buylde” (463), repeats the sonnets insofar as Delia remains safely and 
silently cloistered in them. Henry builds a labyrinth of “intricate innumerable wayes,” 
within “the closed bosome of which frame” Rosamond becomes a “Minotaure of shame” 
(464–478). She describes herself as a “monster of fortune, and the worlds wonder” who 
“Liu’d cloystred in so desolate a case” (479–80). In a context in which the building of 
monuments is so consistently a figure for poetry’s ambitions, it would be difficult to read 
Henry’s monument building and imprisonment of Rosamond without recalling the poet’s 
characterization of Delia, who will live “Vnburied” in the poet’s “lines” where she will 
                                                 
11 An Elizabethan poet’s training is dependent on imitation of classical poetic models, his income on 
successful competition for patronage, and the practice of his craft on how well he occupies and varies a 
limited range of discourses.  
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 be “reseru’d in purenes” as those lines “shall intombe” her “eyes” (36.10–11). From the 
point of view of Rosamond’s plight, Delia’s entombment in the sonnets begins to look 
sinister.  
As if to ward off this association of the poet’s monument building with Henry’s, 
Rosamond suggests that what happened to her will not happen to Delia. “Delia,” 
Rosamond says, is “left to adorne the West.” Unlike Rosamond, who was preferred to the 
voracious court, Delia remains safe and pure in the countryside. Rosamond laments the 
difference between her situation and Delia’s. 
Yet would to God my foote had neuer moued 
From Countrey safety, from the fields of rest: 
To know the danger to be highly loued, 
And lyue in pompe to braue among the best. 
Happy for me, better had I beene blest, 
     If I vnluckely had neuer strayde: 
     But liu’d at home a happy Country mayde. 
Whose vnaffected innocencie thinks  
No guilefull fraude, as doth the Courtly liuer: 
She’s deckt with trueth, the Riuer where she drinks 
Doth serue her for her glasse, her counsell giuer: 
She loues sincerely, and is loued euer. 
     Her days are peace, and so she ends her breath, 
     True life that knowes not what’s to die till death. (533–46) 
 
Rosamond provides a pastoral fantasy that comes to the rescue of beauty. This also 
echoes the sonnets, in which Delia resides not on gaudy Thames but on arcadian Avon. 
Such rusticity redounds to the credit of both Delia and her poet. 
     For God forbid I should my papers blot, 
With mercynary lines, with seruile pen: 
Praising vertues in them that haue them not, 
Basely attending on the hopes of men. 
     No no my verse respects nor Thames nor Theaters, 
Nor seekes it to be knowne vnto the Great: 
But Avon rich in fame, though poore in waters, 
Shall haue my song, where Delia hath her seate. 
     Avon shall be my Thames, and she my Song; 
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      Ile sound her name the Ryuer all along. (48.5–14) 
 
Again, however this fantasy of rural seclusion, both in Rosamond and Delia, appears as 
something of a back formation, a defensive stance against the ineluctable social valence 
of monumentalizing. It reads, in the context of both poems, as an attempt to veil the poet 
and his objects from the inevitabilities of his own discourse. Rosamond suggests that 
Delia’s spatial retirement shields her from temporality. Delia “knowes not what’s to die 
till death.” But the combination of death-inflected sonnets and the echoes of Rosamond’s 
post-mortem complaint make that spatial and temporal fantasy difficult to sustain.    
 The Queen finds King Henry’s labyrinth, the story goes, and wreaks her revenge 
on Rosamond with poison. The final elegy for Rosamond’s beauty is King Henry’s. Here 
he mourns Rosamond’s death.  
And I will cause posterity shall know, 
How faire thou wert aboue all women kind. 
And after ages monuments shall find, 
     Shewing thy beauties title not thy name, 
     Rose of the world that sweetned so the same. (689–93) 
 
Henry promises to make monuments to Rosamond’s beauty. Such monuments were, in 
fact, created, the poem tells us, but they did not last. “Marble and Brasse so little lasting 
be” (707). At the end of the poem, Rosamond has the poet building them again in verse. 
And were it not thy fauourable lynes, 
Reedified the wracke of my decayes, 
And that thy accents willingly assignes, 
Some farther date, and giue me longer daies, 
Fewe in this age had knowne my beauties praise. 
     But thus renewd my fame redeemes some time, 
     Till other ages shall neglect thy rime. (715–21) 
 
A cycle emerges from the above two passages. The eternizing claim fails to do its work; 
it is revealed as only a temporary stay against time and the world’s indifference. Like 
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 marble and brass that wear away, poetry will be “neglected” in future ages. Decay and 
loss are inevitable; beauty is ephemeral. Compare the opening sonnet of Delia to the last 
stanza of Rosamond. Here is the first sonnet of Delia.  
Vnto the boundles Ocean of thy beautie 
Runs this poore riuer, charg’d with streames of zeale: 
Returning thee the tribute of my dutie, 
Which heere my loue, my youth, my playnts reuele. 
Heere I vnclaspe the booke of my charg’d soule, (1–5) 
 
And now the last stanza of Rosamond, in which the poet brings us back to the Delia 
sonnets as Rosamond disappears. 
So vanisht shee, and left me to returne, 
To prosecute the tenor of my woes: 
Eternall matter for my Muse to mourne; 
But ah the worlde hath heard too much of those, 
My youth such errors must no more disclose. 
   Ile hide the rest, and greeue for what hath beene, 
   Who made me knowne, must make me liue vnseene. (736–42)  
 
At the end of Rosamond, the poet contemplates a return to his sonnets but decides against 
it. Instead he gives in to time completely. He closes the “booke” that he opens in the first 
sonnet—the book in which the “eternall matter” of his sonnets, the error of his youth, is 
written. In the first stanza of the complaint, Rosamond’s errors are also those of youth. 
Her first request to the poet is to “write…the ruine of my youth” (64). The poet, then, 
having finished disclosing Rosamond’s error and given her “longer daies,” decides he has 
disclosed enough. In the last line, he claims that Delia or Rosamond (does it make a 
difference?) has made him “knowne,” but now he will “liue vnseene.” Seen in this light, 
the end of The Complaint of Rosamond announces the expense of and the ambivalence 
toward the volume’s monumentalizing ambition.  
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  Rosamond reverses the temporal polarity of Delia. As I note above, Delia’s 
fantasy of temporality is based on the private poet’s doomed defense against becoming 
public. In the ghost complaint, the poet confronts the already written—the already 
public—which makes a claim on his private feeling, his “lamenting Muse.” Rosamond is 
already inscribed in the chronicle history from which she desires a sanctifying escape. 
She wants to wrest a new time from time. For a poet such as Daniel, who, as we have 
seen, remains extraordinarily sensitive to the way in which textual monuments represent 
cultural stability, to “re-edify” the “wracke” of Rosamond’s “decayes” would seem to be 
an act of curatorial preservation. Yet Rosamond presents the poet with a temporal 
conundrum. In her claim for simpatico between herself and the poet, she echoes him and 
presents him with a post-mortem mirror of his poetic attempt. In the Delia sonnets, the 
future of the poet’s enterprise is presumed to consist in a monument that will (future) 
proclaim the beloved’s eternal fame and will have (future perfect) meant the poet’s death. 
That futurity analeptically preserves the poet’s private passion in an authentic present 
address. Death for the poet, in other words, is the necessary consequence of poetry’s 
chaste and suffering present address as it is imagined to emerge into the public eye. 
Sonnet twenty of Delia shows the way in which the sequence depends upon the death 
imagined to attend the poet’s eternizing verse. 
     Come death the Anchor-holde of all my thoughtes, 
My last Resort whereto my soule appealeth; 
For all too long on earth my fancy dotes, 
Whilst my best blood my younge desires sealeth. 
     That hart is now the prospectiue of horror, 
That honored hath the cruelst faire that lyueth: 
The cruelst faire, that sees I languish for her, 
Yet neuer mercy to my merit giueth. 
     This is her Lawrell and her triumphes prize, 
To tread me downe with foote of her disgrace: 
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 Whilst I did builde my fortune in her eyes, 
And laide my liues rest on so faire a face; 
     That rest I lost, my loue, my life and all, 
     So high attempts to lowe disgraces fall. 
 
Death here is imagined as center and limit (“Anchor-holde” and “last Resort”) of the 
poetic address. The present tense of feeling is emphasized again with “hart is now” and 
its looking forward, its “prospectiue of horror.” When the poem comes to Delia’s 
triumph, “her Lawrell,” the terms of the poet’s present shift to those of the past. Her 
“prize” is based on what the poet “did build,” the life he laid to rest, and the same that he 
“lost.” In the 1601 version of the sonnet, “death” becomes “Tyme”: 
Come Tyme the anchor-hold of my desire, 
My last Resort whereto my hopes appeale… 
 
The substitution of time for death is appropriate. The sequence throughout develops its 
obsessive anticipation of death as a temporal system within which poetry operates and 
eternizes. Rosamond’s address in the poet’s prosopopeia unhinges this temporal fantasy. 
Rosamond has read the sonnets that appear in the same volume as her complaint. 
In her own text, she asks her author to write her story, which he is already doing in 
writing her request. This elaborate framing conceit stages a conversation of voices that 
forces the reader into a strange, non-linear temporality. Even if she were not imagined as 
a ghost and therefore already outside of time, Rosamond’s recollection of the sonnets in 
the work that precedes hers would register as a transgression of borders in the sense that 
Gérard Genette develops. Here Genette defines “author’s metalepsis” in both classical 
and modern formulations. 
Cortazar tells the story of a man assassinated by one of the characters in 
the novel he is reading; this is an inverse (and extreme) form of the 
narrative figure the classics called author’s metalepsis, which consists of 
pretending that the poet “himself brings about the effects he celebrates,” as 
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 when we say that Virgil “has Dido die” in Book IV of the Aeneid… […] 
…any intrusion by the extradiegetic narrator or narratee into the diegetic 
universe (or by diegetic characters into the metadiegetic universe, etc.), or 
the inverse (as in Cortazar), produces an effect of strangeness that is either 
comical…or fantastic.12   
 
Genette draws on a tradition in which the rhetorical term “metalepsis” signifies a 
condensation of the tropes of narration with those of the narrated.13 For Genette, the term 
describes the way in which the figuring voice interacts with the figured. In this sense, 
both Rosamond’s awareness of the author’s sonnets preceding the complaint in which she 
appears as well as the way in which she uses that knowledge in pleading with the poet 
register as metaleptic. Genette describes “narrative metalepsis” as playing “on the double 
temporality of the story and the narrating…as if the narrating were contemporaneous with 
the story and had to fill up the latter’s dead spaces.” In ghost complaint, the “dead 
spaces” that the narrating poet must “fill up” are more literally “spaces” belonging to the 
“dead” than Genette’s formulation might intend. Nevertheless, I take Genette’s fortuitous 
wording as a useful point of reference for understanding the metaleptic play of voices in 
Daniel’s staging of possession and dispossession. Genette continues after describing 
some instances of narrative metalepsis. 
All these games, by the intensity of their effects, demonstrate the 
importance of the boundary they tax their ingenuity to overstep, in 
defiance of verisimilitude—a boundary that is precisely the narrating (or 
the performance) itself; a shifting but sacred frontier between two worlds, 
the world in which one tells, the world of which one tells. Whence the 
uneasiness Borges so well put his finger on: “Such inversions suggest that 
if the characters in a story can be readers or spectators, then we, their 
readers or spectators, can be fictitious.” The most troubling thing about 
                                                 
12 Gérard Genette, Narrative Discourse, 234–35. Genette quotes from Pierre Fontanier, Commentaire 
raisonné sur “Les Tropes” de Dumarsais, vol. 2 of Dumarsais’ Les Tropes (1818; repr. Geneva: Slatkine 
Reprints, 1967), 116, and The Art of Poetry: The Poetical Treatises of Horace, Vida, and Boileau, trans. 
Soame, ed. Albert S. Cook [Boston: Ginn and Col, 1892], 160.  
13 See the OED definition of “metalepsis,” which offers a series of statements using the term dating from 
1550 forward. 
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 metalepsis indeed lies in this unacceptable and insistent hypothesis, that 
the extradiegetic is perhaps always diegetic, and that the narrator and his 
narratees—you and I—perhaps belong to some narrative.14 
 
For Genette, readers who suspend disbelief and accept the metaleptic “hypothesis” are 
therefore troubled with the sense that they are caught up in a narrative economy that has 
vitiated the boundaries separating the narrated, narrator, and reader.  
As I have shown in discussing Mirror poems such as “Shore’s wife,” the ghost 
possesses a metaleptic point of view in which she offers both a privileged, first person 
account of her living years as well as retrospective commentary on those years from the 
point of view of the present. Daniel’s Rosamond also occupies this doubled temporality. 
Yet Rosamond comments not only on the past encoding of her own life and afterlife, she 
comments on Jane Shore’s when she suggests that Churchyard has “grac’d” Jane and 
turned her into a “Saint.” Even more importantly, Rosamond reads within the volume in 
which she is written. She has privileged access to the poet’s writing and his thoughts 
about Delia, and she expects that the beloved of the sonnets will be listening as the ghost 
complaint unfolds. This elaborate conceit relies on both a synchronic and diachronic 
metalepsis. Rosamond reads a palimpsest of past lives and texts as well as the present 
volume in which she appears. Churchyard’s poem, in fact, foreshadows Daniel’s use of 
this effect. When Jane addresses Baldwin, the editor of the Mirror, asking him to place 
her “tragedy…among the rest,” she shows an awareness of the other poems that surround 
hers. “I heare,” Jane tells us, “the lives and falles of many wyghtes.” Daniel follows 
Churchyard in allowing Rosamond a view that combines the first person perspective of 
past events with a present view imagined as (at least) coextensive with the author’s. 
                                                 
14 Genette, 236, cites Jorge Luis Borges, Other Inquisitions, 1937–1952, transl. R. Simms (1964), 46.  
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 Metalepsis implicates the reader in its temporal loop by virtue of what Paul de 
Man calls the “scene of reading.”15 De Man suggests that “we do not ‘possess’ language 
in the same way that we can be said to possess natural properties. It would be just as 
proper or improper to say that ‘we’are a property of language as the reverse” (160). This 
is emphasized by the shift from sonnet to ghost complaint. In the sonnet, the lyric 
utterance that the poet addresses to his beloved (and that we, the readers, overhear) is 
presumed to belong to the poet in a way that registers as affectively authentic. It produces 
the effect of a lamenting subject speaking to a beloved object. The address of the ghost to 
the poet challenges that relation among speaker, beloved, and reader by confusing the 
subject-object terms upon which it rests. “The diegetic possibility implies the 
hypothetical existence of a narrator, of a man talking about men,” de Man writes. 
It also implies the necessity of an act by which the question of the 
referential verifiability is raised, and this epistemological moment, which 
cannot be short-circuited, is readily represented in the figure of an 
audience or a reader. We re-find the traditional space or stage for the scene 
of reading as the scene of telling, the mimesis of a diegesis. But the 
necessary presence of the moment of utterance and of the interpretative 
moment of understanding has nothing to do with the empirical situation 
naively represented in this scene…. (161–62) 
 
What ghost complaint adds to the sonnet sequence is a complication of the lyric 
utterance, the apostrophe, of the sonnet form. Sonnets are paradigmatic for the lyric voice 
insofar as they create a scene in which the poet generates the effect of a lamenting self in 
the moment of address to a beloved other. We, the readers, eavesdrop, we overhear this 
lamenting appeal. The sonnet generates a subjectivity effect based upon the presumed 
authenticity the poet-speaker’s affective cry. Of course, sonnets in the Petrarchan 
tradition fracture the very subjectivity effects they create, calling into question the 
                                                 
15 Paul de Man, Allegories of Reading.  
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 authenticity of the voice as much as they rely upon it. Nevertheless, the sonnet 
paradigmatically begins with the premise of the lyric utterance: that a ‘self’ utters its 
lament to an ‘other’ and that we readers overhear this address, taking pleasure in the 
speaker’s eloquent pain. In giving over the plaintive address to a ghost who reads the 
sonnet sequence and hopes to appropriate its appeal for her own lament, The Complaint 
of Rosamond allegorizes our own reading of Daniel’s Delia. This serves to point out the 
way in which, in de Man’s words,  
…the notions of audience and of narrator that are part of any narrative are 
only the misleading figuration of a linguistic structure. And just as the 
indeterminacy of reference generates the illusion of a subject, a narrator, 
and a reader, it also generates the metaphor of temporality. (162) 
 
That the terms of lyric address—the situations of the speaker, addressee, and reader—can 
change places and appropriate each other’s positions, suggests that, as Borges says, “you 
and I,” as readers, also “belong to some narrative.” And that this “narrative” or linguistic 
structure to which we belong makes us a “property of language” as much as language is 
our property (de Man 160). The Complaint of Rosamond reminds us that in reading we 
participate in the “illusion of a subject, a narrator, and a reader” that “generates the 
metaphor of temporality.” In reading the ghost complaint, then, we are implicated in that 
illusory, metaphorical structure.  
Compare the effects that Genette and de Man describe here the theory of how 
poetry works in Musophilus. Musophilus suggests that writing eternizes the writer.     
For these lines are the vaines, the Arteries, 
And vndecaying life-strings of those harts 
That still shall pant, and still shall exercise 
The motion spirit and nature both imparts, 
And shall, with those aliue so sympathize  
As nourisht with their powers inioy their parts. (183–88) 
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 This suggests that, though the writer may be dead, writing becomes newly embodied in 
the reader. Like the formulation by Genette and Borges, the poetics of Musophilus insists 
that poetry draws the reader into its desiring circuit, and that in such a circuit the 
boundary between writer and reader will fade. Lines of poetry will become veins and 
arteries, possessing the living in order to “inioy their parts.” This bears a strong 
resemblance to the way in which the ghost of Rosamond suggests that she and the poet 
share the emotions of pity and woe as well as an audience. The dead Rosamond—in 
Genette’s terms, the “diegetic” character—participates in the poet’s living emotions; and, 
in turn, the poet imagines that he will enjoy the living bodies of readers after his death. In 
this fantasy of materialized citationality, the dead and the living are bound through the 
medium of “lines” into a relation of desire, as “harts,” “sympathize,” and “inioy” make 
clear. In Musophilus, the relation is also sexually necrophilic—an implication made 
unavoidable with the use of “pant,” “exercise,” the “motion” of “spirit and nature,” and 
the suggestion of enjoying “parts.”  Musophilus continues:  
O blessed letters that combine in one 
All ages past, and make one liue with all, 
By you we do confer with who are gone, 
And the dead liuing vnto councell call: 
By you th’vnborne shall haue communion 
Of what we feele, and what doth vs befall. (189–94)  
 
In an extended alliterative scheme, “letters”—which we may understand simultaneously 
as learning in general, epistles, and the symbols that form words—combine, confer, call 
to counsel, and commune. The reference to “communion” alludes to the Catholic 
Eucharist, in which ingesting the communion wafer materializes a spiritual and physical 
union between bodies absent and present. Taking the above two stanzas together, the 
“letters” and “lines” dispossessed from the writer’s own body (presumed to be one of the 
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 “dead” of “ages past” in this formulation) possess the reader. Musophilus figures that 
possession predicated upon dispossession in terms of shared feeling, desire, sex, 
conversation, and spiritual union.  
 At this point in my analysis, that such a relation between past and present bodies 
should be gendered should not surprise. In the dedicatory sonnet of Musophilus, Daniel 
describes his relation to the poem. 
I Do not here vpon this hum’rous Stage,  
Bring my transformed verse apparailed 
With others passions, or with others rage, 
With loues, with wounds, with factions furnished: 
    But here present thee, onelie modelled 
In this poore frame, the forme of mine owne heart: 
Here to reuiue my selfe my Muse is lead 
With motions of her owne, t’act her owne part 
    Striuing to make, her now contemned arte 
As faire t’her selfe as possiblie she can; 
Least seeming of no force, of no desart 
She might repent the course that she began, 
    And, with these times of dissolution, fall 
    From goodnes, vertue, glorie, fame and all.   
 
This is a gendered story of possession: multiple beings occupying the same physical body 
and negotiate mastery. In that the poem’s “poore frame” encloses and shapes the poet’s 
“owne heart,” authenticity, it seems, is at stake. The poem will not present the passions of 
others but those that are of his own essence. Strangely, however, it is the female “Muse,” 
through “motions of her owne” and “act[ing] her owne part” that allows for expression 
from the poet’s own “heart.” The Muse aims for authenticity to “her selfe,” which allows 
the poet’s heart to be framed, shaped, and formed. In this setting, the authenticity of the 
masculine depends upon the ability of the feminine to be herself. On one level, Daniel 
perhaps alludes to the Latin grammatical fact that the soul is feminine; the poet then 
refers to his own soul. Muses are also traditionally imagined as women. But the passage 
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 takes those gendered tropes seriously as a story of how poetry operates. Daniel seems to 
imagine here a self struggling to emerge as itself through a gendered interplay of self and 
self-imagined-as-other, which is the feeling self (“heart”) formalized (“modelled”) in the 
“poore frame” of verse. Of interest here for The Complaint of Rosamond is that the 
emergence of the poet’s imagined, feminine self-as-other threatens not to secure the 
poet’s masculine revival—his rescue from death that “revive my self” implies—but to 
expose it to dissolution and fall. 
She might repent the course that she began, 
    And, with these times of dissolution, fall 
    From goodnes, vertue, glorie, fame and all.   
 
This dedicatory sonnet thus foregrounds the concerns that The Complaint of Rosamond 
also takes up. 
Rosamond, the woman fallen from “virtue, glorie, fame and all,” hopes that the 
poet’s craft—in Ovidian terms, his Orphic breath—will prompt Delia’s sighs. “Sorrow,” 
for Rosamond, “is dead for aye reuiuing.” She needs the poet’s “wofull Song” to take up 
her cause.  
  …my myserable ghost, 
(Whilome inuested in so faire a vaile, 
Which whilst it liu’d, was honoured of the most, 
And being dead, giues matter to bewaile) 
Comes to sollicit thee, since others faile, 
     To take this taske, and in thy wofull Song 
     To forme my case, and register my wrong. 
 
Although I knowe thy iust lamenting Muse, 
Toylde in th’ affliction of thine owne distresse,  
In others cares hath little time to vse, 
And therefore maist esteeme of mine the lesse: 
Yet as thy hopes attend happie redresse, 
     Thy ioyes depending on a womans grace, 
     So moue thy minde a wofull womans case. (29–41, my emphasis)  
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 Here Rosamond echoes Jane Shore’s word, “case.” Jane is “one that may no longer hide 
her face, / But nedes must come and shewe her piteous case.” Another ghost hoping to 
mitigate the judgments pronounced upon her, Rosamond appeals to the poet to “form her 
case.” The word signifies in multiple directions. Given the legalistic terms, “sollicit,” 
“register,” and “redresse,” “case” suggests a context in which the poet will speak on 
behalf of the ghost before those who would judge her.16 In this sense, a case is a matter 
brought forth in court. An entry in Huloet’s 1572 dictionary reads: 
Case in lawe, or properly that ryseth in contention vpon the point of 
the matter, which must be replied vnto, and [ei]ther confessed, denied, 
or trauersed. Caussae constitutio.  
 
This entry notes the relation of legal word, “case,” to the Latin causa. This use of the 
term recalls the Rhetorica ad Herennium attributed to Cicero, an important manual for 
rhetorical training in the sixteenth century. As the ad Herennium suggests,  
Tria genera sunt causarum quae recipere debet orator: demonstrativum, 
deliberabiutur, iudiciale. [There are three kinds of causes which the 
speaker must treat: Epideictic, Deliberative, and Judicial.]17 
 
The “epideictic” causa involves praise or blame, the “deliberative” discusses policy, and 
the “judicial” takes up legal matters. These three together comprise the orator’s art. A 
trained orator, such as a poet, takes up causae, or in the early modern English term, cases.  
Rosamond’s use of Jane Shore’s word, “case,” however, signifies beyond the 
legal context both poems develop. Huloet’s dictionary prints the following entries in 
addition to the one above: 
Case, Casus, us.…gen. Cas. 
Case to put anything in…. Vn estuy de quelque chose que se soit. 
 
                                                 
16 OED dates “case,” as in a suit brought for consideration before a court, to the fourteenth century, offering 
several sixteenth-century examples.  
17 [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, translated by Harry Caplan, I.ii. 
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 The first of these definitions notes the etymology of “case” from the Latin casus, which 
suggests an unfortunate 'falling' out of events. Casus can mean a “fall” or “error,” an 
“accident, event, misfortune,” or even “death.”18 Thus a “case” is often an undesirable set 
of events, as in Jane Shore’s “piteous case,” which Rosamond echoes in her “wofull 
womans case.” Yet “case” also recalls enclosure and embodiment, as the dictionary 
reminds us in its “case to put anything in” above. In this sense the word derives from the 
Latin capsa, meaning chest, box, or a case for books.19 William Baldwin’s Treatice of 
Moral Philosophy suggests that the “body” is “the case & sepulcher of the soule.”20 And 
William Shakespeare’s Cleopatra, when Antony dies, suggests that the “case of that huge 
spirit now is cold.”21 Rosamond speaks of how her “myserable ghost” was once 
“invested in so faire a vaile.” Rosamond’s death, however it divested her, has produced 
“matter to bewail.” Given the insistence on embodiment here, “matter” must play upon 
the physical ‘matter’ that Rosamond leaves behind, her body, and the death that pro
new (subject) ‘matter’ for lament. This context inflects the last line of the stanza abov
which Rosamond asks the poet to “forme” her “case.” The poem itself will, in fact, form 
a case for—frame or embody—her lamenting voice.
duces 
e in 
                                                
22 The play on encasing extends the 
concerns of the first stanza of the poem. 
 
18 Oxford Latin Desk Dictionary, ed. James Morwood (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1994). 
19 Ibid. 
20 William Baldwin, A Treatice of Moral Philosophy [expanded edition by Thomas Palfreyman, 1571] book 
two, chapter six. Cited in OED, “case” n. 2, 3.a., which also cites the next quotation from Shakespeare. 
21 Shakespeare, Antony and Cleopatra, 4.15.94.  
22 The 1572 dictionary gives us one more sense of “case” to which we can add those above. “Case, suche 
as they put pictures in, a case for an image. Aedicula. L’estuy d’vne image.” This plays upon yet another 
etymological association. The Latin aedicula is a small building or temple, which is here perhaps brought 
into the definition in light of the Latin and Italian word casa, meaning small house, hut, or cabin. Huloet’s 
dictionary entry thus seems to confuse the root words capsa and casa. I suggest that Rosamond’s “forme 
my case” follows this etymological confusion in conflating causa, casus, casa, and capsa into “case.” The 
suggestion that a case can be (by metaphor) a picture frame applies as well. Daniel frames the image of 
Rosamond. That Rosamond is an image or copy is an idea that the poem necessarily depends upon (since 
she is a ghost) but everywhere complicates with its insistence on embodying that image. If Rosamond is an 
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 My body found a graue where to containe it, 
A sheete could hide my face, but not my sin, 
For Fame finds neuer tombe t’ inclose it in. (5–7) 
 
This articulation of a contained body with uncontainable afterlife finds rearticulation in 
the play on “matter” and “case” in the later stanza. 
The poet’s prosopopeia of Rosamond reembodies her “soule” in poetic language 
under the sign and authority of “case” in its rhetorical and physical senses, and that 
reembodiment is gendered. Rosamond, materialized by and echoing the sonneteering 
voice, disables that voice’s temporal fantasy in a return from the dead as she speaks in the 
metaleptic perspective that such a return enables. Such an incursion into the poet’s 
sonneteering discourse dispossesses that discourse of its authority because the temporal 
fantasy in Delia relies on the positions in time of the poet, addressee, and readers. 
Unhinged from his sonneteering temporal coordinates in metaleptic address, the poet has 
achieved his dearest wish—to wrest a “time from time”—which also turns out to be his 
darkest nightmare, his “prospectiue of horror.” The result is not, as Rosamond 
optimistically imagines at the beginning of the ghost complaint, that the poet “maist ioy, 
and [she] might rest.” Instead, the ghost complaint has reaffirmed the sonneteer’s deepest 
                                                                                                                                                 
image—as indeed she must be on at least the level of poetic representation—she is an image, an imago, in 
the sense that Pygmalion’s statue is. She can be animated and given a voice. The permutations of “case,” 
however, do not end there. “Case” also potentially signifies sexually. Consider the use of the word in 
Shakespeare’s Merry Wives of Windsor. Sir Hugh Evans asks the schoolboy William to recite the Latin 
“genetive case,” to which William dutifully replies, “Genitivo—horum, harum, horum.” Overhearing and 
misunderstanding the words for English near-homonyms, Mistress Quickly exclaims, “Vengeance of 
Jenny’s case! Fie on her! Never name her, child, if she be a whore” (4.1.57–58). Quickly mistakes the 
grammatical use of the word “case”—the form of a word indicating its particular function in a sentence—
with the use of the same word referring to the vagina. Given The Complaint of Rosamond’s insistence on 
embodying the ghost, and given the way in which, as I note above, Musophilus sexualizes the relation 
between the living and the dead, reading “case” in these lines as implicitly sexual seems worthy of 
consideration. One need not accept all of the many possible senses of “case” available in Rosamond’s 
request for the poet to “forme” her case in one stanza and “move” his “mind” to her case in another. Yet, at 
the least, the three senses of case as unfortunate circumstance, judicial matter, and bodily housing, are 
clearly in play. 
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 fears: that his Muse will “mourne” eternally; that the dissolute world will probably tear 
his monuments down; that he has fallen, like Rosamond, into a pit of error that he cannot 
escape; that his voice does not, nor has it ever, belonged to him; and that his masculinized 
monumentalizing is as uncertain as the timorous feminine soul it pretends to guarantee. 
Rosamond, ever hopeful, chirps at the end of her song, “And if I passe vnto those happy 
banks, / Then she must haue her praise, thy pen her thanks” (734–5). Yet the poet, 
dispossessed of the ability that Rosamond still thinks he might have, can only retire. At 
last, like Narcissus, he splits in the mirror of his own poetizing.  
My youth such errors must no more disclose.  
Ile hide the rest, and greeue for what hath beene,  
Who made me knowne, must make me liue vnseene. 
 
This retreat from “errors” into hiding, grief, and invisibility can be read as the response to 
a dissolution of the poet’s “self” into a spectral state. The poet’s exigi monumentum, his 
reedification or encasing of Rosamond, has constructed a memorializing monument, a 
tomb, in which he finds, finally, himself as poet.      
Richard Danson Brown attributes the beginning of the metapoetic trend in 
complaints to Edmund Spenser, whose Complaints volume was published the year before 
Daniel’s Delia. 
Spenser’s Complaints [1591] constitute a self-conscious renovation of 
traditional complaint. Within this apparently disparate collection of 
‘sundrie small Poemes’, a subtle realignment takes place in which the 
literary energies of traditional complaint are directed away from the 
perception of the instability of the external world towards the recognition 
of the instability of poetry itself. (397)  
 
Brown’s comments are applicable to Daniel’s poem as well. (In fact, Spenser and Daniel 
were likely writing literary complaints at the same time, even if Spenser’s volume 
precedes Daniel’s by one year in printed form.) Daniel, like Spenser, goes beyond what 
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 we might call the de casibus sensibility of, for instance, Churchyard’s Shore’s wife, 
which would tell us in its last words to “Defye this world, and all his wanton wayes.” 
Both Daniel and Spenser draw out and emphasize the metapoetic aspects of complaint as 
inherited from the Mirror (which Brown calls “traditional complaint”). Daniel and 
Spenser set a tone for 1590s complaint, a literary trend that will remain concerned with 
the illusive power of poetry itself. Whether one credits Spenser, Daniel, or both, the turn 
towards the metapoetic in 1590s complaint poetry is undeniable. And as the poetry turns 
(to paraphrase Brown) from the external world to the mazy world of poetry itself, it 
begins to pose more difficult interpretive dilemmas.  
Essays on Rosamond can wreck themselves on the shoals of this metapoetics, 
especially when attempting to construct a moral center for the poem. Scholars notice, of 
course, that the poem both emerges from the moralizing Mirror tradition and comments 
on it. They notice that in the new generation of complaint, the stakes have been raised. 
Yet some insist that Rosamond must still have a moral. Ira Clark, for example, tries to 
account for both tradition and complexity by making the case that the poem is “moral 
allegory” (156). Ronald Primeau reinstates the poem’s moral level by showing that the 
poem is a “satire” of the Mirror tradition (23). In Primeau’s words, “A high point in this 
manipulation of ‘Mirror’ conventions occurred in Daniel’s bending and stretching of 
form to accommodate it to the ethical ironies which were his chief concern” (21). 
Primeau concludes that “Rosamond is not a repentant heroine but a self-centered, fame-
seeking hedonist” (23). Through different interpretive pathways, Clark and Primeau both 
end by suggesting that Daniel exposes Rosamond’s moral corruption. In short, they end 
up reconstructing the moralizing aspiration of the Mirror’s framing apparatus inside a 
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 poem that clearly sets out to make moral judgment a problem.23 This is all the more 
ironic since, as I have argued in earlier chapters, the Mirror ghosts themselves have 
already contested that apparatus by despairing of their own and their readers’ ability to 
generate moral lessons from their stories. Rosamond specifically addresses the moralizing 
of the Mirror tradition in its eleventh stanza. Here the poet has just agreed to tell 
Rosamond’s story. 
Then write quoth shee the ruine of my youth, 
Report the downe-fall of my slippry state: 
Of all my life reueale the simple truth, 
To teach to others, what I learnt too late: 
Exemplifie my frailtie, tell howe Fate 
     Keepes in eternall darke our fortunes hidden, 
     And ere they come, to know them tis forbidden. (64–70) 
 
Rosamond suggests that her story, like those of the Mirror, might be appropriable as a 
negative example, but her idea of “Fate” forecloses that use. She calls on the poet to 
“report,” “reveal,” “teach”; but the example that must be taught will not influence a 
future that the reader is “forbidden” to understand. She herself, as the episode of the 
engraved casket shows, does not learn by example. When presented with the engraved 
figures of Amymone and Io (both ravished), she might take the hint and avoid trouble, 
but she recurs again to fate. 
These presidents presented to my view, 
Wherein the presage of my fall was showne, 
Might haue fore-warn’d me well what would ensue, 
And others harmes haue made me shunne mine owne; 
But fate is not preuented though fore-knowne. 
     For that must hap decreed by heauenly powers, 
     Who worke our fall, yet make the fault still ours. (407–13) 
 
The fatalism of this stanza is clear. Rosamond is presented with a clear lesson in 
preserving her virtue against men in power, yet she cannot learn it. Indeed, even if she 
                                                 
23 For a thoroughgoing rebuttal to Primeau, see Sagaser, “Sporting the While,” esp. 165–66.      
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 wanted to she couldn’t. It is out of her hands. Even as it gestures toward the expected 
moral judgment of Rosamond’s sin, the poem suggests that such judgment is impossible: 
“fate is not preuented though fore-knowne.”  
Rosamond’s contemporaneous detractors were less convinced than Clark and 
Primeau that Daniel’s poem could be interpreted as a moral condemnation. In fact, some 
thought that Daniel had rather too successfully exculpated the sinful Rosamond. The 
more puritanically inclined Michael Drayton, for example, refers to Daniel’s Rosamond 
in his own complaint poem, Matilda.  
Faire Rosamond, of all so highly graced, 
Recorded in the lasting Booke of Fame, 
And in our Sainted Legendarie placed, 
By him who strives to stellifie her name, 
Yet will some Matrons say she was to blame. 
     Though all the world bewitched with his ryme, 
     Yet all his skill cannot excuse her cryme. (B1v)  
 
Drayton feels comfortable reiterating the literary appropriation of religious discourse. He 
places medieval and classical references (“Book of Fame” and “stellifie”) next to the 
“Sainted Legendarie,” yet, in relation to that sanctification he casts the speech of Daniel’s 
poet as witchcraft (by definition unsanctioned), suggesting that we ought not too quickly 
accept the implications of those witchy rhymes. Drayton admits the poet’s “skill” while 
remaining suspicious about its exculpatory power. But the point of Rosamond, as I have 
shown in this chapter, revolves less around the question of whether or not the ruined maid 
should be held accountable for her sins than the way in which the fallen woman’s 
dilemma echoes that of the poet. The point of poem is to reflect upon the power and 
limits of poetry. When Drayton’s Matilda, then, suggests that Daniel’s poem has 
achieved mixed results—stellifying Rosamond even as it exposes her “crime”—she 
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 repeats in a more literal key what Daniel has already figured as the problem of the 
monumentalizing poet in the dissolute world, subject as he is to becoming “knowne” 
even as he is “vnseene.”  
Churchyard seems to imagine that his voicing of Jane Shore produces a “martiall 
man” deserving of fame for his defense of “womens honour” and knowledge of “theyr 
conditions and qualityes.” That is, Churchyard strives to produce a poet normatively 
gendered and glorified precisely, albeit paradoxically, through its adoption of a feminine 
voice. Daniel does not. Instead, Daniel imagines a poet for whom the feminine voice is 
constitutive of his poetizing. The feminine, for Daniel’s poet, can be the object of 
address, as is the case with the Mary, Delia, and Rosamond for whom he would provide a 
place in eternity; but the feminine is also the poet’s (e)motive force insofar as ‘he’ 
consistently imagines a feminized—shamed, chaste, private—“selfe” that is subject to a 
fall into the wanton world and which, finally, resists monumentalizing discourse. To put 
this in the overarching terms of my argument, Daniel finds himself as much in the 
position of Jane Shore as in that of Churchyard insofar as the Delia and Rosamond poet 
internalizes the feminine voice that resists the determinations and reifications of 
monumental history. For Daniel, the “me” conceived as feminine that “must…liue 
vnseene” is the force behind as well as the result of his poetic attempt every bit as much 
as is the normatively masculine public poet, the “me” who longs so mightily to be 
“knowne” as such. Poetizing fractures the poet along gendered lines. Such an 
understanding of how the Delia volume operates requires an appreciation of the layered 
and unstable vocality and temporality of the volume’s terms of address and scenes of 
reading. In other words, Daniel’s poetry does not merely “ventriloquize”—if by that we 
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mean the poet subject appropriates the imagined voice of an animated female object as 
other, thus securing masculine subjectivity through an objectification of the feminine. 
Rather, Daniel’s performance of masculinity in poetic language relies upon a constitutive 
femininity. In the next chapter, I turn toward another ghost complaint poem in which the 
poet is possessed and dispossessed by a voice marked as feminine, Thomas Middleton’s 
The Ghost of Lucrece. 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
HAUNTED HISTORY AND THE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC IN THOMAS 
MIDDLETON’S THE GHOST OF LUCRECE 
 
In the Latin invocation that introduces Thomas Middleton’s The Ghost of Lucrece 
(1600), the poet summons Lucrece from the dead. 
Castissimo, purissimoque Lucretiae Spiritui; Thomas Medius  
et Gravis Tonus primum Surge vociferat  
Tu castitatis imago,  
Surgito! (20–23)  
To the most chaste and pure Ghost of Lucrece: Thomas, in a moderate and 
weighty voice, cries out the first ‘Arise’. O thou, the image of chastity, 
arise!1  
 
“Thomas Medius” plays on the “middle” of “Middleton,” associating the name of the 
author with the poet’s “moderate [medius] and weighty voice [et Gravis Tonus].” The 
poet’s voice thus linked to the author’s name hails Lucrece by the name of chaste, closing 
his invocation with the compliment, “totally devoted to your most chaste ghost” 
(Castissimo Spiritui tuo addictissimus). The poet calls Lucrece from the Roman past into 
the Elizabethan present, the postremo tempore mundi, “the world’s worst age” (25). At 
the beginning of the poem proper, Lucrece responds. She rises from the dead, asking 
 What wind, what storm 
Blew my dissevered limbs into this form,  
And from the virgin paradise of death 
Conjures my ghost with poetizing breath? (62–65) 
 
                                                 
1 The translation is G. B. Shand’s. I am indebted to G. B. Shand for generously allowing me to preview his 
excellent edition, now published in Thomas Middleton: The Collected Works, gen. eds. Gary Taylor and 
John Lavagnino (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007).  Quotations from the poem and translations from 
Middleton’s Latin to follow are from Shand’s edition, cited by line number. The Ghost of Lucrece was first 
edited by J. Q. Adams (New York: Scribners, 1937). 
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 In this reverse blazon, Lucrece is pieced back together by the poet’s Orphic breath. The 
Ghost of Lucrece stages a haunting that will be concerned, as these passages intimate, 
with the power of poetry to figure conjurations of two kinds: that of the Lucrece’s speech 
into (and by virtue of) the poet’s breath and voice and that of the past into the present.         
Reconstructed by means of “poetizing breath” and speaking to the one who 
conjured her, Lucrece’s attention turns quickly to Tarquin; we soon discover that Lucrece 
views herself as inextricably coupled with her rapist in the afterlife. In an early metaphor, 
the two are an eternal lamp, which Lucrece claims uses “my blood for oil, his lust for 
fire” (79). After much lamenting over this condition—which, for Lucrece, functions “to 
seal [her] soul with rape and murder’s stamp”—she summons Tarquin’s ghost: “Come, 
spirit of fire... I conjure thee” (86; 115–21). The poem gives us no indication that 
Tarquin’s ghost hears this: neither the shade nor the voice of the rapist makes an 
appearance. Nevertheless, Lucrece spends a good deal of the poem apostrophizing him by 
means of hurled accusations while she relives the rape. Other targets for Lucrece’s 
lamenting apostrophe include Collatine, Iniquity, Lust, and Chastity itself. Near the end 
of her diatribe, she takes over the position of the poem’s author. Lucrece imagines that 
the poem itself is her letter written to Tarquin: “To thee I consecrate this little-most / Writ 
by the bloody fingers of my ghost” (568–69, my emphasis). Then she falls back into hell 
to spend eternity with Tarquin. The poem ends with an elegiac epilogue in which the poet 
laments Lucrece’s death, the passing of her body and breath. “O her breath,” the poet 
cries,  
That pension of her life, from life to death.  
How ill was this bestowed on death, that elf, 
Which robs all others, yet still poor itself. (637–40) 
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 This cross-couple paradox on death’s acquisitive impoverishment leads to a final couplet 
that underscores once again the fluid border between life and death with which the poem 
is everywhere concerned: 
First Tarquin-life clad her in death’s array. 
Now Tarquin-death hath stol’n her life away. (653–54) 
 
The couplet features a crossing and reversal of order, a chiasmus of “life” and “death,” 
that is also a synœciosis, a coupling of opposites expressing the oxymoronic or 
paradoxical.2 Tarquin is here, in terms of his effect on Lucrece, the principle of both life 
and death, suggesting that Lucrece’s interaction with the tyrannical prince has shrouded 
her in death even while she lives, and even in death Tarquin robs her of life.  
In order to describe how Lucrece’s haunting operates in Middleton’s poem—its 
cultural and literary referents, effects, and consequences—this essay attends to cross-
coupling, or what early modern rhetoricians call “synœciosis,” such as that in the final 
couplet. In The Ghost of Lucrece, synœciosis yokes opposites in order to call attention to 
the perverse or the unspeakable. Death perversely infects life, the past invades the 
present, as the incantatory magic of the invocation stages a mingling of breath in which 
the living poet lends the dead Lucrece a voice. Along with the most perverse coupling, 
that of Lucrece and her rapist in life and in the afterlife, the poem joins blood and fire, 
                                                 
2 Synœciosis (variously spelled syneciosis, synæciosis, and synœciosis) belongs to a larger group of 
rhetorical techniques used for comparison and contrast, similarity and difference, such as antithesis, 
oxymoron, contrarium, and so on. Catherine Belsey, “Tarquin Dispossessed: Expropriation and Consent in 
The Rape of Lucrece,” Shakespeare Quarterly 52 (2001): 315–35, writes that “Synœciosis brings contraries 
together to form oxymoronic or paradoxical truths: to hope more is to have less; to gain is to lose; excess of 
pleasure brings grief” (319). The two seminal discussions of Shakespeare’s use of the cross-couple in The 
Rape of Lucrece are Joel Fineman, “Shakespeare’s Will: The Temporality of Rape” in The Subjectivity 
Effect in Western Literary Tradition (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), 165–221, and Heather Dubrow, 
Captive Victors: Shakespeare’s Narrative Poems and Sonnets (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987). 
Belsey builds on Fineman and Dubrow to argue for a “union of contraries,” or cross-couple result, in 
Shakespeare’s poem: Lucrece’s “final victim-ization, rendered by her own hand, is at the same time the 
ultimate act of self-determination; the object of violence is simultaneously the subject as agent of her own 
judicial execution” (330–31).   
 137   
 milk and blood, chastity and tyranny, and so on, unions that testify to the confusions of 
propriety engendered by rape. For the violated Lucrece, only oppositions pressing 
paradox can articulate the horrifying effects of Tarquin’s “Lust,” which “sets a devil 
where a god had stood” (429), or the fire of his “Iniquity,” which sows ashes on the earth 
“as thick as stones / Like wombs of lust in tombs of lechery” (381–84). With moments 
such as these, Middleton takes up the figure of the cross-couple so prominent in an earlier 
poem on the same subject, Shakespeare’s The Rape of Lucrece (1594), expanding and 
transforming the figure for use in his ghost story featuring a post-mortem version of the 
Roman heroine. As Henry Peacham suggests, “Synæceosis [sic] is a figure which 
teacheth to conioine diuerse things or contraries…”3 George Puttenham’s The Art of 
English Poesy (1589) calls this figure “the Crosse-Couple, beacause it takes me two 
contrary words and tieth them as it were in a pair of couples….”4 Middleton’s poem 
relies on such cross-coupling from syntactical to structural levels: The Ghost of Lucrece 
goes to great lengths to couple not just “contrary words,” but contrary persons, voices, 
and times. As a ghost—and therefore already a paradoxical embodiment, neither living 
nor dead5—Lucrece returns from death to embody the violence of her own story: her 
“ghost the idea of her soul resumes, / Which Phoenix-wise burns in her own perfumes” 
(56–57).      
                                                 
3 Henry Peacham, The Garden of Eloquence (1593) (Gainesville, Florida: Scholars’ Facsimiles & Reprints, 
1954), fol. 170.     
4 The Art of English Poesy by George Puttenham: A Critical Edition, eds. Frank Whigham and Wayne A. 
Rebhorn (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), 291.        
5 Jacques Derrida, Spectres de Marx: L’État de la dette, le travail du deuil et la nouvelle Internationale 
(Paris: Éditions Galilée, 1993), suggests that “le spectre est une incorporation paradoxale, le devenir-corps, 
une certaine forme phénoménale et charnelle de l’esprit…. On ne sait pas is c’est vivant ou si c’est mort” 
(25–26). That is, “the specter is a paradoxical incorporation, the becoming-body, a certain phenomenal and 
carnal form of the spirit…. One does not know if it is living or if it is dead” (Derrida, Specters of Marx, 
trans. Peggy Kamuf [New York: Routledge, 1994], 5). I return to Derrida below. 
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 Those familiar with The Rape of Lucrece will note the way in which Thomas 
Middleton’s The Ghost of Lucrece and Shakespeare’s earlier poem tell the same story in 
very different ways.6 Shakespeare’s well-known poem narrates the sexual assault of a 
beautiful and chaste noblewoman, Lucrece, by a tyrannical Roman Prince. After the rape, 
Lucrece commits suicide in order to preserve the honor of her family. Her body is then 
paraded through the streets of Rome as an example of the effects of royal tyranny, her 
bloody corpse used to generate public outrage in support of a revolution against the 
monarchy. The story ends when Romans respond, “with one consent,” to banish the royal 
family and change the government “from kings to consuls”—from monarchy to 
republic.7 Middleton’s poem follows Shakespeare’s in key ways: both are concerned with 
Lucrece’s attempt to articulate, largely through paradox, a traumatic event that seems to 
exceed the power of language to capture; both Lucreces are threatened with misogynist 
social and literary systems that militate against their becoming ‘subjects’ of their own 
discourse; and both react to the disenfanchisement threatened by rape with an appeal to
the power of authorship.
 
                                                
8 Both versions of Lucrece attempt to counter the threat of 
 
6 Heather Dubrow, “A Mirror for Complaints: Shakespeare’s Lucrece and the Generic Tradition” in 
Renaissance Genres: Essays on Theory, History, and Interpretation, ed. Barbara Keifer Lewalski 
(Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1986), 399–417, draws out the way in which Shakespeare’s The Rape of Lucrece 
participates in and responds to complaint poetry in the tradition of The Mirror for Magistrates and Ovid’s 
Heroides. Even more than Shakespeare’s, Middleton’s poem self-consciously works within the female-
voiced ghost complaint tradition of the 1590s. Formally, that is, Middleton’s Lucrece is more closely 
related to Samuel Daniel’s The Complaint of Rosamond, Thomas Churchyard’s Shore’s Wife, Thomas 
Lodge’s The Complaint of Elstred, and other 1590s complaints that feature famous women returning from 
the grave to lament the conditions that led to their deaths, though Middleton follows Shakespeare with his 
subject matter.  
7 See “The Argument” that precedes the poem (p. 238). Citations of Shakespeare’s The Rape of Lucrece 
follow William Shakespeare: The Complete Works, The Oxford Shakespeare, 2nd Edition, gen. eds. Stanley 
Wells and Gary Taylor (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005); hereafter I cite the poem by line number. 
8 For influential arguments about these themes in Shakespeare’s poem, see Lynn Enterline, “‘Poor 
Instruments’ and unspeakable events in The Rape of Lucrece,” in The Rhetoric of the Body from Ovid to 
Shakespeare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 152–97; Joel Fineman, “Shakespeare’s 
Will”; Belsey, “Tarquin Dispossessed”; Coppélia Kahn, “The Rape in Shakespeare’s Lucrece,” 
Shakespeare Studies 9 (1976): 45–72, and “The Sexual Politics of Subjectivity in Shakespeare’s Lucrece” 
in Roman Shakespeare: Warriors, Wounds, and Women (London: Routledge, 1997), 27–45; and Nancy 
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 becoming a textual object, that which is written, with a consideration of the ways in 
which Lucrece becomes, in Lynn Enterline’s words, “author of her own ‘plot o
through acts of ventriloquism.
f death’” 
, 
y narrative.  
                                                                                                                                                
9 And both poems feature an intertwining of the personal
the trauma of rape, with the political in the form of a national destin
When viewed for how the Lucrece story intertwines the personal and the political, 
at least three critical narratives emerge from scholarly accounts of Shakespeare’s 
Lucrece, its literary heritage, and its late Elizabethan cultural context. I will call these 1) 
the allegorical model, 2) the resistance model, and 3) the complicity model. First, an 
allegorical reading suggests that Lucrece, as a representation of the Elizabethan body 
politic, unveils the abuses of tyrannical monarchy and offers a fantasy of the sacrifice of a 
female body on behalf of a liberatory republicanism. “Lucrece stands as the body 
politic,” Andrew Hadfield writes, “abused as a possession by the monarch….” Lucrece is 
a “male fantasy, a self-sacrificing figure, prepared to die for a political ideal.”10 For many 
scholars equally concerned with how gender operates in the Lucrece story, however, such 
political interpretations raise uncomfortable questions about the extent to which the 
Lucrece narrative asks us to endorse its teleological end point—the republican overthrow 
of monarchical tyranny—if that outcome means exploiting Lucrece’s rape and death as a 
cause célèbre. Is violence against Lucrece the necessary expense of ensuring Rome’s 
future? This line of questioning leads to concerns about agency. To what extent does 
 
Vickers, “‘The blazon of sweet beauty’s best’: Shakespeare’s Lucrece,” in Shakespeare and the Question of 
Theory, eds. Patricia Parker and Geoffrey Hartman (New York: Routledge, 1990), 95–115. The intellectual 
debt this essay owes to work by Catherine Belsey and Lynn Enterline in particular will no doubt become 
clear in what follows, but it is worth stating at the outset. Belsey’s essay on Shakespeare’s poem suggests 
my approach to Middleton’s, and my thinking throughout this essay is deeply engaged with and informed 
by Enterline’s The Rhetoric of the Body.  
9 Enterline, “‘Poor Instruments’,” 153. 
10 Andrew Hadfield, Shakespeare and Republicanism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 
suggests that “given its foundational narrative, republicanism rarely managed to escape from the discourses 
of misogyny that enveloped it, especially the forms that emerged in England in the 1590s” (152–153).    
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 Lucrece orchestrate her unhappy end and therefore knowingly underwrite the political 
use made of her death? Should we instead understand her story in terms of a homosocial 
agenda authorized by her abused body, an agenda that requires her suffering and death?11 
Feminist readings of Lucrece as a viable ‘subject’ or efficacious ‘agent’ tend to suggest 
that the poem holds out at least the possibility of gendered resistance (e.g. an early 
modern, emergent emphasis on “consent”) to oppressive fantasies of male activity in 
which women are mere instruments, silent, passive, and ultimately excluded. This is the 
second model, one that focuses on Lucrece’s resistance. A feminist analysis of another 
stripe, what I am calling the complicity model, suggests that Lucrece is indeed 
ineluctably instrumental to, victimized by, or even complicit in patriarchal linguistic and 
cultural systems. Such a reading understands Lucrece less as a subject with volition than 
as a constitutive absence against which male activity emerges, or as a cog in the wheels 
of male political narratives that turn by virtue of her abused body.12 The lines between 
these three kinds of critical approaches are, of course, considerably less sharp than I can 
represent them in a brief, schematic way; but the distinctions serve to point out the scope 
of the criticism surrounding Lucrece’s early modern reception.  
                                                 
11 Drawing on René Girard and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Nancy Vickers writes, “In Lucrece, occasion, 
rhetoric, and result are all informed by, and thus inscribe, a battle between men that is first figuratively and 
then literally fought on the fields of a woman’s ‘celebrated’ body. Here, metaphors commonly read as signs 
of a battle between the sexes emerge rather from a homosocial struggle, in this case a male rivalry, which 
positions a third (female) term in a median space from which it is initially used and finally eliminated” 
(“‘The blazon of sweet beauty’s best’,” 96). Stephanie H. Jed, Chaste Thinking: The Rape of Lucretia and 
the Birth of Humanism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), shows the “lexical chain” whereby 
the story of the rape of Lucrece, originating with a contest between men and culminating with Brutus 
“preserving chastity by castigating the Romans for their tears,” begins and ends by repressing its referent, 
Lucrece’s bodily presence, in favor of a chaste cultural ideal (11). See also Arthur L. Little Jr., Shakespeare 
Jungle Fever: National-Imperial Re-Visions of Race, Rape, and Sacrifice (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2000), esp. 29–35; and Coppélia Kahn, “The Rape in Shakespeare’s Lucrece.”  
12 I draw, in part, on Belsey, “Tarquin Dispossessed,” who delineates two kinds of feminist models reading 
against an older, Augustinian model (315–16). Belsey does not discuss the model of political allegory, but 
recent work by Hadfield, Norbrook, and others, along with a growing interest in early modern 
republicanism and a general tendency to read early modern texts for political valence or emergent “publics” 
makes it important to consider.   
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 My purpose here is not to endorse or reject any of these models qua readings of 
Shakespeare’s poem but to point out how Middleton’s Lucrece contests, supports, or 
informs the cultural narratives they generate. What does Middleton gain by bringing 
Lucrece back from the dead? Given that readings of how Lucrece signifies in the era so 
often privilege Shakespeare’s The Rape of Lucrece, I take it as salutary to our critical 
conversation to consider also The Ghost of Lucrece, a contemporaneous poem that both 
responds to Shakespeare’s and offers a very different reading of the same story. For 
better or worse, Middleton depicts Lucrece as distinctly trapped in the third of the critical 
narratives I have delineated, the complicity model. She is, as I have pointed out, bound in 
an eternal embrace of sin with her rapist. Yet the poem is dedicated from beginning to 
end to Lucrece’s mighty, if doomed, struggle to emerge as a subject with volition who 
can be read in light of the second, resistance model. The cross-couple paradoxes of the 
poem serve to bridge the gap, I will argue, between resistance and complicity. Lucrece’s 
haunting, her ghostly keening, is a lament for—and as such a form of resistance to—the 
cruel and tireless machinery of early modern exemplary history that consigns her to death 
and damnation. Middleton’s Lucrece decidedly rejects the first, allegorical model, 
however. If she cannot launch a successful campaign of resistance from her half-life as a 
figure determined and judged by history, her speaking specifically precludes an 
interpretation that takes her as a sign for progressive politics  
Middleton’s Ghost of Lucrece conjures Shakespeare’s heroine from the 
underworld to retell the story of her rape and its aftermath. As a ghost, Lucrece has 
acquired a spectral point of view—one that allows her to comment not only on her 
actions in the past but also on how her story signifies for the moment in which she rises 
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 from the grave. The Lucrece of Shakespeare’s poem commits suicide, in part, because 
she worries about the example she might set for future generations. Middleton’s Lucrece, 
back from the dead, knows precisely how her reputation has been read. She knows the 
exemplary history that has been crafted using her rape and suicide. Her “shame,” like a 
beacon in the heavens, has become a warning to all who would remain chaste. 
The candle of my shame burns in the sky, 
Set on the cross-poles of the firmament 
To fear away divine virginity, 
And light this world below, that being bent 
To follow me, they go not as I went. (66–70) 
 
Lucrece’s doubled perspective from both Roman past and Elizabethan present grants her 
a metahistorical consciousness.13 From the perspective of the present, she can now 
consider Rome and Tarquin in lamenting retrospect.  
Tarquin the prince: had Rome no better heirs? 
Thou mistress of the world, no better men? (164–65) 
 
Shakespeare’s Rape of Lucrece narrates and laments the tyrannical act of sexual violence 
prompting the birth of republican Rome; Middleton’s Ghost of Lucrece employs its 
heroine’s ghostly perspective to draw out the moral, political, and religious implications 
of that lament for its present moment. In Middleton’s poem, various challenges to 
differential categories—past and present, masculine and feminine voice, speaking subject 
and spoken-for object, and so on—escalate into an apocalyptic vision, the threat of a 
radical collapse of difference as all names, all systems of order and identity, turn into the 
names of rape with its threat of illegitimate birth. As we will see, the poem turns, at the 
last, not to political revolution—the overthrow of tyranny in favor of republicanism—but 
                                                 
13 I owe the phrase “metahistorical consciousness” to Dahlia Porter, who suggested it after reading a draft 
of this essay. The phrase nicely captures the metaleptic perspective of the ghost looking back upon her own 
history, relating her first-person experience in the past as well as commenting from the perspective of the 
present on how she has been encoded in previous texts.    
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 to biblical revelation, a vision of the corrupt world’s destruction. Such a turn, I argue, 
presents us with a much darker view of how the Lucrece story signifies in the 1590s. 
 
The Name and the Pen 
Middleton’s The Ghost of Lucrece follows Shakespeare’s The Rape of Lucrece in 
its preoccupation with names and naming. Middleton’s ghost bemoans what has become 
of her chaste name, her reputation. As if trying to do her predecessor in Shakespeare’s 
poem one better, however, Middleton’s Lucrece lashes back from the ruins of her own 
name by obsessively naming and renaming her rapist in a bid to claim the power of 
naming itself. This struggle over the power to nominate expands, turning a contest for the 
voice into a contest over writing. Lucrece ultimately takes over not just the poet’s voice, 
but his “pen” as well, expanding upon the authorship motif in Shakespeare’s poem. At 
stake here, for Lucrece, is nothing less than imagined control of the Symbolic order—
control over who gets to do the nominating, who gets to decide which bodies matter and 
in what way.  
Lucrece’s troubles in The Rape of Lucrece begin with an act of naming that is out 
of her control. In the first lines of Shakespeare’s poem, we find that the “name of 
‘chaste’” (8) unwisely “published” by Collatine drives Tarquin “from the besiegèd Ardea 
all in post” (1).14 This sets in motion a trajectory that leads ultimately to Brutus’ decision, 
in the final stanza of the poem, to parade Lucrece’s body through the streets in order to 
“publish Tarquin’s foul offense” (1852). Even Tarquin knows what it is to be named and 
thus have one’s destiny determined. In order to carry out his desire, Tarquin must 
                                                 
14 See Joel Fineman, “Shakespeare’s Will,” on the trajectory of naming in The Rape of Lucrece in terms of 
the itinerary of a letter (an argument inflected by Lacan and Derrida on Poe’s “The Purloined Letter”). 
Fineman was the first to draw critical attention to the problem of the “name” in the Lucrece story.  
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 overcome fears of being written. He anticipates “Some loathsome dash the herald will 
contrive / To cipher me…” (206–7), but desire wins out: “Who fears a sentence or an old 
man’s saw / Shall by a painted cloth be kept in awe” (244–45). Middleton’s specific 
echoes are unmistakable here. His Lucrece utters the “sentence” that Tarquin fears. Back 
from the dead, she says that which she could not say in the prior poem, exercising a 
power from which she was previously barred. Just before she kills herself, Shakespeare’s 
Lucrece tries to tell her husband the name of the man who has raped her. “He, he, fair 
lord, ’tis he…,” she says, but she cannot speak Tarquin’s name.15 Middleton’s Lucrece, 
back from the dead and in full accusatory voice, cannot seem to speak the name often 
enough. She has named him twice by the ninth stanza, in which she begins to summon 
him from hell. By the twelfth stanza she makes explicit that which her counterpart in 
Shakespeare leaves unsaid: “Tarquin, thou art he” (136). She then begins the process of 
naming and renaming to which much of the poem is dedicated. 
Tarquin the ravisher: O, at that name 
See how mine eyes dissolveth into tears! 
Tarquin the Roman: I describe my shame. 
From Rome it came, a Roman name it bears. 
Tarquin my guest: lo, here began my fears. 
     Tarquin from Ardea posts. Hence sprang the fire, 
     For Ardea’s name sounds ardent hot desire. (143–49; my emphasis) 
 
Lucrece names Tarquin four times in this stanza, and the word “name” appears three 
times. Middleton is clearly addressing Shakespeare’s preoccupation with “the name of 
chaste,” turning the crime in the earlier poem into an accusation, in which “Tarquin” 
rather than “Lucrece” becomes the name to repeat. Middleton is taking up both the stutter 
in The Rape of Lucrece—“He, he,…’tis he…”—and Shakespeare’s meta-rhetorical focus 
                                                 
15 The text is admittedly ambiguous here. The narrator tells us that Lucrece “throws forth Tarquin’s name,” 
then belies the statement in the very next line: “But more than ‘he’ her poor tongue could not speak” 
(1717–18).  
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 on the power of a name. Middleton’s ghost not only obsessively names the unspoken 
referent of “he” in Shakespeare’s poem, she also aggressively asserts her right to the act 
of naming itself. She seeks control of words, the power to name. The “name” registers the 
interpellation of Tarquin and Lucrece, both in life and in the afterlife. Insofar as Lucrece 
was the object in Shakespeare’s poem, the one who is named, Middleton works to make 
her the subject, the one who names. The power to name, for the ghost of Lucrece, means, 
at the limit, the power to resignify the past—to rewrite history.16 
Middleton’s concern with the “name” responds to both Shakespeare’s “name of 
chaste,” and the status of the “name” or reputation in spectal and eternizing poetry more 
generally. As Horace tells us in his influential “exegi monumentum” poem, dicar, “I shall 
be spoken of.”17 And, as I discuss below, Ovid’s Metamorphoses ends with the claim that 
the author’s name, his nomen, will live on. Following on such classical precedents, early 
modern writers imagine the name as an essence that exceeds the body in life and survives 
it in death.18 An act of publication-as-naming in Shakespeare’s Lucrece—that Collatine 
“published” Lucrece’s chaste name—prompts Tarquin’s desire. An act of textual 
transmission, a story told and ‘read,’ about Lucrece’s body, fires an appropriative act 
                                                 
16 Writing of women’s roles in Shakespeare’s history plays, Phyllis Rackin, “Anti-Historians: Women’s 
Roles in Shakespeare’s Histories,” Theatre Journal 37 (1985): 329-44, has most eloquently described the 
way in which women figure as “opponents and subverters of the [male] historical and historiographic 
enterprise.” Women as “anti-historians” represent “a voice that challenges the logocentric, masculine 
historical record” (329).  
17 Horace: Odes and Epodes, trans. Niall Rudd (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 3.30. 
18 My understanding of the work of the “name” in classical poetry as received by Shakespeare and 
Middleton is indebted to Lynn Enterline’s discussion of epitaphic and eternizing gestures in Ovid’s 
Metamorphoses (The Rhetoric of the Body, 49–61). Enterline prompts us to detect in Ovid’s claim to self-
preservation by name and voice—his “epic battle against the mortal body and time”—an ironic undertone. 
“The self-conscious interlacing of conventional topoi, the citations of Ennius and of Horace, the graphic 
figure of an unerasable name, the (funerary) idea of a reader’s speaking lips lending life to written letters, 
the allusion to Echo’s iterations in the mouth of the reader as Other: all these poetic and rhetorical concerns 
mean that deeply Ovidian questions remain. Whose ‘voice’ are we supposed to be hearing? Whose 
conquering ‘poetic word’ is this?” Ovid’s eternizing gestures prompt “skepticism about whether anyone 
really owns these words” (61). 
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 upon that body. Those acts register as an assault on Lucrece’s (and Collatine’s) name. 
Vows are made and governments toppled in the name of the victims of that assault. Even 
as embodiment grounds the story’s traumatic events, that story begins and ends in 
disembodied moments—a name spoken in the absence of a body that prompts events of 
social significance, then a body’s post-mortem survival as a name. A name acquires its 
significance by reference to a body and what has happened to that body or what that body 
is imagined to have caused to happen, but a name charged with such significance 
paradoxically increases its power by virtue of its separability from the body. A spectral 
and essentializing thing, a name in this poetic tradition both prompts and encodes social 
causes and effects. A name is a zero degree fantasy of how history operates—or, more 
precisely, how people enter historical time. The name, like the promise of singular and 
enduring consciousness attached to a body, promises to unite present, past, and future 
under one sign.19 The name spurs action in the world, becomes the sign by which others 
read and understand that action, and justifies further action. In this sense (with which we 
are still intimately familiar today) social action is very often justified in the name of 
others. Much can be justified in this way, particularly when those whose names are 
invoked are victims of an assault perceived as unjust.20 The name pretends to presence 
predicated upon absence. To call up a ghost—to resusciate or reencode a name—is then a 
social and historical act as well as a poetic one.  
                                                 
19 See Shoshana Felman, The Scandal of the Speaking Body (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 
esp. 34–35, for a discussion of the way in which such promises are always in bad faith.   
20 As a case in point, think of the name of “Hamlet” that the son shares with the father. The son bears the 
burden of the name that demands action by virtue of the father’s having been assaulted and usurped. In our 
own time, the political change made ‘in the name of’ victims of 9/11 provides an apt example. Other 
examples could be brought forth that do not have to do with righting percieved wrongs, but the revenge 
pattern brings out the honoring of the name in its most obvious and aggressive forms. 
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 Even as Middleton’s ghost represents the return of Shakespeare’s Lucrece from 
the dead, the terms of that return owe as much to Ovid’s epic as to Shakespeare’s poem. 
In his invocation, Middleton summons Lucrece from the “virgin paradise of death” (64), 
commanding her to rise (Surgito!) and behold (Noscito!) Tarquin (23–24).  
…Tu coeptis—nam te mutavit et illum— 
Adspirato meis! Postremo tempore mundi, 
Ad sua perpetuum deducito crimina carmen. (24–26) 
Favour these my beginnings (which have transformed both you and him)! 
In this the world’s worst age, launch my tireless poetry against his crime. 
 
Here Middleton explicitly echoes Ovid’s invocation in the Metamorphoses. Ovid has it 
this way: 
di, coeptis (nam vos mutastis et illas) 
adspirate meis primaque ab origine mundi 
ad mea perpetuum deducite tempora carmen! 
Ye gods, for you yourselves have wrought the changes, breathe on these 
my undertakings, and bring down my song in unbroken strains from the 
world’s very beginning even unto the present time.21 
 
Middleton’s version of Ovid’s invocation puts Lucrece and the poet himself in place of 
the gods. He asks Lucrece (Tu) instead of the gods (di) to breathe on his undertakings 
(coeptis…adspirato meis), and he suggests that his own poetic labor, not the actions of 
the gods, has transformed Lucrece and Tarquin (nam te mutauit & illum). Ovid asks the 
gods to draw out his perpetuum carmen from the first age to his own. Middleton’s poet 
asks Lucrece to bring “eternal verse” to bear against Tarquin’s crime. Middleton’s 
revision, then, makes poetic agency ambiguous: it divides the act of singing (to “bring 
down” [deducito] the song) between the poet and the one who “breathes” on his 
“beginnings” and “inspires” him. As a ghost story rather than one authorized by the gods 
or a muse, Middleton’s scene adds to this traditional dynamic a sense of possession. The 
                                                 
21 As far as I can discover, I am the first to mark Middleton’s quotation of Ovid’s induction. Ovid, 
Metamorphoses, 1.1–4. 
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 poet is, at least in part, the medium for a ghost instead of the gods; and the poem 
refigures temporal coordinates with the implication that the spectral Lucrece will bring 
the “eternal” song from the past into “the world’s worst age.” This last revision of Ovid 
demands careful attention for its reworking of historical frames.   
The narrative direction of Ovid’s Metamorphoses as a whole takes us from the 
beginning of time to the moment of writing. Ovid begins by describing the creation of the 
world, and ends with his arrival at “the span of [his] uncertain years” (15.874). Then he 
famously recalls the perpetuum carmen of his invocation by suggesting that he has 
written a poem that will make his name henceforth indestructible: nomenque erit 
indelebile nostrum (876). Through “all ages” he will “have mention on men’s lips”; he 
will “live in fame” (878–79). The fantasy of presence in Ovid—the basis of the eternizing 
claim—resides, in the last instance, not in the gods, but in the author’s voice. The 
moment of speech draws the past into the present and guarantees the poet’s future in an 
echo effect. While his body dies, his nomen will be imperishable. Middleton’s reworking 
of this temporality, however, emphasizes Lucrece as the singer. The poet’s metamorphic 
“labor” consists in providing a vehicle for her song. Middleton closes his invocation with 
the phrase “Castissimo Spiritui tuo addictissimus” (“Totally devoted to your most chaste 
ghost”). The poet devotes himself “totally” to Lucrece in an incantatory address. He is 
asking her singing spirit, in short, to “arise” and possess him. The fantasy of presence—
the originary secured through writing—is still a voice, but it is not imagined to be solely 
the poet’s.22 The poem’s voice is summoned from the past, from the long ago Rome of 
                                                 
22 See Derrida’s well-known theory of the “supplement” in Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976). Derrida describes “writing as a dangerous 
means, a menacing aid, the critical response to a situation of distress. When Nature, as self-proximity, 
comes to be forbidden or interrupted, when speech fails to protect presence, writing becomes necessary. It 
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 Ovid. In fact, we might hear this invocation as choral as well as antiphonal, an echo of 
Ovid’s voice in the poet’s even as he calls for Lucrece’s. In contrast to Metamorphoses, 
the temporality of Middleton’s revision lays emphasis on Lucrece as the spectral return of 
an originary voice for which the poet will be a vessel.23  
The Ghost of Lucrece, then, presents us with a spectrum of concerns arising not 
only from the political uses of historical exemplarity but also from historicity itself. That 
is, the poem is not only interested in how the Lucrece story provides historical 
examples—a personal model for chaste behavior, for instance, or a public one for 
progressive politics—but also the means by which the story comes to signify as history at 
all. The concerns with poetic breath and naming that Middleton takes from Ovid and 
Shakespeare register the deployment of voice in poetry (Orphic breath) in conversation 
with the reifications and determinations (the “name of chaste” or the “Roman name”) of 
revealed history. In coupling past and present through the ventriloquized figure of a ghost 
who occupies both, Middleton’s poem also collapses the distance between present subject 
and past object, the differential space required, in principle, for historiography’s 
‘objective’ judgment.24 In order to make meaning from past events, that is, history is 
                                                                                                                                                 
must be added to the word urgently” (144). Writing supplements speech in order to guarantee self-presence. 
But what happens, this poem asks us to consider, when the speech that one’s writing is meant to guarantee 
is imagined not to be one’s own?  
23 For further comparison and contrast, see Shakespeare’s Lucrece, who imagines herself lending her 
“lamenting tongue” to Hecuba (1465) or singing in concert with the legendary Philomel, “that sing’st of 
ravishment” (1128). 
24 I draw here on Michel de Certeau’s descriptions of the differential break with the past upon which 
historiography relies. See de Certeau, The Writing of History, trans. Tom Conley (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1988), esp 2–6; and Heterologies: Discourse on the Other, trans. Brian Massumi 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), esp. 3–16. In The Writing of History, Certeau 
describes historiography as a “discourse of separation,” built upon a foundation of  “differentiation between 
the present and the past” (2); and in Heterologies, Certeau suggests that the voices entombed in the past—
the objects of historiography’s differentiation—bite back (re-mordent) from the “text/tomb” (8). See also 
Carla Freccero, Queer / Early / Modern (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), who brings together 
Derrida’s hauntology and Certeau’s historiography to develop “Queer Historiography,” in which “the past 
is in the present in the form of a haunting” (80).  
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 obliged to create a diffferential break between past and present, the subject of knowledge 
in the present (the historian) and that subject’s object (a past event or agents of that 
event). Cross-coupling present subject and past object threatens history’s mode of 
operation, necessarily questioning its interpretive result. The cross-couple, as Catherine 
Belsey notes, is “the trope of deconstruction and thus of the instability of meaning” (335). 
Applied to Middleton’s haunting, this suggests that the figure of the ghost, through her 
very presence, joins past and present in a paradoxical incorporation that carries the 
potential to deconstruct her own history.  
 Lucrece begins her complaint by speaking and ends by writing. In her rage against 
Tarquin and her vociferous suffering in the afterlife, Lucrece possesses the poet, takes 
over a large part of the poem, and ultimately wrests a pen from the poet’s grasp. This 
invasion of the moment of writing threatens the conventional difference between the 
masculine authorial subject (writer) and feminine object (text). But this long-standing 
convention proves resilient and difficult to breach. Lucrece struggles fiercely before she 
gains ground as author. The angel-feather pen, milky-way paper, and “poetizing breath” 
are still the poet’s when Lucrece first rises from the underworld, but by the middle of the 
poem she competes with his voice and by the end of her final speech she replaces his 
writing implements. 
This knife, my pen, 
This blood, my ink, hath writ enough to lust. 
Tarquin, to thee, thou very devil of men, 
I send these lines. Thou art my fiend of trust. 
To thee I dedicate my tomb of dust. 
    To thee I consecrate this little-most 
    Writ by the bloody fingers of my ghost. (563–69) 
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 This late in the poem, she fulfills the terms of the invocation, bringing eternal verse 
against Tarquin’s crime. Lucrece, moreover, gives a title—“Intitulèd, The Lines of Blood 
and Flame”—to the letter she imagines writing, a title that threatens give the poem itself 
an entirely new name (574). Then, in a final gesture before she plunges back into hell, 
she imagines sending her letter. “And from poor Lucrece’ mouth tell Tarquin thus, / That 
Philomel hath writ to Tereus” (589–90). 
About half way through Lucrece’s speaking she becomes dissatisfied with speech 
itself and tries her hand at writing. 
Lo, under that base type of Tarquin’s name 
I cipher figures of iniquity. (395–96) 
 
In the multivalency of “cipher” we can read the issues at stake for Lucrece in this poem. 
Lucrece ciphers figures, by which we might understand that she ‘depicts’ or ‘expresses’ 
such figures.25 In other words, she turns iniquity into characters on a page. But in moving 
from speech to writing, Lucrece is once again threatened with absence, with losing power 
over her words. The use of “cipher” also hints at the noun form of the word, which, 
applied to Lucrece, renders her as nothing, a non-entity, or at best, a code.26 Lucrece, as a 
ghost, is quite literally a cipher in the sense of “non-entity.” She is a personified absence. 
We may also read the word in the sense of “decipher” or decode. Such a reading would 
suggest that Lucrece is deciphering her story of “iniquity.”27 In decoding her story, she is 
attempting to make herself present to understanding. In the least hopeful reading, Lucrece 
suggests that her fate, as in Shakespeare’s poem, is to be spoken by Collatine, written by 
                                                 
25 The Adams edition glosses “cipher” as “express” and calls on Tarquin’s fear of being ciphered in The 
Rape of Lucrece as an example: “Yea, though I die, the scandal will survive / And be an eyesore in my 
golden coat; / Some loathsome dash the herald will contrive / To cipher me how fondly I did dote” (204–7). 
26 OED, 2nd ed., s.vv. “cipher” (v), “cipher” (n), “cypher” (n).     
27 For this sense of “cypher” we can turn to The Rape of Lucrece once again, this time to Lucrece’s words: 
“Yea, the illiterate, that know not how / To cipher what is writ in learnèd books, / Will quote my loathsome 
trespass in my looks” (810–12). 
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 Tarquin’s “pen,” and published as a Roman revenge tract by Brutus.28 Each act depends 
upon her silence, her absence. Yet to “cipher” also means to write. For Lucrece to write 
“figures of iniquity” under Tarquin’s name would make that iniquity Tarquin’s rather 
than hers. If she can become the writer rather than the written, her accusation of Tarquin 
will take on force and guilt will be placed where it belongs. If not, she will continue to 
embody the text created by Tarquin’s pen (not to mention Ovid’s, Livy’s, Shakespeare’s 
and Middleton’s).  
Lucrece needs to become a writer; she needs her own pen. Before she gets it, 
however, the passage continues along predictable gender lines:   
He writes himself the shamer, I the shame, 
The actor he, and I the tragedy. 
The stage am I, and he the history (397–99) 
 
Here Lucrece gives us Tarquin as writer, actor, and history. In terms of these, Lucrece is 
either subject matter (that which is written or acted), or field (the stage upon which 
history is played). This threatens to reinstall the distinction between masculine activity 
and feminine passivity, consigning Lucrece, once again, to textual object. Lucrece 
attempts to counter this threatening vision by conjuring a pen, but the implement is 
inadequate. 
O lust, this pen of mine that writes thee ‘lust’ 
Lies blasted at the sulphur of thy fire. 
The quill and feathers, burnt to ashy dust. (402–4) 
 
She needs a better pen—one that will stand up to the task at hand. 
Send me Prometheus’ heart t’endite withal, 
And from his vulture’s wings a pen of blood,  
                                                 
28 The multiple significations of “pen” are relevant in this context, which clearly range from “penis” to 
writing implement to author-ity. Lacan’s well-known concept of the “phallus” seems both obvious and 
appropriate here. I return to the way in which Brutus uses Lucrece’s dead body to publish his revolution 
below.  
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 Thrice steeped and dipped in Phelgethontic flood. (413–15) 
 
The vulture (or eagle) famously eats Prometheus’ liver every morning while the god is 
chained to a rock. A feather-pen from such a vulture’s wing would seem an appropriate 
tool for Lucrece to use in writing her own story of eternal suffering. With a pen thus 
drawn from the literary history of torment and tempered in hellfire, Lucrece writes her 
letter. By the time she is finished, the implements have changed once again: “This knife, 
my pen, / This blood, my ink….” Whatever the writing tools, however, Lucrece couples 
speaking and writing when she imagines sending this letter: 
And from poor Lucrece’ mouth tell Tarquin thus, 
That Philomel hath writ to Tereus. (589–90; my emphasis) 
 
We can read in these lines the fantasy of Lucrece’s entry into the supplemental agon of 
speaking and writing. Lucrece sends the words from her mouth ahead of the letter, but the 
letter, which should guarantee speech, has apparently been written and posted. If Lucrece 
must relay by “mouth” what she has “writ,” it is because her project in this poem is to 
enter language, to enter the symbolic economy from which she was previously barred.  
 
Haunted History 
The Ghost of Lucrece deals explicitly with questions of gender, tyranny, and 
agency not only as those concerns emerge from Lucrece’s Roman context, but also as 
they inform the poem’s moment of writing. What if, Middleton’s poem asks, Lucrece 
came back from the dead and spoke in the present? Middleton gives his Lucrece a 
metahistorical consciousness through a metaleptic perspective.29 That is, Middleton 
                                                 
29 I use “metaleptic” here in the sense developed by Gérard Genette. In Narrative Discourse: An Essay in 
Method, trans. Jane E. Lewin (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980), Genette characterizes the figure as 
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 constructs such a consciousness through temporal and ontological confusions—the 
paradoxical cross-couples of presence and absence, past and present, masculine and 
feminine, author and text—with devastating consequences for the historiography 
surrounding the Lucrece story. Critics have read Shakespeare’s poem as an endorsement, 
however qualified or implicit, of emergent republican thought or the importance of 
“consent” in sexual relations and political theory.30 Middleton, however, refuses to read 
the Lucrece story either in terms of consent or as a sacrifice that enables greater political 
freedom and thus authorizes a progressive version of history. “And in an iron throne of 
death and dearth / Rules this young age” (336–37). The poem’s “iron age,” as Shand 
notes, is “the last and worst age of the world, a period of wickedness, debasement” 
(335n.). No progressive political model attends Middleton’s poem.  
Neither living nor dead, both present and past, ghosts such as Lucrece carry the 
potential to disturb, among other things, the differences upon which history relies.31 
Middleton’s Lucrece revenant troubles history in several ways. In the invocation, the poet 
conjures Lucrece’s ghost from the timeless underworld into the present, the “world’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
“any intrusion by the extradiegetic narrator into a metadiegetic universe (or by the diegetic characters into a 
metadiegetic universe, etc.)” (234–35). 
30 See Colin Burrow, “Rape and Consent” in The Oxford Shakespeare: The Complete Sonnets and Poems 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 66–73, for an excellent overview of the issues surrounding consent as 
The Rape of Lucrece engages them. Belsey, “Tarquin Dispossessed,” as I have noted, suggests that 
Shakespeare’s Lucrece does the best she can within a system that militates against it to secure a measure of 
“self-determination,” and that therefore “The installation of the Republic which is the consequence of her 
act affirms a model of state politics based on consent” (335). To be clear, I am in complete agreement with 
Belsey’s analysis of Shakespeare’s poem. Of interest to me here is that Middleton’s version of the story 
does not seem to allow a similar conclusion. 
31 The poem represents what Jacques Derrida calls “hauntology,” a haunting that calls ontology into 
question by virtue of its participation in both presence and absence. Speaking of the ontological status of 
the ghost in Hamlet, Jacques Derrida suggests in Specters of Marx, that one does not know if it belongs to 
the past or the present—“one does not know: not out of ignorance, but because this non-object, this non-
present present, this being-there of an absent or departed one no longer belongs to knowledge” (5). 
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 worst age.”32 Lucrece rises to bemoan at length her place in the pious, disciplinary 
tradition of the sixteenth century in which loss of chastity becomes irrevocable 
damnation. She appears to experience at one and the same time a past of rape and suicide, 
a present of purgatorial suffering, and a future of apocalypse. She is thus caught between 
the pagan past in which she lived and the Christian present in which her ghost speaks. 
Though she desires Christian redemption, her pagan life condemns her to eternal torment. 
As G. B. Shand notes, Lucrece “has descended into an underworld which is the inevitable 
destination of her pagan spirit, but which is imaged as a fiery hell of eternal torment, 
rendered unbearably tragic by her ‘Christian’ longing for redemption.”33 She pleads 
mightily with Chastity, the principle that would provide her, in Augustinian terms, with 
redemption, “Sanctity’s saint, divinity’s divine”: “O touch my veins again,” “all chaste 
functions with my soul combine” (541–51).34 Yet the plea is usesless. Her chastity taken, 
she is condemned: “The want of thee,” she says in her apostrophe to Chastity, “made my 
ghost reel to hell” (508). Caught in an inescapable embrace of shame with her rapist, her 
soul burns eternally in the fire of Tarquin’s lust. This eternal and perverse coupling of 
chastity and the lust it inspires threatens to infect not only the chaste name that Lucrece 
meant to guarantee with her suicide, but also the political project that was authorized in 
the name of revenging her rape. Her diatribe calls into question the triumphant, 
progressive history—Rome’s transition from tyranny to republic—that was supposed to 
                                                 
32 Line 25 reads postremo tempore mundi. Shand translates this as “the world’s worst age.” The word 
postremo could be “worst” or “latest.” Adams translates the phrase as “the latest age of the world.” “Latest” 
is perhaps the more common translation of postremo, but I agree with Shand’s rendering: the context of the 
poem makes “worst” appropriate.  
33 Quoted from Shand’s introduction to the poem in Thomas Middleton: The Collected Works, p. 1985. 
34 The problem of chastity in the context of rape and suicide was influentially articulated in Christian terms 
by Augustine in City of God. See Sasha Roberts, Reading Shakespeare’s Poems in Early Modern England 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), esp. 105–113, for an analysis of the Augustinian context of 
Lucrece’s early modern reception. See also Ian Donaldson, The Rapes of Lucretia: A Myth and Its 
Transformations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), esp. 21–39.    
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 have resulted from her death. As she warns while addressing Rome and Tarquin together, 
“I’ll shame you both before my shame be done” (182). 
I read Lucrece’s concerns with fame, name, and genealogy as an engagement with 
political history. As Catherine Belsey notes, “the story of Lucretia was widely read as a 
myth of the founding of the [Roman] Republic.”35 In this myth, drawn from the account 
in Livy’s Early History of Rome, Sextus Tarquinius (Tarquin) is the son of the Roman 
King, Tarquin the Proud. The Tarquins rule Rome with an iron fist, mercilessly killing 
political opponents and taking over their possessions. Legally speaking, Lucrece’s 
chastity is the property of her husband, Collatine; so when Prince Tarquin rapes her, the 
act represents one more abuse of private property by an already tyrannical regime. In 
other words, Tarquin’s appropriation of Lucrece’s body stands in for a political 
appropriation, for his family’s having usurped property that should belong to free male 
citizens. After the rape, Lucrece stabs herself in order to preserve the now stained honor 
of the family and in order to avoid the corruption of Collatine’s lineage that a child born 
of the rape would represent. In the aftermath of her suicide, Lucius Junius Brutus (the 
nephew of the King) takes the knife from Lucrece’s breast and swears to drive the 
tyrannical Tarquins from Rome. Avenging the rape of Lucrece becomes a revolutionary 
project. In place of tyrannical rule, Brutus brings a republicanism that restores the rights 
of the Roman people. The literary history of the rape of Lucrece, drawn primarily from 
accounts in Livy’s history and Ovid’s Fasti, thus links personal trauma with political 
change. This is the literary and historical afterlife Lucrece faces when she rises from the 
grave. Middleton’s Lucrece acknowledges the way in which her suffering promises to 
turn “private means” (i.e. laments) into “public moans” (279). She does not, however, 
                                                 
35 Belsey, “Tarquin Dispossessed,” 327. 
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 write the story of the triumphant birth of republican Rome that we might expect. Instead 
of a story in which the ideal of chastity is preserved through sacrifice, guaranteeing the 
purity of patriarchal futurity, The Ghost of Lucrece gives us a story in which rape and 
suicide generate only perversion and corruption.36   
Middleton’s Lucrece, in a tour de force of lamenting negativity, tears apart the 
progressive, teleological fabric of what scholars have understood in broad terms as the 
translatio imperii, the translation of empire from Rome to England. Middleton’s poem 
forecloses a reading of the Lucrece story as a narrative of the triumphant emergence of 
republican Rome and therefore as precedent for English republicanism. Insofar as English 
national narratives relied on a kinship with Rome that imagined a continuity with and 
rebirth of classical civilization, Rome could be understood in genealogical relation to 
England. As Coppélia Kahn notes, “for the English Renaissance, ‘the Roman past 
was…not simply a past, but the past,’ legendarily linked to the moment in which Britain 
itself emerged into history.”37 In historical terms, Rome was England’s fatherland. 
Humanist education, for which Roman Latin was the father tongue and training in 
classical rhetoric was the goal, reinforced and institutionalized that paternal relation. 
                                                 
36 Laura G. Bromley, “The Lost Lucrece: Middleton’s The Ghost of Lucrece,” Papers on Language and 
Literature 21 (1985): 258–74, suggests that Middleton’s poem satirizes a decadent society, a “fallen world” 
where “corruption is the status quo” (271) and Anna Swärdh, Rape and Religion in English Renaissance 
Literature (Upsala: Upsala University Press, 2003), offers religion as the target of its “satire,” specifically 
the “baroque style” of counter-reformation religious poetry (206–19).  
37 Coppélia Kahn, Roman Shakespeare, cites George K. Hunter to reminds us that “in English chronicle 
histories, the founding of Britain was connected to the founding of Rome through Brutus, the grandson of 
Aeneas, founder of Rome” (3). See Hunter, “A Roman Thought: Renaissance Attitudes to History 
Exemplified in Shakespeare and Johnson” in An English Miscellany Presented to W. S. Machie (Cape 
Town: Oxford University Press, 1977), 93–118. In the context of this essay, Hunter may be worth quoting 
at greater length. “The Roman past was to [Tudor and Stuart writers] not simply a past but the past, and 
therefore, a subject necessarily evaluative, since it led to the present. Roman culture was not simply one 
competitor for attention among several, but supplied, in fact, the only possible range of meanings that 
would have attached to the word culture, if it had existed. The adequacy of national or modern culture 
seemed to be measurable, then, only to the extent that it could reproduce or rival the qualities of Roman 
culture” (95–96). See also Heather James, Shakespeare’s Troy: Drama, Politics, and the Translation of 
Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
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 Middleton’s Lucrece asks a devastating question of this cultural formation: if Romans are 
fathers, who are the mothers? The answer reveals the gendered violence inherent in a 
national narrative that relies on classical precedents. As Margaret Ferguson points out, 
“many Renaissance educators saw themselves as the heirs of Rome, and as the revivers 
and rescuers of its Latin language…”: 
As soon as we think about Latin as a critical instrument for cultural 
transmission broadly understood—a political, economic, and linguistic 
phenomenon that medieval and Renaissance scholars called the translatio 
studii et imperii—we are invited…to think about asymmetries of 
gender…38 
 
Middleton’s poem forcibly reminds us that the women whose bodies enable the translatio 
imperii—figures such as Helen, Dido, and Lucrece—are left behind, exchanged, or 
abused. Tarquin and Rome are, according to Lucrece’s ghost, “Nursed with my blood, 
weaned with my tragedy” (96).  
Recent scholarship on Shakespeare’s The Rape of Lucrece has examined the place 
of republican Rome as an exemplar for Elizabethan England.39 Since the story of 
Lucrece’s personal suffering is also the story of Rome’s political transition from 
monarchy to republic, Shakespeare’s Lucrece is a key text for critics involved in “a series 
of ongoing debates about the place of classical republicanism within the political 
mentality of late Elizabethan England.”40 There is no doubt that republican thought was 
                                                 
38 Margaret W. Ferguson, Dido’s Daughters: Literacy, Gender, and Empire in Early Modern England and 
France (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 15–16. 
39 See, for instance, Andrew Hadfield, Shakespeare and Republicanism, esp. 130–53. Barbara L. Parker, 
Plato’s Republic and Shakespeare’s Rome: A Political Study of the Roman Works (Newark: University of 
Delaward Press, 2004), esp. 31–53, also focuses on the poem’s allegory to show a “correspondence 
between the poem’s milieu and England’s” (33). Belsey, “Tarquin Dispossessed,” suggests that insofar as 
we read the poem as a critique, “what [the poem] criticizes is a model of both marriage and government 
that works to no one’s advantage, not the husband’s and not, in the end, the tyrant’s” (327). Belsey outlines 
several concurrences between the uses of the Lucrece story for Livy, Ovid, and Augustine, and concerns of 
the early modern era such as slavery, consent, and tyranny. 
40 Curtis Perry, “The Uneasy Republicanism of Cornelia,” Criticism 48 (2006): 535–55, 535. 
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 emergent in a late sixteenth-century Elizabethan “monarchical republic” deeply 
concerned with the power of the sovereign and how that power ought to be 
circumscribed.41 Following scholars such as David Norbrook and Andrew Hadfield, 
Curtis Perry aptly summarizes:  
It is clearly true that late Elizabethan writers and readers were avidly 
interested in a number of questions that can at least loosely be described as 
republican, questions about the limits of monarchy and the liberties of 
subjects, the problem of tyranny and resistance, and the role of counsel in 
government. And it is clear, likewise, that writers in this period often 
turned to Roman writers and to stories about the rise and fall of the Roman 
republic as a kind of political science laboratory for thinking through 
problematic questions about liberty and governance, republic and 
empire.42  
 
Lucrece’s was one of the stories that Elizabethan writers turned to for this kind of 
“laboratory.” Hadfield, for instance, relies on this context to claim that Lucrece’s body 
represents the Elizabethan “body politic” in protest against the abuses of absolutist 
monarchy (152). Hadfield invests in the genealogical fantasy of the ‘birth’ of republican 
Rome out of tryannical monarchy and its generational relation to England by claiming 
that in The Rape of Lucrece, “the republic, the child of rape, is born—paradoxically, a 
welcome development resulting from a heinous act” (147). Middleton’s Lucrece tells us a 
starkly different story.     
 
                                                 
41 Patrick Collinson, “The Monarchical Republic of Queen Elizabeth I” in Elizabethan Essays (London: 
Hambledon Press, 1994), 31–57 (first printed in BJRLM 69 [1986–87]: 394–424). Also cited in Hadfield, 
17. Collinson’s influential essay puts forward the claim that “Elizabethan England was a republic which 
happened also to be a monarchy: or vice-versa” (43). Such a claim, however, continues to be controversial 
among historians. John F. McDiarmid has recently edited a collection of essays, The Monarchical Republic 
of Early Modern England: Essays in Response to Patrick Collinson (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), which 
investigates Collinson’s claim further. See McDiarmid’s introduction for a summary of the controversy. 
See Peter Lake’s contribution to the volume, “‘The Monarchical Republic of Queen Elizabeth I’ (and the 
Fall of Archbishop Grindal) Revisited,” 129–147, for a usefully corrective warning that, in some respects, 
the case for Elizabethan republicanism has been “over-stated” (135).  
42 Perry, “The Uneasy Republicanism,” 539. See also David Norbrook, Poetry and Politics in the English 
Renaissance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), and Writing the English Republic: Poetry, Rhetoric, 
and Politics, 1627–1660 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
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 Corrupt Generation 
If Lucrece returns from the dead to become an author, we might fairly ask what 
kind of rewriting she gives us. What work is performed by her imagined authorship? 
Does Lucrece change anything by returning to speak and write? At the end of the poem, 
she plunges back into hell for the “sins” forced on her by the rape, no better off than she 
was at the beginning. And if revenge is at issue, we have no sense that Tarquin even 
hears her invective. But even if Lucrece cannot alter the fate of her soul in the afterlife, 
she does, in fact, change literary history. In exposing and critiquing the bloody logic of 
castigation that informs her story, she changes our understanding of the way in which her 
death signifies.  
Early in her speech, Lucrece examines the terms upon which she has become a 
literary and historical subject. She compares her union with Tarquin to a candle, and then 
a lamp. The fuel (wax or oil) is her blood, and the fire is Tarquin’s lust: “For lust and 
blood are mingled in one lamp / To seal my soul with rape and murder’s stamp” (85–86). 
Here Lucrece extends the lamp / candle metaphor. 
Before my shame, yon candle had no fire, 
Vestals nil feared me, the world saw me not. 
Shame was the tinder, and the flint desire 
That struck in Tarquin’s bosom and begot 
A child of fire, a firebrand, and so hot 
     That it consumed my chastity to dust (87–92) 
 
Lucrece is unseen, securely outside of literary history, before her interpellation by rape. 
Her very absence, signified by chaste shame, fuels Tarquin’s desire. But with the phrase 
“child of fire,” Lucrece hints at a more radical critique to come. The poem begins to 
construct a genealogical fantasy. The next stanza relocates the “firebrand” of lust, the 
child imagined to be inside Tarquin’s “bosom.”  
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 Was I the cradle, O my chastity, 
To rock and lull this bastard firebrand, 
Nursed with my blood, weaned with my tragedy… (94–96) 
 
At the end of this stanza the answer to this rhetorical question is yes: “I was the cradle” 
(99). Lucrece becomes the nurse to Tarquin’s lust-child. Still, this is only the first 
movement in Lucrece’s story of perverse generation: she soon transforms the metaphor. 
Thou art my nurse-child, Tarquin, thou art he. 
Instead of milk, suck blood and tears and all. 
In lieu of teats, Lucrece thy nurse, even she, 
By tragic art seen through a crystal wall, 
Hath carvèd with her knife thy festival. 
     Here’s blood for milk; suck till thy veins run over, 
     And such a teat which scarce thy mouth can cover. (136–42) 
 
Here Tarquin becomes not just the bearer of the lust-child, but the lust-child itself. In the 
act of rape, he perverts himself and Lucrece in such a way that generation itself is 
perverted. One more stanza gives us the political, temporal, and gendered scope of this 
lineage fantasy. 
Tarquin the prince: sham’st thou to hear thy name? 
Rome, ’tis thy heir. Sham’st thou to call him son? 
Tarquin the prince: lo, I’ll repeat thy shame. 
A Roman heir, from him to thee I run. 
I’ll shame you both before my shame be done. 
     Tarquin the prince, Tarquin the Roman heir, 
     Thus will I haunt and hunt you to despair. (178–84) 
 
Having made Tarquin her nurse-child, Lucrece now puts him in the position of both 
father and child. He becomes both lust’s principle of origin and its embodiment, its 
procreative result. In this stanza she extends this characterization of Tarquin to include 
Rome and expands her goal to haunting and shaming both. Using the same confusion 
between father and child, Lucrece blurs the boundaries between Rome as Tarquin’s father 
and Rome as his child. “Rome, ’tis thy heir” can be read both ways. Either Lucrece 
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 addresses Rome with “thy,” in which case Tarquin is the heir of Rome, or she addresses 
Tarquin, which makes Rome the heir of Tarquin. But her task here is to “run” at both 
Tarquin and Rome, to shame them both. In the allegorical narrative, the rape, death, and 
chastisement of Lucrece results in the birth of the republic—“the republic, the child of 
rape, is born—paradoxically, a welcome development resulting from a heinous act.” 
Middleton’s Lucrece offers us a spectral possibility, the dark side of that birth. Reading 
Rome as Tarquin’s “heir”—in the context of the story of perverse generation Lucrece is 
telling with its goal of shaming—allows us to think of the Rome Brutus will found as the 
bastard child of Tarquin, gotten on Lucrece’s body, nursed with her blood, tears, and 
milk. She allows us to think of the triumphant cultural narrative authorized by her rape 
and suicide as essentially perverse, shockingly and thoroughly infected by the moment of 
its rapacious inauguration.      
Middleton’s Lucrece characterizes the effect of Tarquin’s crimes in terms of 
corrupt generation. The names with which she accuses Tarquin also signify the 
degradation of the conventionally protective forces of custom and law. Lucrece names 
“Tarquin the Roman,” Tarquin my guest,” “Tarquin my kinsman,” and “Tarquin the 
prince” (145–64). These names should signify protective, ordered social relations, yet 
here they are the names of a rapist. For Lucrece, the act of rape becomes an assault on all 
systems of meaning and order—from chastity to national stability. Tarquin’s sexual 
crimes take the supports of her world apart, and Lucrece draws on imagery from 
Revelations about the apocalypse to signify the extent of this collapse: 
Now is my tide of blood. Come, quench thy soul. 
The sluices of my spirit now runs again. 
Come, I have made my breast an ivory bowl 
To hold the blood that streameth from my vein. (122–25) 
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This passage bears comparison to Revelations 16, which has much to do with blood and 
bowls. Verse 3, for example, reads: “The second angel emptied his bowl over the sea, and 
it turned to blood, like the blood of a corpse, and every living creature in the sea died.”43 
Revelations 13 also appears, coupled with Roman geographical references. 
[…] seven hills that should o’erlook thy evils 
Like seven hells to nurse up Roman devils? 
To thee, that mak’st the moon thy looking-glass 
To view thy triple crown and seven-fold head… (169–72) 
 
In Revelations, Chapter 13, a seven-headed beast rises from the sea and is “allowed to 
mouth its boasts and blasphemies” (13.5). It is “allowed to make war against the saints 
and conquer them, and given power over every race, people, language and nation” 
(13.7).44 This beast, according to George Gifford’s popular volume of sermons on 
Revelations (1596, 1599), is the Roman Empire.45 “O it is the lot of the Saints,” cries 
Gifford, “to be cruelly murdered by the beast, that is, by the Romane tyrānie” (252). As 
Gifford makes clear, this tyranny not only refers to ancient Rome and its rulers, but also 
to present day Rome and its Pope. Lucrece’s repeated offering of her blood for Tarquin to 
drink echoes Revelations as well. Gifford explains that Romans (then and now) kill 
martyrs (329); the angel pouring out vials of blood suggests that Romans “shed the blood 
of the Saints and Prophets, and therefore [God] hast giuen them blood to drinke” (311). 
Lucrece’s references to the seven hills of Rome, the seven-headed beast, blood, and the 
“triple crown” follow Gifford and other apocalyptic writers in conflating ancient and 
                                                 
43 Cited by chapter and verse from The New Jerusalem Bible (New York: Doubleday, 1990). 
44 See Spenser’s use of the same set of images—the triple crown and seven-fold head—in conjunction with 
references to Rome, which famously occupies seven hills. Spenser, The Faerie Queene, I.vii.16–18. 
45 According to George Gifford, Sermons vpon the whole booke of the Reuelation (1596), “the Roman 
Empire (which is figured by this monstrous beast) did spring and grow vp from the contentions and 
discords, and diuisions among the kingdoms, which are as a raging sea. […] Thus the beast ariseth out of 
the sea: this yee see is verie plaine” (fol. 246). 
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 early modern Roman power.46 A triple crown in this context—loaded as this moment in 
the poem is with eschatological and anti-papist symbology—refers not only to the 
historical domination of three continents by the Roman Empire, but also to the tiara, or 
papal crown.47  
The references to Revelations cast an apocalyptic light on the poem, providing, 
once again, a vision of history in stark contrast to the triumphant narrative of the birth of 
republican Rome. Lucrece gives us an alternate history. Instead of a narrative in which 
her suicide ensures that tyranny is overturned, she suggests one in which rape and its 
perverse progeny utterly and irrecoverably infect the world with a “tide of blood.” This 
view of how Lucrece’s story signifies is made possible by what I have called her 
metaleptic perspective—a perspective that has the effect of collapsing the differences 
upon which gendered identification (and disidentification), authorship, and 
historiography precariously rely. The following lines near the end of the poem aptly 
encapsulate this challenge to difference: 
Lucrece, I say, how canst thou Lucrece be, 
Wanting a God to give a life to thee? (561–62) 
 
The poem leaves unclear who asks this devastating question. At this point in the poem, 
the difference between the voice of the narrating poetic persona and that of the ghost of 
Lucrece is precarious at best. The effect of this uncertainty can be understood as a ghostly 
unison of living and dead voices. But from wherever we imagine this utterance to 
emerge, the question threatens the identity of the Lucrece revenant. How can Lucrece 
                                                 
46 Maurice Hunt, “‘Forward Backward’ Time and the Apocalypse in Hamlet,” Comparative Drama 38 
(2004): 379–99, reminds us of a common belief “that Doomsday would occur at some time just after the 
centennial year 1600” (386). The 1590s, Hunt writes, saw “a spate of books on the Apocalypse.”  
47 See G. B. Shand’s note to line 172. Shand only grudgingly admits (“perhaps”) to a “glancing” allusion to 
the “papal crown.” I suggest that the context makes such an allusion inescapable.  
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 “be,” however uncertain and ephemeral that ghostly being?  How can she exist in the 
collapsed temporal realm that the poem offers—that is, an eschatological time that 
comprises the Rome of both the pagan and the Christian eras? The collapse of 
historiographic differences leaves no room for Rome to emerge as a narrative of identity, 
national or personal.     
When Lucrece plunges into hell at the end of her revenge song, she joins Tarquin 
there in an eternal embrace of sin. She points out her connection with Tarquin: 
“Philomela’s choir / Is hushed from pricksong” (593–94). The cruelty of “pricksong,” 
recalling her rape as it does, links her tragic, Philomela-like song inextricably with its 
cause.48  
Acheron’s bells begin 
To call our ghosts, clad in the spirits of sin. 
Now Tereus meets with ravished Philomel, 
Lucrece with Tarquin in the hall of hell. (594–97)  
 
With Lucrece and her story of perverse generation and apocalypse back in hell, the poet 
resumes control of the poem in an epilogue. He takes great pains to assure us that 
Lucrece is back in the grave, repeatedly describing her as silent and dead. Her voice is no 
longer a threat. The “tongue, which Orpheus tuned before he died” is gone: “Now she of 
it, and it of her bereaven” (627–33). Her beauty is no longer a lure: “That hair which 
danced in beams before her breath / Serves now to stuff the gaping ribs of death” (618–
19). Attesting to the growing sense that the poet has been possessed, the Epilogue locates 
Lucrece in the grave: “Death’s power is come,” the poet writes, “and beauty’s triumph 
                                                 
48 A “prick-song” was a tune written using tablature rather than staff, or, more relevant in this context, 
“music sung from notes written or pricked as opposed to music sung from memory or by ear” (OED). The 
bawdy pun on “penis” is clearly available, as is the sense of a song intended to prick the emotions. Yet 
another common understanding is that the nightingale, as an avatar of Philomela, sings as she pricks her 
breast against thorns. For a history of this last image, see Carol Madison, “‘Brave Prick Song’: An Answer 
to Sir Thomas Browne,” Modern Language Notes 75 (1960): 468–78.   
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 past” (611). His lamenting encomium serves to tame the forces he has released and 
reinstall the temporality the poem’s haunting has worked to dislodge. Just as his 
“poetizing breath” blows her “dissevered limbs” together in the poem’s opening, his 
epilogue blazons her, taking her apart again piece by piece and putting her back into the 
grave. Her breasts, hair, eyes, tongue, and breath each gets its own stanza of lament and 
burial. 
 The urgency with which the poet takes Lucrece apart and laments her death in the 
epilogue can be read as a measure of just how disruptive this literary possession has been. 
“O her breath,” the poet laments, “Through discord of her tongue did all consume” (635–
36). In recalling the image of the unruly tongue, a conventional renaissance indictment of 
women, the poet seems to suggest that Lucrece consumes her own breath in vociferous 
lament. She chokes, as it were, on her own voice. Either that or her voice, in another 
apocalyptic image, consumes “all” the world. In any case, the poet’s epilogue cannot 
seem to make her silent and dead enough. In the final couplet, he suggests that  
First Tarquin-life clad her in death’s array. 
Now Tarquin-death hath stol’n her life away. (653–54) 
 
Lucrece’s relationship to Tarquin here, as I noted at the beginning of this essay, makes 
her dead even while living and doubly dead in the afterlife. Yet as a present absence, a 
past operating in the present, a ghost, the voice of Lucrece was and is both alive and 
dead. The life / death synœciosis in the final couplet acknowledges the strange 
temporality of such a haunting. The past, for the poet, operates inside the present. In 
Lucrece’s struggle to speak, to name, and to write, she and the poet become one. Reading 
the poem that lies between the prologue and the epilogue, we can as easily read the poet 
as a figure for Lucrece as we can Lucrece as a figure for the poet. But Middleton’s poet 
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 goes to much trouble to introduce Lucrece’s speaking with an Ovidian invocation, 
securing his bona fides as an authoritative voice even as he calls for her voice. In the 
epilogue, the poet stops the breath of his Lucrece in blazoning Petrarchan language, 
moving away from haunting possession to more conventional literary territory. The poet 
builds this framing apparatus to contain a voice that threatens to become 
indistinguishable from his own.49  
 Middleton’s poem changes our understanding of how Lucrece’s story signifies, or 
fails to signify, as exemplary republicanism for the late Elizabethan period’s literature 
and history. The poem offers a useful point of comparison for events that early modern 
scholars often read primarily through Shakespeare’s poem.50 But Middleton aims for 
more than presenting an alternative version of Rome’s place in history. The collapse of 
differential categories throughout The Ghost of Lucrece—its haunting vision of 
authorship along with its confusion of temporalities, gendered voices, and narrative 
coherence—questions not only Lucrece’s history, but also her historicity. That is, 
Middleton inquires into the conditions of possibility for exemplary history. 
“Lucrece…how canst thou Lucrece be,” the poem asks. Middleton raises questions about 
Lucrece’s ontological status. Perhaps the poem’s most frightening vision, from this point 
of view, is of Lucrece as a cipher, a nothing, infinitely appropriable, adaptable, for 
                                                 
49 “Death,” writes Paul de Man, “is a displaced name for a linguistic predicament, and the restoration of 
mortality by autobiography (the prosopopeia of the voice and the name) deprives and disfigures to the 
precise extent that it restores” (“Autobiography as De-Facement” MLN 94 [1979]: 919–30, 930). If Lucrece 
cannot alter her fate in the afterlife, it is perhaps because she can only be restored to the precise extent that 
she is disfigured. 
50 In trumpeting his recently published edition of Middleton’s works, Gary Taylor proclaims Middleton 
“our other Shakespeare.” Taylor, suggests that “we can now see the English Renaissance, stereoscopically, 
from the perspectives of two very different geniuses” (58). An investigation of a work of Middleton’s that 
directly engages one of Shakespeare’s would seem to be usefully “stereoscopic.” For an example of the 
consideration of “whether it is just (or even helpful) to claim for [Middleton] the title of ‘our other 
Shakespeare’,” see Michael Neill, “Old Dad dead?” in London Review of Books (4 December 2008): 23–
28, 24.      
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whoever chooses to write her into whatever rhetorical frame comes to hand (and in this 
sense a figure for the authorial persona’s helplessness in the face of an inevitably 
citational future). Yet it is only through a thoroughgoing exploration of Lucrece’s 
historicity that Middleton can get at what I take to be the focus of the poem. The 
historical vision of The Ghost of Lucrece offers scathingly commentary on the exemplary 
republicanism of the Lucrece story. Middleton is interested, finally, in describing the 
human expense of such models. For the Lucrece of Middleton’s poem, a political 
narrative, however liberatory, cannot justify the erasure of the personal costs on which it 
is founded. Constructing histories over abused bodies such as Lucrece’s cannot generate 
authorizing narratives of national identity. It can only continue in a mode of ineluctable 
corruption. 
 
 
 
   
CHAPTER V 
 
 
‘THE TYRANT TIRES ME AN AUNT’: 
COMPLAINT, TYRANNY, AND THE WINTER’S TALE 
 
 In the fifth act of The Winter’s Tale, an advisor urges Leontes not to “fail of 
issue.” Dion pleads with the King, on behalf of the state’s “future good,” to take another 
wife and generate an heir. Paulina counsels against it. “Care not for issue,” she tells the 
penitent King; to “wed again” would dishonor Hermione, “she you killed.” Leontes 
submits to Paulina’s judgment, adding that if he were to choose another, his first Queen’s 
ghost would rise up; her “sainted spirit” would “again possess her corpse.”1 Paulina 
imagines the reaction of the ghost of Hermione to the proposed second wife.   
Were I the ghost that walked, I’d bid you mark 
Her eye and tell me for what dull part in’t 
You chose her; then I’d shriek, that even your ears  
Should rift to hear me, and the words that followed 
Should be, ‘Remember mine.’ (5.1.63–67)2  
 
The Winter’s Tale here recalls the vengeful command, “remember me,” of the most 
famous Shakespearean ghost, Hamlet’s father. Hamlet, like The Winter’s Tale, turns on 
anxieties about what women’s bodies may do as well as what ghosts demand. The 
spectral voice in The Winter’s Tale, however, is imagined not as a dead father’s but as a 
dead mother’s, a “sainted spirit” mediated by Paulina, whose name suggests another 
                                                 
1 See act five, scene one, lines 15–58. All citations of The Winter’s Tale follow the edition by Susan Snyder 
and Deborah T. Curren-Aquino for The New Cambridge Shakespeare (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007). 
2 Here “mine” refers to Hermione’s eyes. “Stars, stars,” Leontes replies, “And all eyes else dead coals!” 
(67–68). To “shriek” is not only something that ghosts do, it is also an expression of overwhelming distress 
or fear. See OED, “shriek,” which cites Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar (“Ghosts did shrieke and squeale 
about the streets” [2.2.24]) and Milton’s Paradise Regained (“Infernal Ghosts, and Hellish Furies,..some 
howl’d, some yell’d, some shriek’d” [4.23]). In the early modern period, as now, shrieking indicates an 
ungovernable expression of extreme emotion by “a human being in pain or terror.” OED cites 
Shakespeare’s A Lover’s Complaint, in which the abandoned woman is overheard “shrieking 
undistinguish’d woe.” 
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saint.3 In a play well known for representing anxieties surrounding what it means for 
women to provide for patriarchal futurity through the “issue” of maternal bodies, the 
ghostly “remember mine” resonates deeply, a vengeful demand not only for Leontes to 
keep Hermione’s eyes in front of his own, but also for restitution of what the Queen 
describes in the trial scene as her “childbed privilege denied,” a forced separation from 
the “fruits of [her] body” (3.2.95–101). Even though Paulina calls “monstrous” the idea 
that her own dead husband should “break his grave and come again,” she enforces the 
King’s long repentance by means of just such images of Hermione’s spectral return 
(5.1.42–3). The fifth act begins by implying that for sixteen years, since the supposed 
death of Hermione, Paulina has been threatening Leontes with the traumatic shrieking of 
the “queen’s ghost” and its memorial demand (80). In order to play the “physician” to 
Leontes, Paulina stages perhaps the most prolonged haunting in early modern theater 
(2.3.54).  
 In the final scene, Paulina orchestrates Hermione’s return; the reanimated Queen 
then claims that she has “preserved” herself, yet the play does not reveal what form this 
preservation has taken (5.3.127). Though Leontes promises everyone will “answer” for 
what has been “Performed in this wide gap of time” (153–5), the time of Hermione’s 
absence, the play ends without providing that answer. This gives rise to the most famous 
of the interpretive problems surrounding The Winter’s Tale: how are we to understand 
Hermione’s absence and reappearance in the play? Is this a ‘restoration’ to society of a 
woman sequestered for sixteen years or a ‘resurrection’ of the dead? Such ambiguity 
prompts various interpretive strategies. Some understand Hermione’s awakening in the 
religious frame suggested by the final scene’s chapel setting and its rhetoric of faith and 
                                                 
3 Paulina, as the play’s critics often remark, is a feminized form of Paul, the most famous of biblical saints.  
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redemption. Others understand the Queen’s absence and ‘miraculous’ return as an 
expression of the power of theatrical representation or a play on the conventions of 
literary romance. Still others unpack these events in terms of possibilities suggested by 
early modern understandings of death and revivification.4 Whether scholars interpret 
Hermione’s reappearance as exceeding the humanly possible or not, the play undeniably 
allows and even encourages both the ‘restoration’ and the ‘resurrection’ scenarios: 
“Shakespeare seems to want it both ways.”5 This essay builds upon the work of those 
critics concerned with how to describe the disappearance and return of Hermione, yet I 
am less interested in the mechanisms of her awakening at the end of the play or deciding 
on the truth of what happens to her after her trial than with the kind of work her absence 
performs during the “wide gap” that the play identifies and refuses to clarify: the interval 
between her apparent death and her reappearance. The ambiguity of Hermione’s sixteen 
year absence structures the play and its critical reception in important ways. What work, 
then, does this absence and the play’s refusal to explain it perform? In order to address 
                                                 
4 For each of these critical positions (which are by no means mutually exclusive) I point to recent essays, 
though the debates they represent are long-standing. Those arguing for the religious dimension to this scene 
(or at least an appropriation of religious rhetoric) draw on Paulina’s name, which suggests a connection to 
Pauline Christianity. See, e.g., Huston Diehl, “‘Does not the stone rebuke me?’: The Pauline Rebuke and 
Paulina’s Lawful Magic in The Winter’s Tale,” in Shakespeare and the Cultures of Performance, eds. Paul 
Yachnin and Patricia Badir (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2008), 69–82; and Scott F. Crider, “Through 
Nurture and Good Advisement: Paulina, Ideal Orator of Shakespeare’s The Winter’s Tale,” Cithara 47.2 
(2008): 17–36. For a variation on this, see James A Knapp, “Visual and Ethical Truth in The Winter’s 
Tale,” Shakespeare Quarterly 55 (2004): 253–78, who argues for an understanding of the final scene in 
terms of ethical choice and redemption. For readings of the play in terms of romance genres, see, e.g., 
Marion Wells, “Mistress Taleporter and the Triumph of Time: Slander and Old Wives’ Tales in The 
Winter’s Tale,” Shakespeare Survey 58 (2005): 247–59; and Stuart Gillespie, “Shakespeare and Greek 
Romance: ‘Like an old tale still’,” in Shakespeare and the Classics, eds. Charles Martindale and A. B. 
Taylor (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2004), 225–37. For readings interested in theatricality, see, e.g., 
Marina Warner, “Painted Devils and Aery Nothings: Metamorphoses and Magic Art,” in Shakespeare and 
the Mediterranean, eds. Tom Clayton, Susan Brock, and Vicente Forés (Newark: University of Delaware 
Press, 2004), 308–31; and Anthony B. Dawson, “Shakespeare and Secular Performance,” in Shakespeare 
and the Cultures of Performance, 83–97. See Kaara L. Peterson, “Shakespearean Revivifications: Early 
Modern Undead,” Shakespeare Studies 32 (2004): 240–66, for a culturally specific understanding of 
Hermione’s awakening.         
5 Susan Snyder and Deborah T. Curren-Aquino, “Introduction” to The Winter’s Tale, 48. 
 172 
   
this question, I bring to bear a nearly contemporaneous discourse structured by concerns 
strikingly similar to those of The Winter’s Tale. 1590s “female complaint” poetry, in 
which women return from the dead as lamenting ghosts, combines concerns with 
absence, spectral return, chastity, patriarchy, tyranny, and sanctification, just as The 
Winter’s Tale does.6 Complaint poetry as practiced in the late Elizabethan era develops a 
vocabulary—an interrelated set of tropes, figures, and discourses—that The Winter’s Tale 
appropriates and stages. Careful attention to this shared vocabulary revises our 
understanding of the gendered terms within which Shakespeare’s play puts patriarchal 
imperatives, the threat of tyranny, and the voices of the lost or dead into conversation. 
The 1590s complaints, in other words, evince and contextualize The Winter’s Tale’s 
structuring concerns. 
Viewing The Winter’s Tale in light of the ghosts of female complaint poetry 
reveals the way in which such texts take up the interplay of patriarchy, tyranny, and 
chastity in the key of haunting loss. Each of these terms—patriarchy, tyranny, chastity—
points toward a wide and highly unstable spectrum of discourses in the early modern 
period. My aim here is less to provide full, historicized parameters for these epistemes 
than to show the ways in which they struggle to define themselves against and in terms of 
each other within the textual objects I consider. Nevertheless, it will help to start with 
minimum definitions, insufficient as they may be. In referring to “patriarchy,” I mean to 
indicate a system of male rule and masculine superiority understood by those within it as 
stable and natural. Under patriarchy, women become instruments of male will; they 
provide the bodies that guarantee the transmission of power between men through 
                                                 
6 John Kerrigan calls this group of poems “female complaints” in Motives of Woe: Shakespeare and 
‘Female Complaint’ (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).  
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generations. “Chastity” provides a disciplinary regime designed to ensure that women’s 
bodies will indeed reliably perform as instruments enabling patriarchy’s stability and 
progress. And “Tyranny” indicates the fall of the social order into disorder insofar as the 
monarch’s will becomes absolute and his actions detrimental to, rather than protective of, 
other bodies participating in the system.7 The discourses to which these terms refer rely 
upon sharp distinctions. Chastity calls upon the figure of the obedient, silent, 
irreproachable maiden opposed to the unruly, shrewish, or wanton woman, just as the 
rhetoric of tyranny attempts to separate the continence and good will of the legitimate 
ruler from the beastly tyranny of the monarch who indulges his own passions at the 
expense of his subjects. And yet, I will be interested throughout this essay not only in 
how complaint and The Winter’s Tale rely upon such distinctions but also in how they 
complicate them. If women must be silent instruments in a successful patriarchy, for 
instance, such a system already registers as oppressive to the very bodies it imagines 
itself to venerate and protect. The rhetoric of chastity, that is, potentially reveals both the 
difference and the similarity between patriarchy and tyranny: patriarchs protect women 
whereas tyrants abuse them, yet both patriarchs and tyrants work to exclude women’s 
participatory voices. The difference between patriarchy and tyranny, understood in terms 
of chastity, becomes one of degree rather than kind.  
In both The Winter’s Tale and female complaint poems, the radical silencing of 
women—by exile, imprisonment, or death—suggests that patriarchy has become tyranny. 
Yet that same exclusion paradoxically provides women with a new medium for speech 
from their positions outside the sphere of the proper. As Simon Shepherd incisively 
                                                 
7 I say “his actions” because the texts I consider here, for better or worse, feature male rulers. This is not to 
say that women cannot be tyrants or, indeed, that they cannot rule in systems otherwise patriarchal, as the 
case of Elizabeth I demonstrates.  
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observes, plays written around the time of The Winter’s Tale (1610–11) commonly 
suggest a “parallelism of women and ghost. The ghost is literally ‘other’. And both 
women and ghost make valid analyses of the male world.”8 The extrinsic speech of the 
ghost possesses a peculiar power. Freed from the constraints of the social order, early 
modern female ghosts echo and shriek—they chastise that order by haunting it. Late 
Elizabethan complaint poems as well as the dramatic works that draw upon them ask us 
to consider the possibility that women’s falls from grace are a sign of a patriarchal system 
derailed by its own conditions. Given the normative misogyny of the early modern 
period, stories about the loss of chastity might be expected to suggest a cause and effect 
relation: unchastity—as the failure of the disciplinary regime for women that enables the 
stable transmission of male power—threatens a resulting collapse of the patriarchal 
project. But the voices of abjected women offer competing scenarios. What if, they ask us 
to consider, unchastity (real or imagined) is not the cause of patriarchy’s collapse but its 
effect? Or, perhaps more startling, what if we can’t tell the difference? 
 
1590s Ghost Complaint 
During Shakespeare’s working life, and in the 1590s in particular, complaint 
poems take on a distinct character. The new “subgenre” of female-voiced ghost 
                                                 
8 Simon Shepherd, Amazons and Warrior Women: Varieties of Feminism in Seventeenth-Century Drama 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981), 112. In his chapter on the “Plays of 1610” (107–118), Shepherd 
discusses, among others, The Revenge of Bussy d’Ambois, The Second Maiden’s Tragedy, Match Me in 
London, The Athiest’s Tragedy, and The Duchess of Malfi: “their plots all concern corrupt courts ruled over 
by men who usually interfere with the marriages of more or less innocent women” (107). In Match Me, 
Shepherd notes, “the queen who has been ‘killed’…reappears saying: ‘You call me from a grave of shame 
and sorrow,/In which I lay deepe buried’ (V.v.66–7).” Shepherd also recalls the Echo scene in The Duchess 
of Malfi as another (ambiguous) return of the voice of a dead woman. 
 175 
   
complaint rises to popularity.9 Poems such as The Complaint of Rosamond (1592), 
Shore’s Wife (1593), The Complaint of Elstred (1593), Matilda (1594), The First Rape of 
Fair Helen (1595), and The Ghost of Lucrece (1600), among others, feature chastity 
threatened or subverted. Matilda and Lucrece commit suicide in order to preserve a 
chaste ideal against a royal assault. Rosamond, Jane Shore, and Elstred compromise 
chastity in pursuit of other goals, sometimes goals as simple as survival. While these 
poems ask us to judge their female protagonists against a standard of chaste behavior, 
they also ask us to pity them for their suffering at the hands of tyrannical princes. 
Lucrece, for instance, kills herself in the name of chastity. But beyond proving her chaste, 
Lucrece’s death serves as a rallying cry for her family to seek revenge against the tyrant 
who rules Rome. As Stephanie Jed has shown, Lucrece’s body figures the body politic—
tyranny over Lucrece’s body figures political tyranny.10 Avenging her rape means 
overthrowing a tyrant. Patriarchy is purged, rescued from tyranny and unchastity, both of 
which are figured as lawlessness and unreasoning excess. This much is familiar from 
Shakespeare’s well-known The Rape of Lucrece (1594), which has been categorized as a 
complaint poem.11 In a sequel of sorts set more squarely within the ghost complaint 
genre, Thomas Middleton’s The Ghost of Lucrece summons the Roman matron from the 
underworld to retell her tale. The Lucrece specter then proceeds to rebuke her tyrannical 
                                                 
9 Heather Dubrow, “A Mirror for Complaints: Shakespeare’s Lucrece and the Generic Tradition,” in 
Renaissance Genres: Essays on Theory, History, and Interpretation, ed. Barbara Keifer Lewalski 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1986), 399–417, claims that in encountering these poems, readers would 
have “sensed themselves in the presence of a subgenre” (410). I call this group of poems “ghost 
complaints” to mark the way in which their female protagonists launch critiques enabled by spectrality. 
Ghosts see things, these poems suppose, that they did not previously see as living beings. They possess a 
retrospective view of their living years as well as the ways in which their stories signify for those in the 
present. They can thus offer an analysis of their histories that they could not offer in life.   
10 Stephanie H. Jedd, Chaste Thinking: The Rape of Lucretia and the Birth of Humanism (Bloomington: 
Indiana UP, 1989). 
11 E.g. Heather Dubrow, “A Mirror for Complaints.” 
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rapist in stanza after stanza. “Tarquin the ravisher,” she flatly accuses: “Tarquin the 
lecher,” “Tarquin the traitor.”12 If, as Celia Daileader notes, the Middleton Lucrece’s 
“ringing vituperatio against Tarquin bears little resemblance to the vacillating self-blame 
of Shakespeare’s Lucrece,”13 the difference must owe in part to the fact that Middleton’s 
Lucrece is a ghost and therefore already excluded from the social realm that constrains 
her in life.   
While not all of the 1590s complaining women are characterized as virtuous like 
Lucrece, even those who seem to be most culpable in their own downfalls are no less 
pitiable for that, and no less vocal in their post-mortem accusations: fallen women have 
their tyrannical tormentors to chastise as well. Rosamond laments her cruel imprisonment 
in a labyrinth at the hands of King Henry II, Jane Shore curses Richard III for vilifying 
and impoverishing her, Helen calls Egeus to account for rape, and so on. The 
complaining women of Shakespeare’s era are assaulted, exiled, imprisoned, left behind, 
or otherwise excluded from a place in what is imagined as a failing patriarchy. This very 
process of exclusion marks the break between patriarchy and tyranny: a patriarch who 
abuses women becomes a tyrant. “So tyrantlike this traytor used me,” Helen protests in 
John Trussell’s ghost complaint.14 In Samuel Daniel’s The Complaint of Rosamond, a 
penitent King Henry mourns over the body of Rosamond, describing himself as 
tyrannical for contributing to her death: “Such life hath tyrants, and this life I led.”15 
Drayton’s Matilda responds to her oppressor by asking her executioner to “tell the Tyrant 
                                                 
12 Thomas Middleton, “The Ghost of Lucrece,” ed. G. B. Shand, in Thomas Middleton: The Collected 
Works (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), lines 143–92. 
13 Celia R. Daileader, “‘Writing Rape, Raping Rites’: Shakespeare’s and Middleton’s Lucrece Poems” in 
Violence, Politics, and Gender in Early Modern England, ed. Jospeh P. Ward (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008), 67–86, 68. 
14 M. A. Shaaber (ed.), “The First Rape of Faire Hellen by John Trussell,” Shakespeare Quarterly 8 (1957): 
407–48, line 168. 
15 Samuel Daniel, “The Complaint of Rosamond,” in Kerrigan, Motives of Woe, line 656. 
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this when I am dead, / I loath’d his beastly and adulterous bed.”16 And in Thomas 
Middleton’s ghost complaint, as I have noted, Lucrece comes back from the dead to 
accuse Prince Tarquin:  
The tyrant, with his force of luxury  
Tires me an aunt, through imbecility. (239–40)  
 
The pun expands “tyrant” to “tires me an aunt”—that is, dresses me as a whore. In the 
one word Lucrece conflates tyranny and the accusation of unchastity. Just as in The 
Winter’s Tale, in which Hermione is imagined to “shriek” at Leontes and stare him down 
from beyond the grave, the women of ghost complaint poetry return to accuse the tyrants 
who tormented them in life.  
Among the most visible and influential of the 1590s ghost complaints features 
Jane Shore, the mistress of Edward IV.17 When King Edward dies, the story goes, Jane is 
vilified by his successor, the notorious tyrant Richard III. In part because of her treatment 
at the hands of the cruel hunchback, Jane becomes among the most famous adulteresses 
in early modern literature. Scholars such as Richard Helgerson and Wendy Wall have 
noted Jane Shore’s influence on Jacobean “domestic tragedy, complete with its critique 
                                                 
16 Michael Drayton, Matilda. The faire and chaste daughter of the Lord Robert Fitzwater (London, 1594), 
sig. G1r. 
17 Jane Shore famously appears in Thomas More’s The History of King Richard the Third (c. 1520). 
Thomas Churchyard first figures her as a ghost in the 1563 edition of The Mirror for Magistrates. In 
response to the 1590s trend for ghost complaints (for which Churchyard and the Mirror are partly 
responsible), the poet expands and reissues his Jane Shore poem in his 1593 collection, Churchyard’s 
Challenge. In decrying tyranny, complaint poetry as practiced by Shakespeare’s contemporaries draws on a 
tradition that includes Ovid’s Heroides as well as the ghost poems of the Mirror for Magistrates. First 
published in 1559, the Mirror anthologizes poems in which the specters of famous figures from English 
history rise up to lament the conditions leading to their deaths. In the words of the first editor of the Mirror, 
the ghost complaints show how God “hath plagued evil rulers” and punished “shameless presumption and 
hypocrisy” with “death, diseases, or infamy.” See William Baldwin’s introduction to The Mirror for 
Magistrates, ed. Lily B. Campbell (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1938), 65. Citations of “Shore’s wife” 
follow this edition. 
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of royal abuse.”18 Less often noted is the way in which that critique relies upon a 
retrospective view of events enabled by Jane’s return as a specter. In Thomas 
Churchyard’s complaint poem, Jane’s ghost is clearly dissatisfied with her ignominious 
reputation. She suffers a “lowde reproach” that she hears even in the afterlife, calumny 
that “doth sound unto the skyes.”19 Such talk forces her out of the grave: 
…byds my corse out of the grave to ryse, 
As one that may no longer hide her face, 
But nedes must come and shewe her piteous case. (41–43)      
 
Jane does not entirely excuse her behavior in leaving her husband for a monarch, but she 
does suggest that, among other things, it was royal demand that made her sin inevitable. 
Before Edward coveted her, she “was never proved light”; she was “chaste in every case” 
(73–74). But alas, “who can withstand a puissaunt kynges desyre?” (89). Yet Jane’s 
troubles begin in earnest when Edward dies and Richard takes over. Richard publically 
punishes Jane for adultery in an effort to slander his predecessor as a libertine. Jane’s 
“piteous case,” it turns out, includes an admonition for current rulers based on a scathing 
indictment of Richard’s tyranny. 
Ye Princes all, and Rulers everychone, 
In punyshement beware of hatreds yre. 
Before ye skourge, take hede, looke well thereon: 
In wrathes yl will yf malice kyndle fyre, 
Your hartes wil bourne in such a hote desire, 
That in those flames the smoake shal dym your sight, 
Ye shal forget to ioyne your iustice ryght. (337–43) 
                                                 
18 Wendy Wall, “Forgetting and Keeping: Jane Shore and the English Domestication of History,” 
Renaissance Drama 27 (1996): 123–56, 123. See also Richard Helgerson, “Weeping for Jane Shore,” The 
South Atlantic Quarterly 98 (1999): 451–74, for an overview of the literary trajectory of the Jane Shore 
story and its impact. Helgerson sees Jane Shore as a figure indexing and even prompting the rise of 
Jacobean domestic tragedy. Thomas Heywood’s The First and Second Parts of King Edward IV (1599) 
first transports Jane Shore from complaint poetry to the stage (Shakespeare having all but ignored her in his 
Richard III).  
19 Thomas Churchyard, “Shore’s Wife,” in The Mirror for Magistrates, line 40. Churchyard’s poem first 
appeared in the 1563 version of the Mirror, but the author revised and republished it in the 1590s in 
response to the growing trend for works of its kind. 
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Jane goes on to suggest that rulers “should not iudge til thinges be wel diserned” (344). 
She gives us Richard III as an example of the kind of malice and wrath that produces the 
fire she describes. “To such mischiefe this Tyrantes heart was bent,” Jane tells us, that “in 
his wrath he made his wyll a lawe” (299–301). Jane goes on to curse the tyrant as a 
“raging wolfe” who “would spare no gylteles bloud” (317). 
I aske of God a vengeance on thy bones, 
Thy stinking corps corrupts the ayre I knowe: 
Thy shameful death no earthly wyght bemones, 
For in thy lyfe thy workes were hated so, 
That every man dyd wyshe thy overthrowe” (323–27) 
   
Following the pattern that Jane Shore sets, the women of 1590s complaint poetry rise 
from the dead to chastise tyranny.20 Revivified, complaining women struggle with the 
patriarchal values that excluded them. Their ghostly voices—self-consciously mediated 
by masculinized poetic voices—ask us to reconsider the reputations of these ‘fallen’ 
women in a new light.  
Jennifer Laws writes that complaint poems “are unremittingly moralistic and 
didactic, with ruin and death for the woman as the inevitable outcome of failing to guard 
her chastity or at least preferable to losing that virtue” (84). This is a common 
                                                 
20 Both the Mirror complaints and the tradition of complaint in the legal system speak against tyranny. 
Wendy Scase, Literature and Complaint in England 1272–1553 (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007), has shown 
that legal complaints in the medieval period—peasant plaint, clamour writing, and libel—markedly 
influenced literary complaint. In her words, “judicial institutions of written complaint…came into dialogue 
with literary production, becoming part of, and centrally informing, a wider literature of complaint” (1). In 
the medieval tradition, a plaint often registers a grievance against those in power. One late medieval 
peasant plaint runs: 
‘To the king I shall go’, said Adam the wretch; 
‘Before the king I shall fall, I’ll deliver him a bill’. 
They went off singing, making much mirth, 
But they come back weeping, lamenting without end. (qtd. in Scase, 5) 
The female complaints of the late Elizabethan period similarly feature characters “lamenting without end” 
in their confrontation with power from its margins. In fact, Samuel Daniel’s Rosamond, Thomas 
Middleton’s Lucrece, Thomas Lodge’s Elstred, and others speak from beyond the margins, as voices from 
the dead. Their male poets imagine their return as ghosts outside of time. 
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understanding of 1590s complaint. But what we tend to forget is that if the poems are 
“moralistic” about the behavior of women, they are equally so about that of the men who 
torment them. Surely the spectral lament of the adulterous Jane Shore would not have 
gained such currency were it not also about castigating the notorious tyrant Richard III. 
And The Complaint of Rosamond is as much about the corruption of the court and the 
lascivious King Henry as it is about how Rosamond is swayed by them. Complaint 
poems depict a tragic world in which the beauty and desirability of women enters into 
lethal combination with the ungoverned fears and desires of men. In the degraded world 
of complaint, chaste women fall and powerful patriarchs become tyrants. Complaint 
poems realize patriarchy’s sweaty nightmare—“that all women at heart are whores” to 
borrow a phrase from Stephen Orgel, and “all men at heart are rapists.”21 The contest 
between tyranny and chastity in complaint reveals the fragility of the patriarchal contract 
between men and women by breaking it and showing us the wreckage.  
 
Patriarchy Lost 
The Winter’s Tale opens with expressions of love between the “twinned lambs” 
Polixenes and Leontes. As scholars have noted, images of male parthenogenesis abound 
in act one.22 The two monarchs have courted each other with “gifts, letters, loving 
embassies” (1.1.24). Polixenes has visited Leontes for nine months, “nine changes of the 
wat’ry star” (1.2.1). His first exchange with Leontes reiterates images of pregnancy: 
empty places are filled up, ciphers multiply, images of “burden,” “perpetuity,” and 
                                                 
21 Qtd. in David Schalkwyk, “‘A Lady’s “Verily” Is Potent as a Lord’s’: Women, Word and Witchcraft in 
The Winter’s Tale,” ELR 22 (1992): 242–72, 246. Schalkwyk analyzes the play in terms of male word as 
transcendental signified that must authorize the female word. 
22 See, for example, Janet Adelman, Suffocating Mothers: Fantasies of Maternal Origin in Shakespeare’s 
Plays, Hamlet to the Tempest (New York: Routledge, 1992), esp. 224–8. 
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“breeding” attach to that nine month stay. The male child, Mamillius, is spoken of as the 
hope of the nation. The “gallant child…physics the subject” (1.1.33). These opening 
speeches do more than simply privilege the homosocial relation between Polixenes and 
Leontes; by imagining a reproductive relationship between men, they contemplate the 
exclusion of women from the patriarchal realm, an idea that, when materialized, will lead 
to tyranny. Patriarchy relies on women even as it attempts to silence them. Women 
provide the reproductive bodies and guarantees of purity without which patriarchal power 
cannot replicate itself even as that replicated power hierarchically devalues women’s 
bodies. Homosocial parthenogenesis, seen in this light, represents a fantasy of the 
successful exclusion of women from the very structure of power only they can guarantee.  
The homosocial exchange between the two men in The Winter’s Tale, an 
exchange of “innocence for innocence,” soon threatens to vilify the heterosexual relation 
as sin and guilt (1.2.68). “We knew not / The doctrine of ill-doing,” Polixenes claims, 
nostalgically describing his childhood bond with Leontes (69–70). Hermione sees where 
such language is going: “Of this make no conclusion, lest you say / Your queen and I are 
devils” (80–81). Yet she fails to derail the “conclusion” she predicts. The language of fall 
from edenic innocence, sexual knowledge, soon becomes the language of infection, in 
Leontes’ words, “the infection of my brains” (144). Leontes relentlessly universalizes an 
awareness of Hermione’s infectious sexuality as a corrosive on patriarchal lineage: “thy 
mother plays,” he tells his son,  
…and I  
Play too, but so disgraced a part, whose issue  
Will hiss me to my grave. Contempt and clamour  
Will be my knell (185–8).  
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Futurity itself is infected. “It is a bawdy planet,” the King claims—there is “no barricado 
for a belly,” no way to ensure that his children are his own (199–202). Therefore, “the 
world and all that’s in’t is nothing” (290). To look upon the paradox of patriarchy—that 
its survival is guaranteed by the word of the very women it attempts to silence—is to see 
the patriarchal contract and the futurity it authorizes “disgraced” and reduced to 
“nothing.”23 Patriarchy needs the voices of women, their good will and powerful 
guarantee: in his “diseased opinion” (298), as Camillo describes it, Leontes becomes 
tyrannical to the degree that he refuses to accept the terms of this contract. The Winter’s 
Tale shows us patriarchy run aground on the shoals of its enabling paradox.  
Given these thematic parameters, however, the question is still valid: what 
prompts Leontes to turn so suddenly toward jealousy and tyranny, rejecting not only his 
wife but also his beloved friend? After all, Hermione clearly and lovingly supports 
Leontes’ bond with Polixenes, facilitating a longer visit for the men and even offering to 
                                                 
23 Critics have long understood this as a paradox. Phyllis Rackin has done much to bring such structures to 
our attention in examining the relation between women and history in the plays. As the editors neatly 
summarize in the introduction to The Winter’s Tale, “Rackin examines the paradox of women who 
ostensibly have no voice within the patriarchal historiography of the early modern era but who nonetheless 
manage, by their very presence as ‘keepers of the unwritten and unknowable truth’ of biological legitimacy, 
to subvert the patriarchal historical record” (20, note 47). Here Snyder and Curren-Aquino cite Phyllis 
Rackin, Stages of History: Shakespeare’s English Chronicles (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1990), 146. Kathryn 
Schwarz, “Chastity, Militant and Married: Cavendish’s Romance, Milton’s Masque,” PMLA 118 (2003): 
270–85, incisively describes the fraught relation between patriarchy and chastity: “chastity...is not a 
straightforward mechanism of hierarchical imposition by a complicated and always potentially contested 
interplay of constraint and will. We have come to recognize that dependence on well-governed female 
sexuality poses a threat to patriarchal structures, revealing need in the light of utility. As a social 
imperative, chastity mobilizes the response to that need, investing women with the power to provide 
guarantees” (270). See also Schalkwyk, who puts this problem in terms of the play: “patriarchy in The 
Winter’s Tale is predicated upon a paradox: its greatest need is at the same time the source of its deepest 
fears and insecurity. Nothing but a woman’s word can justify the legitimacy of its bloodline. The whole 
action of the play springs from that paradox” (“‘A Lady’s “Verily” Is Potent as a Lord’s’,” 269). In using 
the language of “contract” for patriarchy, I follow Patricia Parker, “Temporal Gestation, Legal Contracts, 
and the Promissory Economics of The Winter’s Tale,” in Women, Property, and the Letters of the Law in 
Early Modern England, eds. Nancy E. Wright, Margaret W. Ferguson, and A. R. Buck (Toronto: U of 
Toronto P, 2004), 25–49, who has shown that The Winter’s Tale attaches contractual language—
“commercial and legal terms”—onto a “trajectory of forbearance and the gestational passage of ‘Time’” 
that “invoke[s] the temporal gap between ‘promise’ and ‘performance’.” She calls this “the promissory 
economy of the play” (26–27). 
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give Leontes her “commission” when it is his turn to visit Polixenes “To let him there a 
month behind the gest / Prefixed for’s parting” (40–42). If patriarchy entails bonds 
between men producing “gallant” male children that ensure the replication of male power 
in states made stable by such bonds and assurances, the play gives us a picture perfect 
example of that system. Leontes and Polixenes have exactly what a patriarch might desire: 
both have sons who promise stabilizing primogeniture, and the bond between the men 
represents “loving embassies” between states. If, moreover, patriarchy needs women to 
willingly participate, to make of themselves obedient vessels facilitating male exchanges 
of power, Hermione enthusiastically gives herself to such a project. Leontes tells her she 
“never spok’st / To better purpose” when she convinces Polixenes to stay longer, and she 
insists that such speaking springs from an original capitulation to the will of her husband: 
My last good deed was to entreat his stay. 
What was my first? It has an elder sister, 
Or I mistake you— (87–98) 
 
Leontes admits that it was when she agreed to marry him, when “didst thou utter, / ‘I am 
yours for ever’” (103–104). The claim here, that Hermione’s speech act convincing 
Polixenes to stay is the “elder sister” of that with which she married Leontes, 
immediately precedes the King’s precipitous turn into jealousy. Leontes famously 
completes the easy meter of Hermione’s summary of her own speech acts, “The one for 
ever earned a royal husband, / Th’other, for some while a friend,” with the hypermetric 
spondees, “Too hot, too hot!” (106–107).  
Leontes does not object here to a situation that disables the homosocial fantasy of 
exchange between men, but to one that that enables it too seamlessly. Hermione does 
exactly what she is asked to do: prompted by a desire to obey her husband, she speaks on 
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behalf of the friendship between the two men. Yet as soon as she does this, echoing the 
marriage vow, she lays bare for Leontes the proximity between heterosexual union and 
homosocial bonding upon which the male parthenogenesis fantasy relies. “To mingle 
friendship far is mingling bloods,” Leontes claims; there is “no bourn ‘twixt his and 
mine” (108, 133). He cannot accept the exposure of his own fantasy, which has already 
mingled friendship with “bloods”—with the imagined procreative union between men, 
“his and mine.” Hermione’s speaking, in effect, subverts rather than reinforces patriarchy 
precisely by exposing and enacting its enabling terms. Leontes responds to this exposure 
by rejecting both Hermione and Polixenes. Hermione having made transparent for him 
the way in which the social system that ensures his own power and even state power (so 
far as the relations between Sicilia and Bohemia are concerned) depends on bodies in 
such intimate proximity to his, even “mingling” with his own, he begins to understand 
those bodies as cancerous, as an infectious threat to his autonomy and authenticity. 
Leontes now seems to understand this system as a materialization of the phantasmatic: 
“Affection,” he claims, “communicat’st with dreams”; desire is “coactive” with “what’s 
unreal” and “fellow’st nothing” (137–41). Whether he understands this “affection” as his 
own or that of others (the text is ambiguous), he makes clear that the phanasmatic has, 
however improbably, conjoined with the material world to produce an “infection” (144). 
Leontes’ world protectively narrows. No will, no body but his own is now trustworthy. 
This very reliance on an errant will insisting on its own autonomous judgment at the 
expense of others earns Leontes the name of “tyrant” in the following act.  
This early in the play, Leontes loses faith in patriarchy’s conditions of possibility: 
he loses the ability to believe that a system in which female bodies and voices authorize 
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homosocial exchange can work. The version of patriarchy with which Leontes is 
presented, perhaps because suspiciously perfect, begins to appear perverse. For such a 
system to work, men in power must hear and believe the women they invest with the 
power to guarantee legitimacy. But for Leontes, if the system is not to be trusted, neither 
are the women who authorize it; women “will say anything” (1.2.130). The play will 
insist that “tyranny” is on offer when men in power cease to believe women. Leontes 
raises the threat of tyranny himself in responding to the perceived threat of his wife’s 
speech: he reasserts the mastery he understands to be compromised, resorting to a royal 
“prerogative” that does not rely on counsel or law but solely his own opinion—a 
mistaken belief that he takes for knowledge (2.1.163). In fact, Leontes has an 
overabundance of good counsel. Camillo, Antigonus, Paulina, and Hermione all launch 
well-crafted arguments against him, all of which rely on belief. As Camillo frankly says, 
“I cannot / Believe this crack to be in my dread mistress” (1.2.318–19). He understands 
that Leontes bases his actions on “diseased opinion” (1.2.294). In another defense of 
Hermione, Antigonus puts the problem most clearly: to doubt Hermione is to refuse to 
believe women in general and thus annul the patriarchal contract. If Hermione is false, 
every “woman in the world…is false.” To disbelieve women, for Antigonus, is 
tantamount to castration. “I had rather glib myself,” he tells Leontes, “then they should 
not produce fair issue” (2.1.149–50). Yet at this point in the play Leontes has moved 
from belief to knowledge. His opinion has become certainty: “Alack for lesser 
knowledge!” he laments (2.1.38). Clinging to his absolutist position, he ignores counsel 
and assures himself that the divine word of Apollo will endorse what he knows already. 
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Tyrants Chastised 
Paulina’s words, however, anticipate those of the oracle, who will call Leontes a 
“jealous tyrant” in the next act (3.2.131). Approaching Leontes with Hermione’s baby, 
Paulina asks the lords, “Fear you his tyrannous passion more, alas, / Than the Queen’s 
life? A gracious, innocent soul / More free than he is jealous!” (2.3.27–30). Directly 
confronting Leontes, she calls him “unworthy and unnatural,” but she’s just warming up: 
   …I’ll not call you tyrant; 
But this most cruel usage of your queen, 
Not able to produce more accusation  
Than your own weak-hinged fancy, something savours  
Of tyranny, and will ignoble make you, 
Yea, scandalous to the world. (2.3.112–20) 
 
Paulina predicts a future of scandal. She presents Leontes with the vision similar to the 
one Tarquin has as he makes his way toward his victim in The Rape of Lucrece. “Yea, 
though I die,” Tarquin says, “the scandal will survive”:  
…my posterity, shamed with the note,  
Shall curse my bones, and hold it for no sin  
To wish that I their father had not been.24  
 
Tarquin imagines the consequences of his anticipated rape of Lucrece here in words 
similar to those of Leontes in the face of his wife’s imagined adultery. “Contempt and 
clamour,” Leontes predicts, “will be my knell.” Insisting that Leontes’ own “tyranny” 
and not his wife’s adultery is that which will make him “scandalous to the world,” 
Paulina makes the connection between the poem and the play explicit: tyranny, evidenced 
by the mistreatment of women, threatens patriarchal futurity just as certainly as 
unchastity does. Indeed, both the poem and the play intertwine tyranny and chastity. In 
The Rape of Lucrece and in complaint poetry more generally, it is not only the sexual 
                                                 
24 The Rape of Lucrece in William Shakespeare: The Complete Works, Second Edition, eds. Stanley Wells 
and Gary Taylor (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), lines 204–10. 
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waywardness of women—whether imagined, chosen, or forced—that promises to void 
the patriarchal contract, it is equally the tyranny of the men who torment them. 
Tyrannical behavior itself becomes a form of unchastity that promises to yield, in 
Leontes’ words once he realizes his mistake, “shame perpetual” (3.2.235).25 
The voice of the god Apollo pronounces its judgment upon Leontes: he is a 
“jealous tyrant.” Taking a cue from David Schalkwyck’s analysis, we might say that 
Apollo is the embodiment of the male Word par excellence, the transcendental signifier. 
But even this divine pronouncement does not convince Leontes of his error. The King 
claims that the oracle is false. Leontes must witness the collapse of the patriarchal 
project—Mamillius and Hermione must “die,” and Perdita must be “lost,” cutting off all 
possibility for patriarchal futurity—before he can give up his absolutist stance. Paulina 
now directly calls Leontes a “tyrant” (3.2.172), accusing him of a “tyranny” (176) 
marked by foolishness, weakness, and inconstancy. For Leontes to be reformed, the 
voices of women, having been repressed (lost, imprisoned, dead) must return. In 
mediating the accusation of the absent women, Paulina “canst not speak too much” 
(3.2.212). Patriarchy, having crossed the line into tyranny by practicing the exclusions 
toward which it has always tended, must be haunted by the very absences it has forced. It 
                                                 
25 The discourses of chastity and tyranny are inextricably interlaced in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. In the preface of the era’s most famous polemic against tyranny, the Vindiciae, Contra Tyrannos: 
or, concerning the legitimate power of a prince over the people, and of the people over a prince, ed. and 
trans. George Garnett (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994), the author presents us with a vision of proper 
governance in gendered terms: “…we will bear in mind this old and, to be sure, perfect image of the 
governance of kingdoms, as a legitimate, chaste, and blameless matron without any excessive adornment; 
in its place these Machiavellians do not hesitate to present us with an illegitimate, painted, lewd, and 
wanton harlot” (8). The contraries here couple the question of legitimacy with disciplinary descriptions of 
women’s behavior all too familiar in the early modern period: chaste/wanton, matron/harlot, 
blameless/lewd, unadorned/painted. In order for the kingdom to be “passed on from hand to hand,” kings 
must possess a “royal virtue” that preserves chaste governance. The Vindiciae thus dedicates itself to 
providing a “perpetual remedy…for posterity” (9).  
 188 
   
must listen to the ghostly voices it has created. The only way to hear such an absence is 
in a mediated form. 
 In presenting Leontes with the vision of Hermione as a “sainted spirit” who would 
“again possess her corpse” to “shriek” at him, Paulina takes upon herself the task of 
translating the voice and will of the dead—the same task assumed by the mediating poet 
in ghost complaint. Ghost complaints feature a poet-persona who self-consciously 
facilitates the return of the wronged woman. In Jane Shore’s complaint, Thomas 
Middleton gives Jane an invocation to her own poem in which she claims to “sodaynly 
appeale and appeare” to her author, who has “experience…in defending of womens 
honour.”26 The poet hears her appeal agrees to pen her story. Samuel Daniel’s The 
Complaint of Rosamond begins with Rosamond’s lamentation, “Ovt from the horror of 
infernall deepes, / My poore afflicted ghost comes heere to plaine it” (1–2). She soon 
turns to the poet to plead with him to retell her tale. 
No Muse suggests the pittie of my case, 
Each penne dooth ouerpasse my iust complaint,  
Whilst others are preferd, though farre more base: 
Shores wife is grac’d, and passes for a Saint; 
Her Legend iustifies her foule attaint; 
     Her well-told tale did such compassion finde, 
     That she is pass’d, and I am left behinde. (22–28) 
 
The the poet is “forthwith mou’d with a tender care” by the fate of the spectral 
Rosamond: “What she desir’d, my Muse deygn’d to declare.” He deems “her 
griefes…worthy to be knowne,” agrees to become a conduit for her speaking, and bids 
her “boldly tell her minde” (57–62). Expanding on this pattern in which the ghost and the 
poet negotiate the terms of the poem, Thomas Middleton’s Ghost of Lucrece provides an 
                                                 
26 This invocation appears in the 1587 and subsequent editions of Mirror for Magistrates, 372. 
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elaborate Latin invocation in which the poet summons Lucrece from the underworld and 
dedicates himself to her lamenting ghost: 
Castissimo, purissimoque Lucretiae Spiritui; Thomas Medius  
et Gravis Tonus primum Surge vociferat  
Tu castitatis imago,  
Surgito! (20–23)  
To the most chaste and pure Ghost of Lucrece: Thomas, in a moderate and 
weighty voice, cries out the first ‘Arise’. O thou, the image of chastity, 
arise!27 
 
She rises, asking  
…what wind, what storm 
Blew my dissevered limbs into this form 
And from the Virgin-Paradise of death  
Conjures my ghost with poetizing breath? (62–65). 
 
After a negotiation of the terms within which the poet reassembles her and gives her 
voice, Lucrece proceeds to tell her story of rape and tyranny. In ghost complaints such as 
these, the ghost must strike a bargain with the poet. By virtue of channelling a lamenting 
woman, the poet is himself feminized. Something of a gendered contest is nevertheless 
implicit in these poems between the poet’s masculine endeavor and the female ghost’s 
complaint against patriarchal systems. As Wendy Wall notes in discussing Middleton’s 
Lucrece, the ventriloquism of a ghost featuring “the vivid narration of the loss of 
chastity…constructs a pattern whereby the writer establishes an identification with and a 
renunciation of femininity.”28 The writer triumphs because he gets credit for the poem. 
As Jane Shore admits in her invocation and appeal to her poet:  
hee shall not only haue the fame of his owne worke (which no man can 
deny) but shall likewise haue all the glory I can gieue him, if hee lend mee 
the hearing of my woefull tale, a matter scarce fit for womans 
shamefastnes to bewray. (372)  
                                                 
27 The translation is G. B. Shand’s from his edition in Thomas Middleton: The Collected Works. 
28 Wendy Wall, The Imprint of Gender: Authorship and Publication in the English Renaissance (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1993), 272. 
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However challenged normative gender roles are in ghost complaint, Shakespeare’s move 
in The Winter’s Tale to give the role of ghost mediator to Paulina instead of a poet with 
his own masculinized agenda would seem a welcome improvement. 
 Unlike the ambiguously feminized poets who mediate ghosts in the complaint 
poems, Paulina is unambiguously feminine. Along with the role of spokesperson for the 
absent Hermione and lost Perdita, in fact, she takes up a key gendered commonplace of 
the rhetoric of tyranny. As Rebecca Bushnell has shown, in the early modern period 
tyranny is often accompanied by the figures of the shrewish woman and the effeminate 
man. Proper patriarchy is figured in terms of patriarchal gender roles, and tyranny 
reverses those roles in carnavalesque fashion.29 In Bushnell’s words, “in that the family 
was…seen as a symbol of the state and as its essential building block, the shrew’s 
‘mannish’ authority and her husband’s submission to her served as a model of tyranny, 
the opposite of legitimate sovereignty” (69). The Winter’s Tale adopts this inversion 
model after Leontes breaks his family through tyranny. A parody of the tyrannical family, 
even if they are not married to each other, Leontes becomes the male milquetoast to 
Paulina’s shrew. Paulina scandalizes the royal advisors when she accuses the King of 
having “killed” Hermione (5.1.15). Leontes submits to her chastisement:  
Good Paulina, 
Who has the memory of Hermione, 
I know, in honour, O that ever I  
Had squared me to thy counsel! (49–52) 
 
                                                 
29 As the Vindiciae demonstrates, proper marital relations model royal virtue. Under the heading of “what 
the purpose of kings is,” the Vindiciae cites Augustine, who links properly governed families and states: 
“those who are concerned for the welfare of others are said to command, as a man does his wife and parents 
do children….” (92, citing Augustine, De Civitate Dei, xix, xv). When a king exercises proper authority 
(what Augustine in Vindiciae’s citation calls“compassion in providing”) over the state, normative (i.e. 
patriarchal) gender roles are imagined to remain secure and a “legitimate” state can be “passed on,” 
enabling patriarchal futurity. 
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Playing the scold to the sorrowfully obedient King, Paulina fulfills the role that tyrannous 
sovereignty provides for her, the “audacious lady” and “Dame Partlet” that Leontes has 
already accused her of becoming (2.3.48, 75).  
Staging an elaborate haunting, Paulina “physics” patriarchy by sanctifying 
Hermione; she works to make Hermione a “sainted spirit” in Leontes’ eyes (5.1.57). 
Much has been made of acts of sanctification in the awakening scene of The Winter’s 
Tale, which takes place in a chapel under the direction of Paulina’s white magic.30 
Sanctification is also a common motif in complaints. As I note above, Rosamond claims 
that Jane Shore was so well articulated by her poet that she now “passes for a saint.” 
Matilda, in turn, says that “Faire Rosamond” is “highly graced…and in our Sainted 
Legendarie placed” (B1v). Paulina similarly works to resignify Hermione’s death as 
martyrdom in the face of tyranny. If tyranny is to be rehabilitated—however it may be 
altered or compromised in the process—it must listen to its extrinsic voices, 
reincorporating them and expanding its self-enclosed, homosocial system to once again 
include them. This has little to do with truth or knowledge and much to do with “faith.” 
Paulina (in at least one critical narrative) lies when she claims that Hermione is dead. 
Whether she tells the truth or lies, however, the fact that Leontes believes her is the first 
step in reinstalling belief into a system of knowledge that has attempted to exclude it. If 
tyranny relies on knowledge and judgment alone, untempered by mercy, patriarchy 
depends on the way compassion and belief inform knowledge. This gives fuller 
resonance to those famous words near the end of the play just before Paulina reawakens 
Hermione, “It is required / You do awake your faith” (5.3.94–95).   
 
                                                 
30 Paulina: “Either forbear / Quit presently the chapel, or resolve you / For more amazement” (5.3.85–7) 
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Reconsidering Complaint and The Winter’s Tale 
My approach here was initially suggested by the fact that the name “Hermione” 
does not occur in William Shakespeare’s source for The Winter’s Tale, Robert Greene’s 
Pandosto. Scholars have most often explained the choice of the name in light of its 
etymological association with “Hermes,” pointing to the messenger god of that name and 
to the derived word, “herm” or “herma,” which can mean “statue.”31 This etymological 
association seems entirely persuasive, which perhaps explains why an alternative 
explanation has gone unexplored. More than forty years ago E. E. Duncan-Jones 
suggested that the name “Hermione” would have been best known to Shakespeare and his 
contemporaries as one of the complaining women from Ovid’s Heroides. Shakespeare’s 
Hermione would have been associated with her namesake, the daughter of Helen and 
Menelaus. Duncan-Jones notes a strong resemblance between Ovid’s poem and 
Shakespeare’s play: each involves “a mother’s adultery, a daughter’s motherless 
childhood and a reunion between mother and daughter after a separation of many 
years.”32 The connection between Ovid’s Hermione and Shakespeare’s is, in fact, even 
stronger than Duncan-Jones suggests. Ovid’s lament begins with Hermione accusing 
Pyrrus of tyranny: “Pyrrus…inclusam contra iusque piumque tenet” [holds me in durance 
against every law of earth and heaven].33 Hermione pleads with her husband Orestes to 
come to her rescue: “Husband, I entreat, succour your wife” (29). The lament for unjust 
imprisonment and plea for a husband’s proper behavior towards his wife might well 
suggest to us the plight of Shakespeare’s Hermione.  
                                                 
31 E.g. Julia Gasper and Carolyn Williams, “The Meaning of the Name ‘Hermione’,” Notes and Queries 33 
(1986): 367.  
32 E. E. Duncan-Jones, “Hermione in Ovid and Shakespeare,” Notes and Queries 13 (1966): 138–39, 139. 
33 Ovid, “Hermione Orestae,” in Heroides, transl. Grant Showerman and G. P. Goold (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard UP, 1977), 8:3–4. 
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Shakespeare was, as we know, familiar with Ovid’s Heroides. It was a favorite 
text in the grammar school curriculum, and it was readily available to early modern 
readers both in Latin and in a popular English translation by George Turberville. 
Complaint poetry inspired by the Heroides and the Mirror for Magistrates, though 
perhaps not as visible as it might be in current criticism, occupied a prominent place in 
Shakespeare’s literary landscape. Some of the foremost poets of the era tried their hands 
at the form, including Edmund Spenser, Samuel Daniel, Michael Drayton, Thomas 
Middleton, and Shakespeare himself (depending on whether or not we believe he wrote A 
Lover’s Complaint or on how we categorize The Rape of Lucrece). Given all this, the 
notion that the name “Hermione” might have signalled a connection between complaint 
poetry and The Winter’s Tale seems probable. 
We cannot know with certainty, of course, what Shakespeare had in mind in 
choosing the name “Hermione” or what that signifier may have recalled for audiences. At 
stake here, however, is less an absolute determination of what Shakespeare or his 
audiences knew than how we contextualize the play. The popularity of complaint poetry 
and its importance for Elizabethan and Jacobean literature has not traditionally drawn a 
great deal of scholarly comment, yet complaints have happily begun to enjoy renewed 
critical attention in the last few decades, owing in large part to John Kerrigan’s work in 
Motives of Woe (1991).34 Reevaluations of A Lover’s Complaint, for instance, have 
increased our understanding of the popularity and centrality of complaint literature for 
                                                 
34 Yet Catherine Bates, Masculinity, Gender and Identity in the English Renaissance Lyric (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), sounds a cautionary note. She argues that we have yet to fully examine 
and question the way in which female complaint poetry has been “ignored, overlooked, blanked out, one 
could almost say institutionally suppressed by the authorities and guardians of the canon, in spite of the fact 
that, endemic and universal, the literature of female abandonment has existed since poetry began and has 
crossed centuries, continents, and cultures” (181). 
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Shakespeare’s era.35 This promises to build new bridges across the generic divide 
between the era’s poetry and dramatic works.36 This essay adds to our critical 
conversation by unpacking a connection between the spectral dynamics of 1590s female 
complaint and The Winter’s Tale. As I have argued, Shakespeare’s play addresses 
precisely the same problems as late Elizabethan complaint does, and in closely related 
terms. Shakespeare’s play, like female complaint poetry inspired by the Heroides and the 
Mirror, shows us the fragility of the patriarchal contract between men in power and the 
women whose bodies are supposed to guarantee pure patriarchal lineage. Both complaint 
poems and the play show us that contract broken; both imagine functional patriarchy 
degraded into dysfunctional tyranny. Most importantly, many of these poems—such as 
The Complaint of Rosamond, Matilda, The Complaint of Elstred, and The Ghost of 
Lucrece—imagine the haunting return of their female protagonists from the dead. Such 
hauntings, like the one Paulina facilitates in The Winter’s Tale, serve to chastise tyrants, 
“sanctify” women, and thus to critique the treatment of women under patriarchal rule. 
Reading The Winter’s Tale in light of literary complaints elaborates both the terms of 
patriarchy’s crisis in the face of tyranny and that which becomes necessary to piece back 
together a more inclusive system of governance. 
 
                                                 
35 See, for instance, Critical Essays on Shakespeare’s A Lover’s Complaint: Suffering Ecstasy, ed. Shirley 
Sharon-Zisser (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2006). Another sign of complaint literature’s critical revival, 
the journal Renaissance Studies recently devoted an issue (volume 22, issue 3, 2008, edited by Susan 
Wiseman) to the early modern reception of Ovid’s Heroides.  
36 See Heather Dubrow’s contribution to Critical Essays on Shakespeare’s A Lover’s Complaint, “‘He had 
the dialect and different skill’: Authorizers in Henry V, A Lover’s Complaint, and Othello,” 121–34. 
Dubrow’s essay, in her words, “yet again demonstrates the interactive connections among [Shakespeare’s] 
dramatic and non-dramatic texts” (133). I take it as equally salutary to draw “interactive connections” 
among Shakespeare’s dramatic works and poems by others with which Shakespeare was nevertheless 
deeply engaged.   
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